Count Draghula retweeted
China’s interests are brutally straightforward. It needs Hormuz open. It needs Bab el-Mandeb open. It needs Saudi oil, Iranian oil and Gulf trade. It does not want an ideological crusade in the Middle East because wars interrupt commerce. Beijing is not doing this out of charity. It is protecting China.
Count Draghula retweeted
doing research on China is mostly a process of repeatedly discovering a data series that might finally shed light on your question only to learn that said series was discontinued in October 2015
Count Draghula retweeted
Below is an important write-up on China's reaction and as such their exposure to the crisis.
China's exports to ASEAN countries was growing at 13% and was slated to do the same again this year. Exports to ASEAN are about 20% of total exports. After the decline in growth to the US, ASEAN is doing the heavy lifting on total export growth.
The Chinese economy is almost entirely reliant on export growth after property and infra slowdowns. China cannot bear much less than targeted GDP growth so exports must continue to grow. This can't happen if those countries are starved of oil.
China has opted to not bid for the smaller pie of crude imports. Some of this is forced (reduced inflow from Iran). The rest seems to be a decision to not put this at risk, and not due to neighbourly love.
I (and most others) thought that most of this was enabled by drawdowns of reserves. This was bullish risk as it signalled a belief that the crisis was short enough (despite the size of their reserves). Clearly refined product reserves are being drawn upon but I don't know how much of these they have.
Their handling according to @CRUDEOIL231 post below messages two things to me:
1. They are reluctant to let go of cheaply bought reserves out of caution. They don't know when the crisis will be over (and they should have information on this)
2. That the real stress (and inflation pressure) will be through feedstock for petrochem rather than through crude and products for the time being. This has a huge passthrough to inflation in addition to higher product pricing.
I’ve been grinding away trying to map out China’s recent crude plays, but after going through today's report, I have to hand it to OIES—they scripted the plumbing way better than me.
Here is my quick breakdown after running through their print, alongside the Chinese refinery throughput chart to help connect the dots.
-
Three months into the Hormuz crunch, and Beijing is completely blindsiding the market with its crude playbook. A heavyweight that easily sucked in 11mb/d over the last five years just saw its import prints plunge to 9.3mb/d in April. Now, the forward data says May and June seaborne arrivals are about to crater straight into the gutter at 6.5mb/d.
Instead of running its usual playbook of panic-dumping the SPR to backstop the market during a supply crisis, Beijing just completely cock-blocked refiners from touching the strategic vaults, only greenlighting commercial stock draws.
To make it worse, refiners aren't even willing to bleed their own commercial inventories, while state traders are acting like total penny-pinchers—happily flipping premium WAF cargoes back into the market and hoarding dirt-cheap Russian barrels instead.
This is a complete 180 from the 2021 power crunch, when Beijing panicked and ordered everyone to grab supply 'at any cost.' The heavyweights and policymakers in Beijing clearly think they can outmaneuver this supply shock and keep the economic damage locked down by playing a few smart, tactical micro-levers.
China’s true red line for freezing out imports is hardwired to the scale of their run cuts. If they try to copy-paste their five-year average throughput of 14.1mb/d, the exact moment seaborne arrivals drop below 9.2mb/d, they’re trapped—they either have to open the strategic taps wide or start chasing expensive market barrels. Instead, chopping runs by 5% down to a 13.4mb/d baseline is hands-down their most realistic, long-term survival play.
In this setup, if domestic crude extraction and pipeline taps keep humming, they can easily coast for a few months without taking a single economic hit, even with seaborne prints scraping a measly 7.9–8.5mb/d, because transportation fuels like gas and diesel will still be taken care of.
However cranking run cuts to a nuclear 10% scenario means they could survive without chasing a single market barrel even if seaborne flows dry up to 7.2mb/d—but they'd have to throw petrochemical feedstocks like naphtha and LPG under the bus just to keep gas and diesel flowing, a desperate move that runs on borrowed time and stalls out after a few months unless the whole economy is in a total tailspin.
To micromanage this whole run-rate circus, China's refining complex is pulling a highly responsive lever: the yield shift.
Beijing explicitly told state majors like Sinopec and PetroChina to ditch chemical feedstocks and prioritize flooding the market with gas and diesel, and these plants immediately saluted by shifting their product yields by several percentage points on a dime.
As a result, the real bloodbath isn't happening at the refining gate—it's completely decimating the downstream petrochemical chain. With Hormuz blocked, their seaborne naphtha inflows were already sliced in half, but a 5% run cut is about to bleed domestic naphtha and LPG supplies by tens of millions of tons a quarter, sending a compounding, fatal shock straight through the petchem feedstock backbone.
They are keeping wheels turning by guaranteeing gas and diesel, but the squeeze on industrial chemical feedstocks is completely running on borrowed time.
To paper over the massive raw material hole in the petchem chain, Beijing is shoving its massive 'Coal-to-Chemicals' complex into the spotlight, branding it as a strategic shield against volatile crude under the 15th Five-Year Plan.
Thanks to dirt-cheap, stable domestic coal, inland plants churning out olefins and methanol are running hot to boost volumes, but this quick fix hits a hard ceiling when it comes to replacing lost barrels at scale due to structural bottlenecks.
The core infrastructure is trapped deep in the northwestern sticks like Inner Mongolia, meaning slamming those products down to the massive manufacturing teeth on the southeastern coast comes with a punishing logistics and freight premium.
Most importantly, coal gasification routes physically cannot clone key aromatics or specialized LPG chemical chains—the feedstock deficit is mathematically locked in.
On top of that, the fact that Beijing is sitting on a massive 1.1-1.3 billion barrel pile without tapping it proves that institutional red tape is locking up the plumbing.
The 100 million barrels buried deep in dark underground rock caverns—completely invisible to satellites—are almost entirely SPR, requiring endless red tape like complex auctions and market disclosures, so Beijing is hoarding it as a nuclear option.
Even for the commercial barrels that are accessible, refiners are terrified to draw down because plotting out the repayment timeframe to replace that crude is a total mathematical nightmare in this chaotic macro environment.
Beijing is pulling off a highly calculated micromanagement script here: they are completely freezing out the inventory draw requests from state-owned heavyweights like Sinopec, who are nakedly exposed to global benchmarks and were the first to aggressively slash throughput.
Instead, they are using the Shandong teapots as a human shield—handing these independent refiners tax breaks and strict run-rate mandates because they have the flexibility to stomach toxic, illicit Iranian and Russian barrels to cushion the margin bleed.
Bottom line, this entire web of macro levers—starving imports, shifting yields, hunting for distressed barrels, and burning through coal-to-chem assets—will keep the lights on and protect the economic skeleton through the peak of summer, but only under that tight 5% run cut baseline that keeps seaborne arrivals pinned at roughly 8mb/d.
But with May and June seaborne prints already locked in at a subterranean 6.5mb/d, the expiration date on this makeshift band-aid play cannot stretch into autumn.
Short of letting their entire national refining infrastructure suffer a catastrophic meltdown, Beijing is running straight into a hard physical wall.
Before late summer wraps up, they will be forced to either open the strategic floodgates and dump their massive stockpiles or make a frantic U-turn right back into the international physical market, chasing heavy volumes aggressively at any price.
#oott #iran
Count Draghula retweeted
Bigger inflation shock coming in petrochemicals (and core goods) than generally realized
I’ve been grinding away trying to map out China’s recent crude plays, but after going through today's report, I have to hand it to OIES—they scripted the plumbing way better than me.
Here is my quick breakdown after running through their print, alongside the Chinese refinery throughput chart to help connect the dots.
-
Three months into the Hormuz crunch, and Beijing is completely blindsiding the market with its crude playbook. A heavyweight that easily sucked in 11mb/d over the last five years just saw its import prints plunge to 9.3mb/d in April. Now, the forward data says May and June seaborne arrivals are about to crater straight into the gutter at 6.5mb/d.
Instead of running its usual playbook of panic-dumping the SPR to backstop the market during a supply crisis, Beijing just completely cock-blocked refiners from touching the strategic vaults, only greenlighting commercial stock draws.
To make it worse, refiners aren't even willing to bleed their own commercial inventories, while state traders are acting like total penny-pinchers—happily flipping premium WAF cargoes back into the market and hoarding dirt-cheap Russian barrels instead.
This is a complete 180 from the 2021 power crunch, when Beijing panicked and ordered everyone to grab supply 'at any cost.' The heavyweights and policymakers in Beijing clearly think they can outmaneuver this supply shock and keep the economic damage locked down by playing a few smart, tactical micro-levers.
China’s true red line for freezing out imports is hardwired to the scale of their run cuts. If they try to copy-paste their five-year average throughput of 14.1mb/d, the exact moment seaborne arrivals drop below 9.2mb/d, they’re trapped—they either have to open the strategic taps wide or start chasing expensive market barrels. Instead, chopping runs by 5% down to a 13.4mb/d baseline is hands-down their most realistic, long-term survival play.
In this setup, if domestic crude extraction and pipeline taps keep humming, they can easily coast for a few months without taking a single economic hit, even with seaborne prints scraping a measly 7.9–8.5mb/d, because transportation fuels like gas and diesel will still be taken care of.
However cranking run cuts to a nuclear 10% scenario means they could survive without chasing a single market barrel even if seaborne flows dry up to 7.2mb/d—but they'd have to throw petrochemical feedstocks like naphtha and LPG under the bus just to keep gas and diesel flowing, a desperate move that runs on borrowed time and stalls out after a few months unless the whole economy is in a total tailspin.
To micromanage this whole run-rate circus, China's refining complex is pulling a highly responsive lever: the yield shift.
Beijing explicitly told state majors like Sinopec and PetroChina to ditch chemical feedstocks and prioritize flooding the market with gas and diesel, and these plants immediately saluted by shifting their product yields by several percentage points on a dime.
As a result, the real bloodbath isn't happening at the refining gate—it's completely decimating the downstream petrochemical chain. With Hormuz blocked, their seaborne naphtha inflows were already sliced in half, but a 5% run cut is about to bleed domestic naphtha and LPG supplies by tens of millions of tons a quarter, sending a compounding, fatal shock straight through the petchem feedstock backbone.
They are keeping wheels turning by guaranteeing gas and diesel, but the squeeze on industrial chemical feedstocks is completely running on borrowed time.
To paper over the massive raw material hole in the petchem chain, Beijing is shoving its massive 'Coal-to-Chemicals' complex into the spotlight, branding it as a strategic shield against volatile crude under the 15th Five-Year Plan.
Thanks to dirt-cheap, stable domestic coal, inland plants churning out olefins and methanol are running hot to boost volumes, but this quick fix hits a hard ceiling when it comes to replacing lost barrels at scale due to structural bottlenecks.
The core infrastructure is trapped deep in the northwestern sticks like Inner Mongolia, meaning slamming those products down to the massive manufacturing teeth on the southeastern coast comes with a punishing logistics and freight premium.
Most importantly, coal gasification routes physically cannot clone key aromatics or specialized LPG chemical chains—the feedstock deficit is mathematically locked in.
On top of that, the fact that Beijing is sitting on a massive 1.1-1.3 billion barrel pile without tapping it proves that institutional red tape is locking up the plumbing.
The 100 million barrels buried deep in dark underground rock caverns—completely invisible to satellites—are almost entirely SPR, requiring endless red tape like complex auctions and market disclosures, so Beijing is hoarding it as a nuclear option.
Even for the commercial barrels that are accessible, refiners are terrified to draw down because plotting out the repayment timeframe to replace that crude is a total mathematical nightmare in this chaotic macro environment.
Beijing is pulling off a highly calculated micromanagement script here: they are completely freezing out the inventory draw requests from state-owned heavyweights like Sinopec, who are nakedly exposed to global benchmarks and were the first to aggressively slash throughput.
Instead, they are using the Shandong teapots as a human shield—handing these independent refiners tax breaks and strict run-rate mandates because they have the flexibility to stomach toxic, illicit Iranian and Russian barrels to cushion the margin bleed.
Bottom line, this entire web of macro levers—starving imports, shifting yields, hunting for distressed barrels, and burning through coal-to-chem assets—will keep the lights on and protect the economic skeleton through the peak of summer, but only under that tight 5% run cut baseline that keeps seaborne arrivals pinned at roughly 8mb/d.
But with May and June seaborne prints already locked in at a subterranean 6.5mb/d, the expiration date on this makeshift band-aid play cannot stretch into autumn.
Short of letting their entire national refining infrastructure suffer a catastrophic meltdown, Beijing is running straight into a hard physical wall.
Before late summer wraps up, they will be forced to either open the strategic floodgates and dump their massive stockpiles or make a frantic U-turn right back into the international physical market, chasing heavy volumes aggressively at any price.
#oott #iran
Count Draghula retweeted
Replying to @birdseye88 @Kallang22
Second, the bathymetry of the Straits, which shows you that the deepest part (Thalweg) is close to Oman. The Iran part is very shallow. Dark blue areas are usually no go for many ships.
Count Draghula retweeted
Replying to @Man1zzsh
China not only needs oil, it needs the European and Asian economies that are absorbing its trade surplus to have access too, otherwise they’re economies collapse. If Iran overplays its hand here they lose China’s support as well.
Count Draghula retweeted
Another gut punch for China. First its Venezuelan barrels get cut, then the Indian waiver reverses the recent pick up in Russian crude deliveries, and now Iranian barrels could be unsanctioned.
~30% of China's seaborne crude imports last year were from these three countries.
Count Draghula retweeted
Because it's often getting lost in the discussion here, this is a partial list of Iran's attacks on energy *before* the Israeli strike on South Pars:
- Ras Laffan LNG complex in Qatar
- Ras Tanura oil refinery in Saudi
- hundreds of drone attacks on Saudi oil fields
- Ruwais refinery in Abu Dhabi
- Shah gas field in Abu Dhabi
- port of Fujairah
- Bapco oil refinery in Bahrain
The list goes on. Point is that, yes, South Pars was an escalation in American/Israeli targeting, but it comes after weeks of Iranian attacks on GCC energy infrastructure.
Count Draghula retweeted
This is a great read... worth reading all by @countdraghula open.substack.com/pub/macroi…
Count Draghula retweeted
China has a closed financial account. Its massive trade surplus would normally be expected to put upward pressure on its currency, pulling in imports and making production outside of China cost competitive.
1/many
Count Draghula retweeted
China is now resisting pressure on the yuan to appreciate. That isn't (yet) the conventional wisdom, but the evidence is now clear at this stage.
A new blog --
1/
cfr.org/blog/case-china-now-…
Count Draghula retweeted
Nice note by @countdraghula. My big takeaway is to continue having a decent allocation to gold in the portfolio (15-20% allocation). Great charts on gold demand in the chart pack.
macroisdead.com/p/charts-and…
Count Draghula retweeted
The market is already beginning to price in a major dovish pivot in monetary policy once Powell is gone. March and June 2026 SOFR futures spread shown here from @countdraghula
Things are about to get weird.
Count Draghula retweeted
Replying to @countdraghula
@countdraghula enjoyed your latest Charts & Notes post.
macroisdead.com/p/charts-and…
Count Draghula retweeted
Great note today from @countdraghula 🙏👇
macroisdead.com/p/charts-and…
Count Draghula retweeted
A small area where I disagree with Evan (and many of the Asian hands) --
US demand for Asia's goods remains absolutely central to East Asia's current economic set up. Asia doesn't work as now constructed economically without a US goods deficit.
Most of Washington simply presumes American centrality in Asia. Here, I beg to differ, in part because I think the U.S. is long on security and short on everything else. Me in a longish segment on @CNBC's #SquawkBoxAsia. cnbc.com/video/2025/05/16/th…
Count Draghula retweeted
this is correct and fundamental to the nature of the balance of payments.
global excess savings from surplus countries is dumped into the US; this distorts currency equilibrium effects that should naturally correct trade imbalances (inbound capital strengthens deficit country currencies, which makes their exports less competitive).
the US is AWASH in capital, inbound capital is not "funding" anything, it is dumped here because the US is the most secure, robust destination to park money.
capital inflows *perpetuate* deficits. they do not fund them, they force them. a capital account surplus always results in a current account deficit of equal size.
tax capital inflows = reduce capital account surplus = this will reduce the trade deficit, this is axiomatic. if you disagree with this it's because you do not understand how trade balances settle.
it's easier to sell human-readable narrative storytelling ("the Chinese just like to save!", "the US just likes to spend!") than understand how the accounting works, and sometimes manifests in counterintuitive outcomes.
you will not improve the deficit until you address how the accounting must reconcile and how these imbalances are perpetuated. QT explains further.
"you should not argue from accounting identities, but you must always keep them in mind."
China and "Competitiveness": The Insect Method
The purpose of exports should be more imports; exports are real costs, imports are real benefits. When economic behaviors do not reflect this, an insidious strategy is taking shape.
If global trade were driven by comparative advantage, what free-trade types will tell you is the case, persistent major trade imbalances would not exist, because your exporting success necessarily sows the seeds of your future exporting disadvantage.
There would be a natural equilibrating force that manifests between currency strength and exports that results in something approximating mid-to-long-term trade parity between nations. This is not occurring.
There is one materially flawed point in QT that Balaji and others completely overlook: what the word "competitive" means, how it's achieved, and on what terms.
How did China become so darn "competitive"?
It’s often the case that chronic surpluses are accomplished via varying tactics of domestic wage suppression. A tactic that subverts the natural equilibrating forces of balanced trade.
Germany and China are particular culprits, who coincidentally just so happen to have the two biggest trade surpluses.
China is not “more competitive” due to some Ricardian “free trade” advantage. It has taken the perverse approach of depriving its middle class of its share of GDP, which is a fancy way to say structurally diminishing wages.
The popular human-readable narrative is that China's trade success comes from superior efficiency and work ethic. They're extra busy bees over there!
The reality is something different: through its industrial policies (which manifest as de facto trade policies) it's systematically underpaid workers.
When you pay workers less than their productivity warrants, you're not being "more competitive", you're just shifting money from workers' pockets to exporters' profits. This isn't free trade; it's wage suppression dressed up as economic efficiency.
If your labor input is cheaper because you subvert the wages of labor, it’s not all that surprising where your “advantage” comes from.
This is the Strategy of the Bug. The Method of the Insect.
China didn't magically grow more competitive than the US because its workers one day decided to “save more” or “work harder". People love these story-telling narratives rather than looking at the raw mechanics of what's going on.
China's exporting "competitiveness" is in large part achieved because its workers have intentionally received a smaller share of their productivity gains.
This isn’t "efficiency" but rather a transfer of wealth from workers to businesses.
In China, it's the Hukou system that exploits labor rights and wages. Think of it like the US H1B program, but on steroids. It creates a servant-like, low-wage underclass that China uses to its exporting advantage.
The system classifies Chinese citizens into two categories:
Agricultural (rural) hukou
Non-agricultural (urban) hukou
This classification determines not just where you live, but access to jobs, education, healthcare, housing, and other social benefits.
To compete with this... *shudders*
"Competitiveness"... who wants this?
This is not the only way China facilitates its mercantilist surpluses. It also manipulates its currency, keeping it artificially depressed.
This is of substantial benefit to manufacturing (exporters) at the expense of households (all households are effectively importers, because they only buy goods and do not produce them). A weaker currency aids exporters and is a hinderance to importers.
Important: What matters is whether workers' compensation reflects their productivity. It's the productivity share of GDP where this dislocation has its impact. That's where the Hukou system takes its toll.
To illustrate: on a GDP/worker basis, Chinese workers are around 20% as productive as US ones. If they earned ~20% of the wage that'd be fine and not a competitive advantage.
But they don't, they earn around 10-15% of the US worker. This is a major difference for manufacturing labor inputs.
China has a substantial productivity-income gap relative to the US, and it allows their sustained surpluses to perniciously persist.
The average Chinese worker produces about a fifth of his American counterpart, but consumes an even smaller fraction of that output.
"COMPETITIVENESS"
A global race to the bottom ensues on account of a cancerous globalism wage assault, and the middle class bears the brunt of it. As the only way to compete in this shitty worldwide competition is to continually undermine wages.
To "compete" with this on its own terms is to overtly vitiate labor and hold your middle class in disregard, seeing them as little GDP variables and nothing more. Americans have no desire to "compete" with this, nor should they. Nor should anyone.
I hope this elucidates why certain types love the US H1B program so much, as well as the obsession politicians have with allowing in infinity immigrants.
They present it as “inclusion” “refugees” “diversity” and all walks of warm-and-fuzzy platitudes. This is a lie. It’s a wage-suppression technique.
What else keeps wages down? Labor supply. What increases supply? More warm bodies. Your wages can’t rise if we’re importing a bunch of guys that will work for half the price.
No more.
Don’t worry “free traders”, what you have here is not free trade anyways. You have mercantilist subversions that you have allowed to happen at your expense, because you prefer simple soundbites like “tariffs are tax” rather than root-level, distal-cause analysis.
Industrial policies are de facto trade policies. China can say it has "free trade", but that's a lie. Because it manipulates both its currency and domestic labor, which is every bit a functional trade policy as tariffs are, just with optics that deceive people.
The best time to address this was when it first started, the second-best time is now.
Reject the Insect Method.
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