The proposal envisaged Khalifa Haftar and not Saddam Haftar becoming head of the Presidential Council, with key ministries, including defence and foreign affairs, allocated to the LNA. However, the deal has already begun to lose momentum. Influential stakeholders from Misurata have effectively vetoed Dabaiba, weakening the foundation of the arrangement. For many regional and international actors backing a Dabaiba–Haftar deal, the logic was straightforward: Tripoli finally had a prime minister capable of enforcing decisions, unlike the more constrained tenure of Fayez al-Sarraj under the GNA. That assumption is now being challenged. The firm rejection from Misuratan actors has forced many to rethink their position, even as some in the international community still believe a deal could happen. The more likely reality, however, is that Libya is entering a familiar phase once again, a renewed cycle of contested legitimacy rather than a stable political settlement.