Defence, arms industry, tech innovation & space. Usual caveats.

Berlin, Deutschland
Joined September 2017
📢 Excited to share that my latest research paper, "Blinded by the Hype: How Envisioned Futures Shape the Role of Artificial Intelligence in Defence Applications and Warfare", has just been published in Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik! #ZfAS
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Südkorea hat quasi eine nicht-nukleare Triade an weitreichenden See-, Luft-, und Bodengestützen Raketen und Lenkflugkörpern aus fast ausschließlich pur nationalen Systemen bei 2,33% des BIP als Verteidigungsausgaben. Fast alle davon wurden in den letzten 20 Jahren eingeführt.
First Look At Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicle Just Tested By South Korea There is something of a budding, but murky hypersonic arms race emerging on the Korean Peninsula. twz.com/land/first-look-at-h…
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Had the absolute pleasure of writing a short piece on the defence industrial dimension of Europeanizing NATO for @ICDS_Tallinn. TL;DR: Despite a unique opportunity, longstanding challenges and incentive strcutures won't vanish and changing the system will entail political costs.
Reconfiguring the European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) for a more European NATO is possible but, like all serious reforms, entails high political cost. It is unreasonable to hope that private companies will change their current behaviour without state-induced incentives and pressure. Defence industrial bases are vital for security of supply to the armed forces, writes Torben Schütz, Research Director of EDINA. @_schuetzt icds.ee/en/europeanising-nat…
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Nevertheless, for most relevant areas - production capacity, innovation & adaptability, quality & timeliness, economics & competitiveness, and dependencies - we have good ideas and best practices to use. Yet overcoming political inertia & industrial interests doesn't come cheap.
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Make sure to check out the other pieces in this comprehensive series - many still forthcoming - and given them a follow here or on any platform of your choosing! icds.ee/en/category/european…
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Torben Schütz retweeted
I haven’t seen the plan described in this article (although I want to) but I feel confident about its content and what’s next. Russian strategy has discussed for 10+ years what we are seeing now as strikes. A 🧵 on the calculated cruelty in the strategy: nytimes.com/2026/10/02/world…
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*surprised pikachu* on the defenece if you don't have C-UAS or your own drones you get killed. Incredible. Also the part about the trees is very important...
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Ah jemand war noch nie auf einem U-Boot, U-Jagdflugzeug oder Fregatte. Noch billiger als KI sind beispielsweise auch Algorithmen die schon seit den 70ern dort genutzt werden...
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Bezüglich die 60 jährigen Generäle sind nicht innovativ genug. Das hier ist von 1998!
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In fast jeder Zeitung wird aktuell über Rüstung geredet und dabei beschäftigt man sich nur mit was beschafft werden soll. Selbst bei den relevanten Abgeordneten bleibt es auf dieser Ebene. Wir reden null über die großen gesetzlichen Rahmenbediengungen. 🧵
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Torben Schütz retweeted
AI Goes to War and Is Not (Yet) Winning This is the core message of "Ambivalent Acceleration," my new comparative assessment of the current state of defense AI in (now) 37 countries. Frank Schmiedchen et al. will publish it in their forthcoming volume "Living with AI: State, Applications, and Challenges of Artificial Intelligence," which should be available from Springer later this year. This chapter updates the findings of all 25 case studies published in "The Very Long Game," and adds new insights from the latest DAIO case studies on PAK, POL, IDN, ROU, BEL, BRA, and all six GCC nations Contrary to the prevailing rhetoric, AI is still primarily considered an extension of existing military systems and platforms, thus prolonging the imaginaries (see yesterday's post "Goodbye California – Hello Kyiv"), concepts, and practices developed to use them. Yes, we are witnessing an accelerated push for defense AI driven by war(s), battlefield deployment, and increasing defense spending and private defense funding. But the outcome is ambivalent: First, emulation is even more dominant than two years ago, albeit with a different twist as the fear of missing out on how Ukraine is using defense AI (FOMO-U) is creating a new role model. And so is, among others, the 5-day war between PAK and IND, as I argue in the paper. Second, developing AI against the background of existing systems and platforms shapes AI in line with their prime tasks. This is strengthening "defense verticals." That's why software is not "eating" defense hardware, as the paper discusses. Finally, concerns about digital sovereignty are significantly more pronounced today than two years ago. This creates a geostrategic dilemma as the partner you might want to work with for geopolitical reasons is the one that limits your leeway for geoeconomic reasons. And now…..enjoy reading the paper. borchert.ch/wp-content/uploa…. Thank you cc @KarasikTheodore @Lauren_A_Kahn @mchorowitz @paul_scharre @KofmanMichael @HoansSolo @Mauro_Gilli @aa_gilli @Konflikt_Sicher @HorizonDefence @Ce_Moll @breitenbauch @sambendett @Adib_Moghaddam @jessicadorsey @WarintheFuture
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Torben Schütz retweeted
It's a bit like Whiplash spending time with Ukrainian units who desperately wish they were supported by decent numbers of modern combat aircraft as it would genuinely solve so many tactical problems, while commentators advocate swapping these for slow, low payload munitions.
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“The threat is that we create new, complex layers within defense that result in a heavy, expensive, and at the same time ineffective system,” he warned.
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Torben Schütz retweeted
My latest on the UK’s purchase of GBU-53/B glide bombs for the RAF and the RN; and what it says about how best to increase effective combat mass to bolster UK and European ability to deter direct Russian aggression: rusi.org/explore-our-researc…
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Torben Schütz retweeted
War is a dialectical competition characterized by cycles of adaptions & counter-adaptions at all levels of warfare (technical, tactical etc.), shaped, among other things, by the operational environment (weather, terrain, etc.) that affects the different phases of a conflict. A common analytical mistake is to draw linear conclusions about the future trajectory & character of fighting from one particular phase, especially given that information in an ongoing war is always fragmentary & limited. Media narratives especially have a tendency to swing from gloom to euphoria, with little room for nuance in between.
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Torben Schütz retweeted
Der Kampfpanzer ist ein allseits beliebter Sündenbock, wenn es darum geht, Ineffizienzen in der europäischen Rüstungs- und Verteidigungspolitik zu benennen. Das Problem daran ist, diese Argumentation ist bei einer tieferen Betrachtung haltlos. hartpunkt.de/der-unsterblich…
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Torben Schütz retweeted
If you ask why the US dominates so many areas of high-tech weaponry in the West, the scale of defense R&D gives you an answer. More featured on today's Chartbook Top Links in the comment below.
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Torben Schütz retweeted
New Military Balance 2026 came out yesterday @IISS_org: as usual it's going to be my bible for the year to come. Among the many striking data: China + Russia defense spending in PPP outmatch the US for the first time
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Seriös einfach 1000 Annahmen bis 2050 fortzuschreiben... "Bleibe es bei der jetzigen Regelung, wonach das Gros der Verteidigungskosten über Kredite finanziert werden darf, »droht der Schuldenstand [...] bis 2050 ‌auf fast 100 Prozent des BIP zu steigen«" bit.ly/49DFU8O
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