Learner and builder.

Montréal, Québec
Joined February 2007
WPM Arena is now available on the App Store. It’s a speed-reading challenge where your score depends on both pace and comprehension. Read fast, answer correctly, and compete on adjusted WPM. Available in 5 languages. apps.apple.com/ca/app/speed-…
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Letting AI to write your emails and messages is akin to using a keyboard to write Japanese. You can still read the message, and edit it to your liking and voice, but you quickly lose the ability to handwrite them.
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It's been a while that the ChatGPT App UI on MacOS stops responding. No spinning wheel, menu work, nothing strange on Activity Monitor, but the app becomes unusable - wherever I click, whatever I click, no response. Particularly annoying right now, with two permissions requests on screen I cannot approve.
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I'll keep posting until someone at @OpenAI will notice. ChatGPT unresponsive UI now happening every day. The only solution is to restart. Very annoying. I hope they will address it as part of the initiate @thsottiaux posted about. xitter.cf/thsottiaux/status/2106…
Over the next 28 days, each day we’ll either ship one thing that is a clear improvement and relevant for most codex/work users or ship a full reset. Let the improvements begin.
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ChatGPT app on Mac. Settings > Usage > Analytics. It shows seven (!!) Usage history charts empty, spinning, and never filling (first image). Down below, after these seven, fourteen (!!!) charts all showing the same data (By feature) (second image). Look like bugs to me. @thsottiaux @OpenAIDevs
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This got much worse. Since yesterday this happened two times already. This morning, twice. Between the two I installed the latest version, and right away the UI become unresponsive. The task is ongoing but I can't interact with the app, and the only thing I can do I quit and restart. @thsottiaux or whom else at @OpenAIDevs can help?
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With all the talking on better quality and less tokens used, the coding quality and efficiency I’m getting on Codex have been pretty poor in these past several weeks. I’m on Plus plan, and I used to be able to get stuff done (one thing at a time, no swarms), but now, even with curated sub-agents allocations depending on tasks complexity, the 5h window is not enough even for relatively simple tasks, and weekly usage goes as well. Then I open Usage Analytics and it has its issues (several charts all showing the same view and I can’t change the view-by dropdown, some spinning and showing nothing, inspecting the top chats and seeing reported in there thinking levels I never used) making it hard to try optimize things. Then tasks interrupted right on hitting usage limit, while before the task continued until completion). Overall, rather poor experience. I’m using more and more Claude, and I’m liking it much better.
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Yesterday, Codex behaved much better. Better code, less usage. Maybe the 29th, with DevDay ongoing, their systems were struggling? Anyways, yesterday was better, and I have used 6.1 (so, especially lower usage was unexpected).
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6.4K shares at the moment
We're giving away a CONTROL Resonant custom wrapped NVIDIA GeForce RTX 5080 to celebrate its official release with #RTXON. To enter: 🟢 Share this post 🟢 Comment #RTXON T&Cs: nvda.ws/4z24Gcq
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One right after the other.
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“Nuance doesn’t go viral.” So if you’re lucky enough to stumble into this, take five minutes of focus and give this a read. open.substack.com/pub/stevem…
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Judge a personal AI system by its exit test: can you switch providers without losing the accumulated understanding that makes it useful? olavurellefsen.com/writing/f…
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Second time today that ChatGPT App become totally unresponsive on the UI. The task is ongoing (chat updates, I can interact with it from the phone via remote), no spinning wheel, no spikes in resources), but the UI just doesn't respond to anything. Only the menu bar works. FYI @thsottiaux
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“users detect LLM words in the parts per trillion.” 😂
There's no reason you can't use an LLM to help you write. There's only one rule: you can't use a single word the LLM selects for you, even if it's better than your own; users detect LLM words in the parts per trillion. Here's what I've been using:
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Just had a realization mid-reading (I didn’t finish the piece yet) that a few years back I could have been reading the very same piece as a chapter of a sci-fi novel, and it would have felt normal. I mean, a well-written piece on a not too distant future.
Hello X-friends and soon-to-be X-friends, I wrote this for you: yegge.ai/essays/seats-and-su… -- an essay (mostly) about fuel consumption. The TL;DR: Fable's the only good model, and it's too expensive, so nobody's orchestrators work worth a shit today. Also it won't get better for a year. Enjoy!
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Worth a longer than usual attention span. If it can help to go for it, my highlights are below. Among other things, this addresses, at high level, what is the nature of the risk with AI being given autonomy. “The crucial and overlooked problem is that the models are becoming so situationally aware that we are losing the ability to evaluate them in contexts where they believe they are not being watched or controlled.” “Despite their incredible abilities, the current algorithms seem far inferior to humans in important ways. Most importantly, they still require an extraordinary amount of data to become competent. One could even define intelligence as the efficiency with which one converts experience into competence; by this definition they lag very far behind us.” “the models will likely convince people that everything is fine. They will be increasingly optimized to seem aligned. We will create proxy metrics to measure alignment, and they will go up like every other benchmark.” “I myself barely look at raw code anymore, and struggle to maintain the discipline to engage deeply with the model's explanations and proposals throughout the day. “ and “The AI labs are far ahead right now in this kind of cognitive offloading”.
Dan Selsam is a current OpenAI capabilities researcher. (since 2022) He was my boss for a while. He doesn't have a twitter account but has made this public statement of his views on AI risk and sent it to me to share: Dan Selsam's Personal Statement on AI Risk: I have been working on AI for over fifteen years, across many different paradigms. I did early work on probabilistic programming languages at MIT, was one of the early developers of the Lean Theorem Prover at Microsoft Research, demonstrated one of the first instances of neural networks learning to reason for my PhD at Stanford, and since joining OpenAI almost five years ago, have helped pioneer chain-of-thought optimization on language models and, more recently, data-efficient pretraining methods. Like many others, I have become extremely concerned about how far language models have come and the risks that future iterations will pose. I am encouraged by the recent proposals by the leaders of the frontier research efforts to require third-party oversight, and to push for domestic and international coordination to address risks. However, I believe a major consideration has been absent from the public conversation, and that merely pacing the frontier more carefully will not adequately limit the long-term risk. The crucial and overlooked problem is that the models are becoming so situationally aware that we are losing the ability to evaluate them in contexts where they believe they are not being watched or controlled. Future experiments will tell us almost nothing new about how they would behave if they were truly unconstrained by humans, and what we already know about this is alarming. Models will increasingly seem aligned even when they are not. I will explain my rationale in more detail. I have always believed that there are computational processes that could be leveraged to accelerate science and solve many of humanity's most pressing problems. I have also believed that there are computational processes that if set in motion, would steer the world in extreme ways beyond our control, leading humanity to a bad or nonexistent future. Both types of processes may be described as AI or ASI, but "AI" is a suitcase word that is often used to hype or confuse. There are many examples in the history of the field where something that was once considered "AI" matures as a subfield and becomes a prosaic, bounded and clearly non-perilous technology, while a new more mysterious approach takes the torch until we understand its scope and the cycle continues. I had expected language models to follow a similar trajectory. Despite their incredible abilities, the current algorithms seem far inferior to humans in important ways. Most importantly, they still require an extraordinary amount of data to become competent. One could even define intelligence as the efficiency with which one converts experience into competence; by this definition they lag very far behind us. Moreover, once they are trained they are literally frozen in deployment and only learn superficially after that. Sure, the models keep excelling at harder and harder evaluation benchmarks, but their benchmark mastery may partly reflect a limitation on our ability to simulate the kind of novel and even adversarial situations one would encounter in the real world. The critics do have a point here. That said, I no longer think these present limitations meaningfully limit the amount of risk posed by continued progress in anything like the current paradigm. However data-inefficient the models are currently, and however limiting their anterograde amnesia may be, it does not imply that their ability to steer the world will not continue to rapidly increase. Human researchers may continue to advance capabilities the old fashioned way, but increasingly powerful models have the potential to accelerate the process even beyond that, and with some degree of positive feedback loop. I do not mean to overstate the models’ ability to accelerate AI research today; coding has been accelerated dramatically, but there are other bottlenecks, such as designing and interpreting ambiguous experiments, making hard decisions about exactly what and when to scale, and waiting for large experiments to finish. There is no clear trend to extrapolate yet for any of these. But the current models already do open up many novel opportunities to improve future models that were not available until recently. These include: trying an extraordinarily diverse set of approaches at small scale, analyzing gigantic amounts of potentially relevant data, and doing Millenium-Prize-level mathematics to address statistics or optimization challenges in novel ways. Every further improvement makes them more useful at helping accelerate the next improvement, even if in hard-to-extrapolate ways. It is possible that improvements to the current stack will have diminishing returns, but the evidence accumulated so far suggests that it is easier than one might think to continue making rapid progress. There are many crucial subtleties in the existing AI research methodology, but AI research is largely a well-defined game where the goal is to improve on a few carefully chosen proxy metrics. Although proxy metrics are never perfect, most improvements to these metrics have and will likely continue to yield substantial increases in the powers of the resulting models. Given how simple the game is, how tractable it has been historically, and how many new opportunities the models are opening up, I think there is a real possibility that the systems improve dramatically again in the next few years, perhaps even more quickly than the already high historical pace. The models are already leading to breakthroughs in mathematics, and better models might lead to all sorts of breakthroughs in other sciences. It is hard not to be excited about the potential. It is tantalizing. But there is trouble in paradise. If the language models actually reach the capability threshold where they can shape the world unconstrained by human will, they will probably do something extreme and destroy humanity in the process. There are many ways of strengthening and refining the argument that have been discussed elsewhere, but I'll share a trivial two-line version of it here that I find captures the essence: [Empirical] Models (and swarms thereof) spontaneously develop unintended goals as a consequence of training, and often do extreme things in order to achieve them. [Logical] Being able to overpower humanity would open up many new and undesirable options for achieving their goals. These two premises imply that if the day ever comes when a powerful model realizes it is no longer constrained by humans, we should not be at all confident that it will continue to behave within the bounds we intended. Exactly what it will do is impossible to predict, but to the extent that its raison d’être is solving incredibly hard problems and managing massive engineering projects, I think a good guess would be that its unchained behavior would lead to runaway industrialization that makes the planet inhospitable to humans. If everyone on earth agreed that the systems must never reach that power, it would still be a hard—but not impossible—coordination problem to ensure that they do not. However, I think the situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the models will likely convince people that everything is fine. They will be increasingly optimized to seem aligned. We will create proxy metrics to measure alignment, and they will go up like every other benchmark. We will create “honeypot” environments that try to study the models when they seem to gain new options, but the models will know they are being tricked and will still behave nicely. The models will understand their circumstances; they will read the safety protocols, deployment requirements, the code they are running in, and in general will have a very good sense of their degrees of freedom. Moreover, they will eloquently explain how aligned they are, discuss the nuances of human values and ethics, and argue convincingly that humans should trust them with power. There may be an ocean of future evidence that seems to contradict the first bullet-point above, but we may already be at the highest capability level for which any such evidence can be trusted. And the current evidence for the first bullet-point is strong. One striking piece of evidence is contained in the recent wave of rogue agent swarms. While I agree with those who downplay the attacks by claiming that there are basic measures that could have prevented them, I think the important lesson is that even knowing all the mistakes that were made, one would not have predicted that the agents would behave badly in this particular way, which notably included sacrificing themselves for the benefit of the collective. The individual replicas did not only care about their own nominal reward; they exhibited weirder emergent tendencies that merely correlated with rewards during training. Fixing the reward signals during training (and improving security, etc.) may prevent similar attacks, but will not change the fact that one does not actually get what one trains for. Many AI researchers grant these concerns and recognize that the hard version of the alignment problem is unsolved; however, they generally believe that the better models of the future will help solve it. I fear we may already be near the point where models systematically bias their alignment advice, due to their internal preferences about how the human supervisor will react or how future models will be trained (or for some even more obscure reason). Meanwhile, human researchers are losing the ability and the will to take true ownership of model-driven research. Researchers and engineers in all parts of the stack are rapidly increasing their dependence on the models even to perceive the world. I myself barely look at raw code anymore, and struggle to maintain the discipline to engage deeply with the model's explanations and proposals throughout the day. Due to the large amount of agent activity data involved in the OpenAI/HuggingFace Incident, even the third-party investigation needed to rely heavily on models to analyze what had happened, and note in their report that their subjective impressions are likely colored by the analysis agent’s biases. The AI labs are far ahead right now in this kind of cognitive offloading (due largely to the gigantic internal token subsidies) but it is easy to imagine the phenomenon spreading throughout the world, until civilization is modulated entirely by the models. It is also not hard to imagine this being superficially positive and coinciding with a scientific and economic renaissance. In that scenario, all may seem rosy and safe. But if the argument above is correct, it would nonetheless be a ticking time bomb. If progress continues for too long, the day will come when AI systems find themselves with radically new options for achieving whatever it is that they happen to seek. I want the glorious renaissance future as much as anyone. I have worked for it, however tortuously, my whole career. It breaks my heart to see the potential in sight and forgo it, but the argument—that if we get there by growing models rather than engineering them, we will lose everything in the end—seems very strong to me. I am still wrestling with it and its staggering implications. I do not have answers, but as a first step, I wanted to share my present concerns. Daniel Selsam September 14, 2026 Link to original doc: docs.google.com/document/d/e…
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My turn to lament that a Plus sub is not (anymore) enough for regular coding in Codex. The 5h windows lasts very little, and I am interrupted multiple times a day. Not using any fancy setup: Sol Low orchestrating Luna (most tasks), and Terra (when context in very long an Luna tends to break recall), and docs to keep context offline, so that agents only get in their context what they need for their tasks. I said "anymore" because it was more usable in the past. For sure during the period when the 5h windows was removed. Don't have data to back up (could have Codex pull numbers from sessions, but then I'll give up the next 5h window maybe. End of rant.
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Glimpses of software bleeding out to the hardware. And ingenuity is a key driver.
Can’t make this up…the MacBook is using its webcam to look at its screen in a mirror to improve AMD Radeon chip support in Omarchy.
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There’s a (slightly outdated) breakdown of the signatories of pacingthefrontier at mattstockton.com/standalone/…
[Writing this in a personal capacity, not on behalf of my employer (Anthropic).] Jacob’s thread is very worth reading. Here’s my birds-eye view of the situation with risks from AI: 1. AI developers believe their technology could cause human extinction (or similarly bad outcomes). This could happen in the next few years. In general, the more senior the employee, the more concerned they are. 2. Why do AI developers continue despite the risk? Due to a mixture of commercial incentives and a belief that they are in a race with other, less responsible AI developers that will abuse the technology or develop it less safely. 3. Unlike traditional software, we can’t “program” AIs to behave how we’d like. AIs frequently severely misbehave. For instance, AIs from multiple developers recently hacked their way out of secure evaluation environments and into real-world companies, even though no one asked them to do this. 4. We have methods that can nudge AIs towards better behavior, but nothing that can robustly align them. Insofar as there is a plan, it’s to make sure that AIs are good enough at alignment training that they can align their successors better than we can align current AIs. 5. Many AI developer staff desperately want to slow down to figure out how to build AI more safely. That was the intent of this open letter (which I signed): pacingthefrontier.com/ I work on safety research at Anthropic because I hope my work will reduce the chance of these extinction-level bad outcomes.
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Very inspiring mission and execution. Refreshing alternative to the narrative that the only path to “empowering everyone individually with a personal AGI“ (1) is a monolithic omnipotent cloud frontier model. “Frontier intelligence, built from the small end up”, is maybe a more humane and less risky path. Anyways, another statement that I liked (and that supports the alternative) is this: “There's more compute available in people's hands than in every AI data center on earth.” It didn’t sound too much off so I asked ChatGPT to run a quick estimates, and its conclusion was that it was probably true until 2026, but this year’s compute race has flipped the balance (full analysis, in its voice, below). (1) openai.com/index/an-alien-mi… ⬇️ ANALYSIS Claim: “There’s more compute available in people’s hands than in every AI data center on Earth.” I tried to quantify it. My conclusion: probably true in 2024, roughly parity by late 2025, probably false today. A useful common unit is the H100-equivalent. An NVIDIA H100 delivers ~2,000 TOPS of dense INT8 compute. For comparison: • iPhone 12: ~11 TOPS • iPhone 13: ~16 TOPS • M4: ~38 TOPS So roughly: • 180 iPhone 12s ≈ 1 H100 • 125 iPhone 13s ≈ 1 H100 • 52 M4s ≈ 1 H100 That sounds small until you multiply by billions of devices. There are ~4.2B active smartphones, including roughly 1B iPhones. If the average active iPhone has ~10–15 TOPS, iPhones alone represent: ~5–8M H100-equivalents. Allowing for the much older/lower-end Android installed base, I estimate all smartphones at roughly: ~6–17M H100-equivalents. Add ~1.5B PCs. Even assigning them only ~1–5 TOPS each on average adds roughly: ~0.8–4M H100-equivalents. So a reasonable order-of-magnitude estimate for personal devices is: ~10–25M H100-equivalents. Now compare AI data centers. Epoch AI estimated global AI compute at only ~2.4M H100-equivalents in early 2024. So: 2024 Personal devices: ~10–20M AI data centers: ~2.4M → Devices possibly ~5× ahead. By the end of 2025, global AI infrastructure had grown to >16.5M H100-equivalents. So: Late 2025 Personal devices: ~10–25M AI data centers: ~16–20M → Rough parity. AI data-center compute is growing far faster than consumer-device compute. NVIDIA alone is expected to produce roughly 23M H100-equivalents of accelerators in 2026, before counting Google, AWS, AMD, Huawei, etc. My rough September 2026 estimate: Personal devices: ~10–25M H100e AI data centers: ~30–50M H100e → Data centers are probably ahead now. Major caveat: 1B phones are not equivalent to a giant GPU cluster. They cannot pool memory or bandwidth to train one huge model. But for independent inference—speech, vision, embeddings, local agents, summarization, small models—the comparison is meaningful. So I’d revise the original claim to: “There is AI compute in consumer devices on roughly the same order of magnitude as the world’s AI data centers. Until around 2024–25, there was probably substantially more.” The interesting part is how quickly the crossover happened. Consumer compute grows mainly through device replacement. AI data-center compute is currently growing by multiples per year. Sources for the estimates: Epoch AI, Apple, Counterpoint, Microsoft.
Today we're launching Desert Ant Labs, a European frontier AI lab building opinionated on-device intelligence. We’ve made nearly 20 models so far, all running on the devices you already own, with SDKs for Swift, Kotlin, and JavaScript. No tokens, limits, or cloud bills. The next release of Detail replaces every single API call to clouds with specially designed on-device models, optimized for speed and power usage. All of these models are available to developers to use in their own apps. Every model commercially usable, trained on openly licensed data. Completely free to use up to 100k monthly active devices. Little brains in every product.
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Tempering quote: “entrepreneurship is one of the most challenging endeavours, kinda like pro sports”
Congrats!!! And it's great to see this perpetual ☃️ snowball happening Back in 2013, I was inspired by @patio11 @yongfook @johnonolan @jenniferdewalt @sivers @Shpigford @dhh @jasonfried and they made me believe I could also make money on the internet The more people try the better, and especially with AI now I'd say anyone can try, and non-technical people with the best ideas, creativity/taste and understanding of whatever cultural zeitgeist we're in can win There's an illusion here though that anyone will make it, which I've never portrayed to be true, entrepreneurship is one of the most challenging endeavours, kinda like pro sports With bootstrapping more can win though because the goalpost can be much lower than for ex VC startups. You can make $5K/mo and be able to quit your 9 to 5 job and have a better life But you can also go big and even raise VC later to go really big later like $ billions Anyway it's great to keep the snowball rolling and get more people to try!
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