In this thread we will present the source lists for our other threads:

Since early September, elements of the 🇺🇦35th Marine Brigade have also begun deploying to the Slovyansk sector. However, we are not able to properly discern whether this unit has received a specific area of responsibility at the moment. The 🇺🇦18th Brigade of the National Guard, previously covering a sector north-west of Chasiv Yar with its Special Purpose Battalion “Donbas”, appears to have partially reinforced Slovyansk’s eastern flank.It was recently involved in “Search and Strike operations” (clearance of 🇷🇺-infiltrated areas) near Mykolaivka. Lastly, we must stress that given the recency of these events our information is incomplete and might require corrections in the near future. The brigades’ sectors, specifically, originate from the interpretation of potentially conflicting data and should be treated as estimates.

In early September, as Russian infiltrations intensified east of Kramatorsk, the 🇺🇦67th Mechanized Brigade was redeployed southeast of the city. It took charge of a sector stretching approximately from Malynivka in the north to Fedorivka in the south. Ever since 2023, this had been the 🇺🇦56th Motorized Brigade’s area of responsibility. It is possible that, as in the 46th’s case, the 67th Brigade has replaced the 56th. The 33rd Assault Regiment is also involved in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk sector. Rumors from Ukrainian military-affiliated channels indicate it might have been assigned to UV Center’s command, presumably as a quick reaction force for the area. More specifically, its Rifle Battalion has reinforced the 46th and 67th brigades in the area of Malynivka and Tykhonivka.

It appears that the 46th Brigade’s previous position in northern Kostyantynivka has been taken over by the 🇺🇦78th Air Assault Brigade - this unit should be relatively fresh, as it participated in the Oleksandrivka offensive during the summer but previously spent several months (mostly) in reserve. Along with the 🇺🇦210th Assault Regiment, which we previously reported on, the 78th Brigade might be acting as a relief force to support the withdrawal of other Ukrainian elements from southern Kostyantynivka. Elements of the 🇺🇦147th Artillery Brigade (7th Air Assault Corps) have also been transferred to this area following the 7th Corps’ summer rotation out of the Pokrovsk sector. Overall, it is currently assessed that Ukrainian command does not intend to withdraw out of Kostyantynivka, as it would allow Russian unmanned systems crews to fully establish themselves in the dense urban area. Rather, the constant presence of interspersed positions in the city’s ruins allows Ukrainian UAS to persistently hunt Russian infiltration elements, inflicting heavy attrition on the units involved.

Throughout the summer of 2026, Russian forces under the 🇷🇺“South” Grouping pressed on with their grinding advance on both the 🇺🇦11th and 19th Army Corps’ sectors. Most of Kostyantynivka became contested, while infiltration groups continued seeping through the chain of villages and towns east of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. By early August, Ukrainian command reacted by committing the 🇺🇦46th Airmobile Brigade to the Kostyantynivka direction. It was initially deployed northeast of the city, possibly enabling the 🇺🇦24th Brigade’s fallback from positions near Chasiv Yar by reinforcing and anchoring its right flank. However, based on the limited data available in September, we estimate that the 46th Brigade was moved north in late August, approximately facing Rai-Oleksandrivka and Yurkivka. This move indicates that the heavily depleted 🇺🇦30th Mechanized Brigade, operating in this area since 2023, has likely been withdrawn for reconstitution. Notably, in early September the 🇷🇺1194th Motorized Rifle Regiment was redeployed from Kostyantynivka to the Rai-Oleksandrivka area. This regiment is part of the 🇷🇺84th Motorized Rifle Division (ex 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade), one of the leading units in the fight for Kostyantynivka. However, it is unlikely that this was a reaction to Ukrainian redeployments.

🇺🇦Ukrainian reinforcements deploy to the “fortress cities” As the final battles for Donbas seem to be looming on the horizon, the new 🇺🇦command team led by Maj. Gen. Mykhailo Drapatyi might be drastically restructuring the frontline in the region. Following Syrskyi’s replacement in the summer, a decision was made to split the area of operations in Donetsk oblast between two new force groupings: 🔵 UV Center, under Brig. Gen. Biletskyi, in charge of the sector between Borova (Kharkiv oblast) and Druzhkivka 🔵UV Azov, under Brig. Gen. Prokopenko, in charge of the sector between Druzhkivka and Novopavlivka (Dnipropetrovsk oblast) The defense of Donbas, and more specifically of its fortress belt, now rests on these two command bodies. UV Center is entrusted with the larger cities of Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, while UV Azov guards its right flank on the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axis of advance. The crucial importance this sector holds was highlighted in August 2025, when Russian forces attempted to break through northeast of Dobropillya. Their maximalist objective was the city of Barvinkove, a key logistical hub for the defense of the fortress cities. The Main Supply Routes (MSRs) connecting Dnipro to Kramatorsk, Slovyansk and Izyum all pass through Barvinkove. For the Ukrainians, the loss of Barvinkove would put the fortress belt at risk of encirclement. For the Russians, occupying the fortress belt would complete the capture of Donbas.

🔵The newly created UV “Center” (Brig. Gen. Biletskyi) and UV “Azov” (Brig. Gen. Prokopenko) defend the remaining unoccupied part of Donetsk oblast, including the “fortress cities” of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and the key Dobropillya sector. 🔵Part of the frontline east of the Dnipro - Donetsk oblast border is under the control of a temporary “Air Assault Forces (DShV) Strike Group”, led by the DShV commander (Maj. Gen. Apostol). 🔵UV South (Maj. Gen. Sydorenko) is in charge of the entire southern sector, including the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts. The headquarters and some support units of the 7th Corps (Air Assault Forces) transferred to the Hulyaipole direction, east of 17th Army Corps, at the end of August. At the moment, none of the 7th Corps’ organic maneuver brigades have moved together with the Corps HQ. Interestingly enough, a recent @pravda_eng article revealed that the 7th Corps' HQ was briefly transferred to the Volyn direction, on the northern border, to prepare for an invasion from Belarus. This happened in the final weeks of Gen. Syrskyi's tenure as Commander in Chief (~July 2026) and was quickly reversed by Maj. Gen. Drapatyi. Note: the 21st Army Corps does not currently have an area of responsibility. Its maneuver brigades are deployed in the Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts - there is no indication that the Corps headquarters might take charge of a frontline sector in the near future.

First and foremost: the echelon above corps. The 🇺🇦Ukrainian frontline is split into six major sectors. Each of these is under the operational control of a “Grouping of Forces” (Угруповання військ), which is a temporary command body in charge of the corps deployed in its sector and of various smaller units. 🔵Groupings of Forces (“UV”) West (Brig. Gen. Shvedyuk) and North (Brig. Gen. Shandar) control the northern border, including the occupied area of Sumy oblast. 🔵The Joint Forces Task Force (Brig. Gen. Bryhinets) commands most of the corps deployed in Kharkiv oblast, as far south as Borova. (The JFTF has the same role as other UVs, though it is not based on a permanent Operational Command). Note: the 12th Army Corps is a command element coordinating the defense of Kyiv. The deployment of its maneuver brigades in the east does NOT imply the deployment of the corps.

🇺🇦Ukrainian Groupings and Corps sectors - a basic guide This thread is an introduction to 🇺🇦Ukrainian “Force Groupings” and Corps deployments as of late summer 2026. We have noticed several misconceptions on the topic, shared by analysts and the “broader public” alike. Our information is exclusively based on open sources and observation of publicly available data. ❗️Before we begin, a fundamental notion must be clear: at the moment, the corps headquarters and their organic brigades should be treated separately. With a few exceptions, most corps do not have all their brigades in their assigned sector (and many brigades are subordinated to corps they do not organically belong to).

The information on the expansion is based on the change in name of their main telegram channel: t.me/z4lpr/

The newly formed Russian Motorized Rifle Divisions in 2024-2026 consist of 3 Motorized Rifle Regiments and 1 Separate Tank Battalion. As the 4th Brigade already had two Regiments attached, they already have all those elements. Only their support units will need to be expanded.

The Division currently operates exclusively near Kostyantinivka, Donetsk, specifically its southwestern portions (h/t @AudaxonX for providing so much data)

Russian armed forces expansions are continuing: 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade has highly likely expanded to the 84th Motorized Rifle Division. This is an unsurprising move as its combat elements already surpassed the numbers of some existing divisions

Sources: vk.ru/wall-119368900_1191834 https://x. com/richardzai38580/status/2098074400603963571 t.me/Sib_army/11229 vk.ru/wall-192849126_9900 vk.ru/wall-229306709_213 https://x. com/richardzai38580/status/2094529271507366132 t.me/zvezdanews/180161 vk.com/wall-224388372_43223

Interestingly, the redeployment of so many 🇷🇺 41st Army elements has left the Novopavlivka front relatively sparsely manned. Between the remaining elements of the 90th Guards Tank Division around Komar and the 15th Brigade in Udachne, only a few reserve regiments remain stationed in this section of the front.

On the Ukrainian side, they face the 19th Army Corps and the consolidated 1st Azov Corps. The 425th Assault Regiment was subordinated to the Corps and tasked with conducting counterattacks within its area of responsibility while the organic 52nd International Assault Regiment continues its formation. For now, the 15th “Kara-Dah” Brigade continues to be held back as the Corps’ operational/strategic reserve.

Details: Over several weeks throughout summer, the 41st Army redeployed most of its brigades from the Novopavlivka direction. Naval Infantry units - the 61st Brigade and 177th Regiment - along with the 35th Brigade, are now attacking toward Novovodyane–Zolotyi Kolodyaz, while the 74th and 137th Brigades attack in the Kucheriv Yar–Novomykolaivka direction. Notably, the 228th Motor Rifle Regiment and 239th Tank Regiment of the 90th Guards Tank Division were responsible for the combined-arms mechanized assault that was stopped in the Shakove area.