
🇮🇹Aero engineer / ORBAT & OSINT nerd Research on @warunitobserver Prog music enthusiast / drummer IG for slightly unserious posting below:
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For those who missed it, our latest weekly talk is available on all our platforms.
We were delighted to welcome Rob Lee (@RALee85), Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and former Marine infantry officer, to discuss the 🇷🇺Russian perspective on the K#ll Zone.
The conversation also featured Erlend (@edrotning), Joseph (@JThomason88), Stanimir (@delfoo) and Sirdo (@sirdo_)
🔗Listen here:
YouTube: youtube.com/watch?v=31GLq0pG…
Spotify: open.spotify.com/episode/5Lk…
Apple Podcasts: podcasts.apple.com/no/podcas…
As was discussed during Sunday's @tochnyi stream, the use of armor and mechanized elements in Vivaldi was very limited.
Most of the fighting was conducted by dismounted infantry/recon elements going after dispersed 🇷🇺 groups (usually between 5-10 people, based on footage)
"During Operation Vivaldi, units of the 3rd Army Corps successfully used armored vehicles twice to conduct mechanized assaults behind Russian lines...
According to Biletskyi, armored vehicles can no longer serve as a conventional reserve rapidly deployed after an enemy breakthrough.
'Today, the use of armored vehicles is effectively a special operation. It requires extremely detailed planning and the coordination of a huge number of assets,' he explained...
The first mechanized assault helped Ukrainian forces partially encircle the settlement of Nove.
During the second assault, Ukrainian armored vehicles advanced about 4.5 km behind Russian lines and deployed infantry in the rear of Russian units. The Ukrainian troops then attacked wooded areas where Russian drone operators were stationed.
According to Biletskyi, losing these positions deprived Russian forces of some reconnaissance capabilities and FPV drones, allowing Ukrainian units to keep advancing.
The deployed Ukrainian infantry operated virtually surrounded for several days while continuing to destroy Russian drone operators’ positions. Biletskyi said he believes the raid contributed to the subsequent collapse of a significant section of Russian defenses."
militarnyi.com/en/news/ukrai…
As major battles unfold in Donbas, @WarUnitObserver examines the restructuring and reinforcement of what are often called the “fortress cities.”
Focusing on developments since summer 2026, the thread examines Ukrainian forces' movements 🇺🇦 across the region.
Read the thread below ⬇️
🇺🇦Ukrainian reinforcements deploy to the “fortress cities”
As the final battles for Donbas seem to be looming on the horizon, the new 🇺🇦command team led by Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi might be drastically restructuring the frontline in the region.
Following Syrskyi’s replacement in the summer, a decision was made to split the area of operations in Donetsk oblast between two new force groupings:
🔵 UV Center, under Brig. Gen. Biletskyi, in charge of the sector between Borova (Kharkiv oblast) and Druzhkivka
🔵UV Azov, under Brig. Gen. Prokopenko, in charge of the sector between Druzhkivka and Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast)
The defense of Donbas, and more specifically of its fortress belt, now rests on these two command bodies.
UV Center is entrusted with the larger cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, while UV Azov guards its right flank on the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axis of advance.
The crucial importance this sector holds was highlighted in August 2025, when Russian forces attempted to break through northeast of Dobropillya.
Their maximalist objective was the city of Barvinkove, a key logistical hub for the defense of the fortress cities.
The Main Supply Routes (MSRs) connecting Dnipro to Kramatorsk, Slovyansk and Izyum all pass through Barvinkove.
For the Ukrainians, the loss of Barvinkove would put the fortress belt at risk of encirclement.
For the Russians, occupying the fortress belt would complete the capture of Donbas.
sirdo retweeted
🇺🇦Ukrainian reinforcements deploy to the “fortress cities”
As the final battles for Donbas seem to be looming on the horizon, the new 🇺🇦command team led by Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi might be drastically restructuring the frontline in the region.
Following Syrskyi’s replacement in the summer, a decision was made to split the area of operations in Donetsk oblast between two new force groupings:
🔵 UV Center, under Brig. Gen. Biletskyi, in charge of the sector between Borova (Kharkiv oblast) and Druzhkivka
🔵UV Azov, under Brig. Gen. Prokopenko, in charge of the sector between Druzhkivka and Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast)
The defense of Donbas, and more specifically of its fortress belt, now rests on these two command bodies.
UV Center is entrusted with the larger cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, while UV Azov guards its right flank on the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axis of advance.
The crucial importance this sector holds was highlighted in August 2025, when Russian forces attempted to break through northeast of Dobropillya.
Their maximalist objective was the city of Barvinkove, a key logistical hub for the defense of the fortress cities.
The Main Supply Routes (MSRs) connecting Dnipro to Kramatorsk, Slovyansk and Izyum all pass through Barvinkove.
For the Ukrainians, the loss of Barvinkove would put the fortress belt at risk of encirclement.
For the Russians, occupying the fortress belt would complete the capture of Donbas.
sirdo retweeted
2/x
Initially I was skeptic whether #ICEYEX36 really was an intentional target: but a series of manoeuvers by #Kosmos2612 starting on Sept 30, were clearly designed to bring the two objects very close and synchronise their orbital periods, orbital altitude and eccentricity:
sirdo retweeted
Today, Russia killed dozens of innocent, unarmed civilians in Kramatorsk by bombing buses full of people. Yet atrocities like this have become so normalized that they barely make waves in the news anymore. People have grown accustomed to them. There is little outrage, barely any reaction. Most will simply shrug it off as “just another day in Ukraine.”
I’m not going to appeal to the West or the “international community” here. At this point, I doubt it would convince anyone of anything.
What worries me isn’t even the long-term demographic and economic catastrophe that will affect both Ukraine and Russia for decades, perhaps even a century. What worries me far more is that this relentless terror against Ukraine will give rise to the ugliest kind of national resentment. A deep sense of injustice, a burning need to settle scores, to somehow restore fairness.
History is full of examples, and I won’t go into them here. After all, it’s easy to tell people to “just move on and look to the future.” But to someone carrying the pain of losing a loved ones with all they knew and worked for burned to the ground, that advice makes about as much sense as telling a homeless person to “just buy a house.”
This is where some of the ugliest forms of radicalisms and all the other dangerous “isms” take root. Resentment emerges as the dark twin of hope, born when it feels as though nothing remains but despair.
This war has already lasted longer than World War I, and the trauma it leaves behind will shape both current and future generations, and certainly not for the better.
The echoes of this war will be felt across the world long after the fighting ends. And part of that legacy will be the fact that, at some point, the world simply grew “tired” of resisting an axis of dictatorial regimes waging war in Europe.
sirdo retweeted
🇺🇦Ukrainian Groupings and Corps sectors - a basic guide
This thread is an introduction to 🇺🇦Ukrainian “Force Groupings” and Corps deployments as of late summer 2026.
We have noticed several misconceptions on the topic, shared by analysts and the “broader public” alike.
Our information is exclusively based on open sources and observation of publicly available data.
❗️Before we begin, a fundamental notion must be clear: at the moment, the corps headquarters and their organic brigades should be treated separately.
With a few exceptions, most corps do not have all their brigades in their assigned sector (and many brigades are subordinated to corps they do not organically belong to).
🎙️ Tochnyi Weekly
Ukraine-Korea Diplomatic Crisis
▶️ Erlend ( @eDrotning )
▶️ Joseph ( @JThomason88 )
▶️ Stanimir ( @delfoo )
▶️ Colby Badhwar ( @ColbyBadhwar )
Sun 20:00 Berlin | 21:00 Kyiv | 14:00 New York
⬇️ Link in next tweet
sirdo retweeted
ITALY: HOW RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AND "THE RUSSIA IS NOT MY ENEMY" CAMPAIGN CROSSES THE POLITICAL DIVIDE
1/10
I started looking at the Italian accounts participating in the current "Russia is not my enemy" wave.
There are a lot of them.
But counting accounts isn't particularly useful. There are endless numbers of accounts willing to repeat political slogans.
The more interesting question is:
• What sits behind them?
• Where did the narrative come from?
• Who has promoted it before?
• Which networks move it?
• Which political communities pick it up?
• And what happens to the message once it becomes "Italian"?
Italy turns out to be an unusually useful case because this campaign did not suddenly appear on X in September 2026.
There is an older Italian infrastructure behind it - involving physical poster campaigns, pro-Kremlin organisations, Russian state media, alternative-media networks and political communities on both sides of Italy's conventional left/right divide.
This thread follows that network.
Not every participant is a bot.
Not every participant is controlled by Russia.
In fact, that is precisely the point.
The most effective influence operation is the one that eventually persuades real people to spread the message themselves.
🧵| European rearmament is generating strong political rhetoric. But how do the spending commitments compare with the numbers—and with the funding actually being delivered?
A closer look at NATO’s targets, European budget choices and Russia’s spending plans.
1/7⬇️
sirdo retweeted
I haven’t seen the plan described in this article (although I want to) but I feel confident about its content and what’s next. Russian strategy has discussed for 10+ years what we are seeing now as strikes. A 🧵 on the calculated cruelty in the strategy:
nytimes.com/2026/10/02/world…
sirdo retweeted
Against the backdrop of putin’s statement, I’ll turn his own logic back on him.
russia will inevitably lose this war.
Ukraine was once subjected to both the russian empire and the Soviet Union - states that were far larger than modern russia in terms of territory, population, economic capacity, and military power in their respective eras. Their control over Ukraine ultimately proved temporary. The outcome was an independent Ukrainian state.
Today, Ukraine has the greatest military potential in its modern history, and that potential continues to grow.
Every tyranny has an expiration date. After wars of aggression, aggressor states face the consequences: economic losses, reparation claims, international isolation, political responsibility, and the moral burden of decisions made by the previous regime. The price of war does not disappear with the people who started it.
So, if we follow putin’s own logic, the question is this: if russia’s strategic defeat is inevitable, does it make sense for russians to keep fighting this war and multiplying their own losses?
russia may yet pay a far higher price for this war than it is paying today. A scenario of severe internal destabilization, or even the breakup of russia itself, is entirely possible. And a day may come when a politician from a much smaller country speaks regretfully about the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” - the collapse of russia - just as putin spent decades speaking about the collapse of the Soviet Union.
There is little point in asking putin this question personally anymore. After the russian leadership declared Sviatohirsk captured, while the commander of Ukraine’s Third Army Corps was recording a video from the center of the city, Operation Vivaldi once again showed the gap between reports moving up the russian chain of command and the actual situation on the battlefield.
The russian political and military leadership, however, knows the real situation far better.
So instead of asking them a question, I’ll give them some advice: for those who already understand how this ends, this may be the last good moment to start cooperating with Ukraine’s intelligence and security services - and to buy a ticket for a train that is already leaving the station.
sirdo retweeted
Хотів трохи поділитися зі своїми україномовними підписниками думками, актуальними для України й навіяними як моїми подорожами до Африки, так і робочими перетинами з цим континентом.
Почну здалеку. Окрім добре відомого геноциду проти тутсі в Руанді 1994 року, на початку 2000-х був ще один масовий геноцид у Дарфурі (регіон у Судані). Не дивлячись на сотні тисяч жертв тоді, у квітні 2023 року в Судані спалахнула нова війна між Збройними силами військової диктатури та парамілітарними Силами швидкого реагування - RSF.
У жовтні 2025 року, після приблизно 18 місяців облоги, RSF захопили Ель-Фашер, останній великий опорний пункт урядових сил у Дарфурі. Захоплення міста супроводжувалося масовими стратами, вбивствами цивільних, зокрема тих, хто намагався втекти, сексуальним насильством та іншими звірствами. Лише ООН задокументувала понад 6 тисяч убивств лише за перші три дні наступу й наголосила, що реальна кількість загиблих є значно вищою.
Якщо ви дочитали до цього місця, то, можливо, подумали: а до чого тут Україна?
Саме тут, як на мене, і є важлива паралель. Багато людей в світі про події в Ель-Фашері або взагалі не чули, або сприйняли їх як чергову далеку трагедію, яка майже не впливає на їхнє повсякденне життя. Для значної частини світу Україна теж може виглядати подібним чином: десь триває війна, десь гинуть люди, про це час від часу говорять у новинах, але за межами регіону життя переважно продовжується.
Це, звісно, не означає, що стратегічне значення цих війн однакове. Від результату війни в Україні значною мірою залежить майбутня архітектура безпеки в Європі, а отже, її наслідки виходять далеко за межі самої України.
Але стратегічна важливість події й те, наскільки сильно вона емоційно зачіпає пересічну людину в іншій частині світу, це різні речі.
Із цього для мене випливає доволі неприємний висновок. Не знаю, чи залишилися в Україні ілюзії щодо цього, але остаточною опорою для українців залишаємося ми самі. Міжнародна підтримка може бути критично важливою, але жодна міжнародна організація чи іноземна держава не має механізму, який автоматично гарантує порятунок країни лише тому, що вона стала жертвою агресії.
Судан це лише яскравий приклад. RSF роками фінансувалися, зокрема, через видобуток і торгівлю золото в обмін на підтримку з боку ОАЕ. І навіть коли масштаби злочинів стали очевидними й добре задокументованими, міжнародна реакція не змогла їх зупинити, і в цілому взагалі ніяк не вплинула на це
Це цинічна, але важлива річ, яку варто усвідомлювати. Статус «жертви» сам по собі не гарантує порятунку, так само як статус окупованої країни, де відбуваються масові злочини, не гарантує реакції міжнародної спільноти, що виходитиме за межі заяв про стурбованість.
У нас є важливі партнери, з якими сьогодні збігаються інтереси, але вони не безумовні союзники, готові за будь-яких обставин діяти замість нас.
Зрештою, саме тому головною опорою України все одно залишаються її власний народ та внутрішня згуртованість.
📢 #Announcement | Tochnyi is now on LinkedIn!
Alongside X and Bluesky, we’re expanding our social media presence to LinkedIn. Follow us for our latest analysis and updates on the war in Ukraine.
Instagram is coming soon!
Russian brigades continue expanding into Divisions (at least on paper).
4th MRB is one of the main units attacking Kostyantynivka, so this could have important consequences for the frontline.
ru infiltrations in dobropillia/druzhkivka look quite worrying as they spend all the Center GOF reserves to push here (41CAA +90GTD), but remember 1st azov corps got significant reinforcements in terms of X-number of skala battalions and hold 15th NGU in reserve
the coming weeks and months will then show if and where ru managed to consolidate
Dobropillia 🇷🇺 ORBAT - Summer 2026
Similar to last year, Russia has significantly reinforced the Dobropillia direction, seeking to capture the town itself while simultaneously developing the southeastern approach toward Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk.
To that end, the “Center” Grouping of Forces redeployed most of the 41st Army and elements of the 90th Guards Tank Division to reinforce existing forces in the area, including the 51st Army, 8th Army, and elements of the Naval Infantry.
This change in disposition allows the 51st Army to refocus its efforts northwest toward Dobropillia, while the 41st and 8th Armies push north, attempting to maintain this offensive pressure from summer into the fall.
sirdo retweeted
Hello everyone. Today I’m starting another fundraiser to get engineering equipment to Ukraine, and I’m asking for your help by sharing, donating, and liking this post. Even if you can’t donate, sharing it genuinely makes a difference.
Plase watch the video with their CV90 Crew explaining the importance of this equipment.
The donation link is in the comments below.
A good friend of mine from the 21st Mechanized Brigade of the UAF has been working on improving the survivability and effectiveness of the 🇸🇪 CV90 IFVs and, most importantly, the soldiers inside them.
He recently reached out to me asking for help getting engineering equipment for his brigade.
This is one of those things that doesn’t look as dramatic as drones, armored vehicles, or weapons, but it directly saves lives.
A properly dug fighting position, trench, vehicle shelter, or reinforced position can be the difference between soldiers surviving an artillery or drone attack and not coming home.
Unfortunately, because of bureaucracy and often simple neglect by higher command, excavation equipment remains critically overlooked. It is one of the most obvious low-hanging fruits on the battlefield: relatively inexpensive machinery that can save soldiers’ lives and protect multimillion-dollar equipment.
The brigade already has several excavators, but they are in critically bad condition. We are already working on getting those repaired. But even if every one of them were operational, it still wouldn’t be enough for the brigade’s needs.
Their full request is for 3 excavators, transportation for them, a crane, and pickup trucks.
The total cost would be around $240,000.
I wish I could say we can raise all of it, but with the current level of donations, I don’t think that is realistic.
So we scaled the fundraiser down to $100,000.
That will allow us to purchase 3 excavators and a truck capable of transporting them.
It is still a huge amount of money. But these machines will not sit somewhere in storage. They will be working every day, digging positions, protecting vehicles, and giving Ukrainian soldiers a better chance of surviving.
And that is why I’m asking for your help.
If you can donate, even a small amount helps.
If you can’t donate, please like and repost this post. The more people who see it, the better chance we have of reaching this goal.
Thank you to everyone who has supported our previous fundraisers and continues supporting Ukraine.
Don't mind the snow in the video, they asked for this in march, and unfortunately I couldn't fundraiser until today. But we have been working on repairing their equipment and supplying some machines since June.
Donation link is in the 1st comment below.
Based.
Lithuanian Armed Forces slides about their recently re-established 1st Division, featuring 19 thousand soldiers and the following units:
3 combat Brigades, a Heavy built around the Leopard 2A8 an CV90, a Medium built around the Boxer and a Light bulilt around the JLTV
DivArty (?) with PZH2000, Caesar 6x6 and Himars
Plus Engineer Regiment (Battalion ?), Reconnaissance, MP, Air Defense, Signals, Medical and Logistical Battalions
FOC planned for 2030
sirdo retweeted
Dobropillia 🇷🇺 ORBAT - Summer 2026
Similar to last year, Russia has significantly reinforced the Dobropillia direction, seeking to capture the town itself while simultaneously developing the southeastern approach toward Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk.
To that end, the “Center” Grouping of Forces redeployed most of the 41st Army and elements of the 90th Guards Tank Division to reinforce existing forces in the area, including the 51st Army, 8th Army, and elements of the Naval Infantry.
This change in disposition allows the 51st Army to refocus its efforts northwest toward Dobropillia, while the 41st and 8th Armies push north, attempting to maintain this offensive pressure from summer into the fall.
sirdo retweeted
Obviously, we have been tracking Ukrainian advances north of Lyman the entire time. We have tons of backdated geolocations, along with video footage, of the attacks dating back a long time. But the operation was deemed sensitive enough to be protected, similar to what happened in Kupyansk and then in south Donetsk.
However, the operation in Lyman seemed even more protected since even the most in the know and honest Russian reporters seem to be missing it. Or at least silent about it. It was honestly shocking to watch how out of the loop the Russians really were, which I think is in large part due to the collective action of OSINT to avoid speaking about the situation.





























