Elastic Security Labs Technical Lead. Lawful Neutral. Threat Hunting with the Elastic Stack author. Retired CW4.

Joined May 2019
RE work by @cyril_t_f uncovered a kill switch in the implant for an NX domain, so we registered it. It was rewarding to see the implants checking in and then terminating - hopefully giving defenders detections and time to remediate.
🤖 Made with AI
KREMLIN is a multi-stage credential theft toolkit targeting Brazilian banking users. New research from Elastic Security Labs (REF9334): go.es.io/4yfkg4R by @cyril_t_f and @andythevariable The infection chain combines JavaScript loaders, an optional PE injector, and a custom C++ installer. The installer downloads and installs a malicious browser extension for Chrome and Edge and/or deploys an embedded PULSAR or REMCOS RAT. This malicious extension is then used for web-browser data interception and exfiltration. KREMLIN resolves its C2 endpoints from Ethereum. Smart contracts store payload URLs and extension download locations as on-chain key-value pairs. The operators update endpoints by writing a new transaction. The extension installation bypasses Chromium's integrity system. The installer launches Chrome under a debugger, recovers the App-Bound OSCrypt key from process memory, extracts the seed from resources.pak, then regenerates the HMACs and encrypted SHA-256 hashes that Secure Preferences requires. The extension registers silently with developer mode forced on. Once active, it logs input fields, intercepts HTTP requests by configurable URL and method rules, injects attacker-controlled HTML, and exfiltrates intercepted data, cookies, and credentials over WebSocket and HTTP. Elastic Security Labs Threat Command registered the network canary domain that operates as a kill switch. We observed thousands of implants from Brazil attempting to check in to this domain. Once this domain was live, the KREMLIN loaders crash before trying to update or install the final payload, temporarily disrupting this campaign. The targeting is clear. Lure filenames impersonate PIX transfers, bank statements, and receipts from Banco do Brasil, Bradesco, Sicoob, Santander, C6 Bank, and PagBank. Ethereum transaction timestamps cluster in São Paulo working hours. Portuguese-language artifacts appear throughout the codebase.
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This’ll calm ‘em down.
🤖 Made with AI
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On June 17, I'm going live with @jamesspi and @danielmiessler to cover the Obsidian and Axios supply chain attacks, and how AI agents can speed response. Humans don't leave the loop; they're moved to the top of it. 10am PT / 1pm ET @elasticseclabs elastic.co/lp/agentic-ai-thr…
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The attempts at environmental anti-tamper techniques to encrypt the payload were clever…just not enough. #tclbanker #ref3076
We uncovered a new Brazilian banking trojan campaign: TCLBANKER. What makes TCLBANKER notable isn’t just the malware itself, but how it spreads. The campaign uses compromised WhatsApp and Outlook accounts to propagate through trusted user relationships, deploys targeted banking overlays, and incorporates anti-analysis techniques designed to evade detection. For defenders, it’s another example of malware increasingly blending into legitimate user behavior and everyday communication channels, making detection harder and trust easier to exploit. Our latest research breaks down the infection chain, propagation methods, evasion tactics, and detection opportunities observed across the campaign. Read the full analysis: go.es.io/4ewvCKF
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I think the really big takeaway from this is the abuse of a legitimate tool's plugin capability to execute💀scripts. Many hours of work over the weekend by @soolidsnakee @DanielStepanic and @SBousseaden.
We have identified a novel social engineering campaign abusing Obsidian, the popular note taking app, to deliver a previously undocumented RAT #PHANTOMPULSE and it’s loader #PHANTOMPULL targeting individuals in finance and crypto. The attack never exploits a vulnerability. It abuses Obsidian's own plugin ecosystem to execute code the moment a victim opens a shared vault. Full analysis: go.es.io/4cld0dB
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All Python spin for the Elastic Container Project is available if anyone wants to kick the tires. Probably going to archive the Bash version at the end of 2025(ish) #elasticcontainerproject github.com/peasead/elastic-c…
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Replying to @DanielStepanic
@DanielStepanic and @elasticseclabs are keeping on top of #REF7707 and their new RAT - #NANOREMOTE
New from the developer of #FINALDRAFT: Meet #NANOREMOTE, a newly-discovered Windows backdoor that leverages the Google Drive API for data theft and payload staging. Get the full analysis and defense strategies: ela.st/nanoremote
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#RONINGLOADER -> PPL abuse, the new hotness.
#ElasticSecurityLabs uncovers #RONINGLOADER, a multi-stage loader utilizing signed drivers, PPL abuse, CI Policies, and other evasion techniques to deliver #DragonBreath's gh0st RAT variant. Check it out at ela.st/roningloader
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It's not too often we get to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the practitioners and researchers on the front lines. #REF3927 is an intrusion set that deploys SEO cloaking capabilities, RATs, webshells, and RMMs - largely using a novel IIS module we named #TOLLBOOTH
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Sometimes naming intrusions and families can be tough - but sometimes TAs do all the hard work. Sorry Shelby's, but @soolidsnakee and @bluish_red_ had to put you to the canvas. #shelbyc2 #shelbyloader #ref8685
We’re exposing a newly discovered #malware family that has made its home on #GitHub. SHELBY targeted a middle east telecom company, uses GH commits for C2, and shares hard-coded tokens for authentication. Read the malware and campaign breakdown: go.es.io/3DXE8Cv
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The significant thing to note with the ABYSSWORKER intrusion is that this isn't just BYOD; it's BYO(Malicious)D, something that's not super common. Solid research and analysis by @cyril_t_f
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