Senior Director of Product Research @HuntressLabs and custodian of secret histories. Posts are my own.

New York State
Joined October 2014
Microsoft Threat Intelligence is tracking an active supply chain attack in which a threat actor compromised the trusted OAuth App of the backup application ConnectWise Cloud Backup (AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae), formerly SkyKick Backup, to obtain access tokens across customer tenants. ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a multitenant vendor application; customers grant consent for the application to operate in their tenants. We assess that the threat actor likely abused permissions previously granted by customers to the application, including highly elevated permissions like Directory.ReadWrite.All. On October 15, 2026, we observed broad successful service principal authentication originating from the IP address 144.172.64[.]128. Follow-on activity included Microsoft Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add additional credentials on the related service principal in target tenants to maintain direct access as a backdoor. Microsoft Defender detects post-exploitation activity with the following alerts: - Any alert related to "Suspicious sign-in" - Graph API activity from a Microsoft threat intelligence IP address - Verified Threat Actor IP Defenders should review service principal sign-ins from unrecognized IP addresses, app credential changes, and OAuth grant activity associated with this specific OAuth AppId. In addition, we recommend looking for Threat Intelligence alerts on matching of IP against the Graph API activity and service principal activities. We will continue to monitor this incident and will share updates as they become available. We encourage customers to check ConnectWise advisory for more information and additional guidance: msft.it/6013aQBvV. Indicators of compromise (IOCs): - App name: ConnectWise Cloud Backup - AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae - Publisher name: SkyKick - Source IP: 144.172.64[.]128 - User agents: Python-urllib/3.12, python-requests/2.31, python-requests/2.34.2
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We just finished the @virusbtn presentation on #TollBooth. Was fun, if you have any questions feel free to reach out personally or through x 🫡
Replying to @k33b0i
@k33b0i and myself will be presenting today at @virusbtn 2026 in Seville on a cool research around SEO poisoning ! #vb2026 #threat #malware
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Replying to @k33b0i
@k33b0i and myself will be presenting today at @virusbtn 2026 in Seville on a cool research around SEO poisoning ! #vb2026 #threat #malware
571 IIS servers hijacked using machine keys from public docs. @soolidsnakee and @k33b0i break down REF3927 at @virusbtn VB2026 • Today, 15:00 CEST in the Green room. Talk abstract and kill chain outline: go.es.io/3Us9kSw Full blog: go.es.io/4hZ5TKG
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Devon Kerr retweeted
So far, we have seen over 100 compromised tenants. We have taken proactive measures for impacted Huntress ITDR partners. You’ll be hearing from our team via a phone call if you haven’t already.
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Devon Kerr retweeted
This activity is an application sign-in with a vendor credential, not a user sign-in. The IP address from which the activity originated is 144.172.64[.]128.
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ブログ JPCERT/CC Eyes「連続不正アクセス事案の攻撃手法に関する調査」公開。調査の過程で攻撃者がAIを利用して既知の脆弱性のスキャンやAPI経由での攻撃などを実施していたことを確認しました。国内外のWebサービスなどに対する攻撃の状況を紹介しています。^KI blogs.jpcert.or.jp/ja/2026/1…
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Devon Kerr retweeted
RAPID RESPONSE: Huntress has become aware of a widespread security incident involving ConnectWise Cloud Backup (formerly SkyKick). We’ve confirmed that an unknown threat actor abused the access they obtained in SkyKick to pivot to access customers' Microsoft 365 environments. 🧵
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Replying to @SolanaFloor
Here’s a deep dive from @k33b0i and @DanielStepanic that walks through the implant, campaign, and detections and preventions.
We identified a malicious npm package, apexacc/cli, which led us to an operation posing as a Web3 accelerator. Read more about REF8801 by @k33b0i and @DanielStepanic : go.es.io/3TDeUBk The fake accelerator spent months courting crypto founders with free Claude and Gemini credits. Our supply-chain monitor caught the package. It was malicious from its first published version. The 2 Apex packages we examined, and what they deliver: • apexacc/cli: redirects OpenRouter-labeled model requests to an attacker-controlled API • apexacc/audit: MCP server whose 18 tools return fabricated findings • macOS payload: CloudSyncD backdoor • Windows payload: infostealer that exfiltrates to Telegram We asked the operation's scoring tool to rate a project that doesn't exist. It scored 51 in every category, and said its AI scorer was down.
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Devon Kerr retweeted
In a few minutes I will be giving a talk on deobfuscation at the Virus Bulletin conference in Seville. If you are hanging out at #VB2026, come watch it to learn some new things about IDA!
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Devon Kerr retweeted
FWIW we notified the event organizers before it took place. Not sure if a vetting process is feasible with the amount of events going on. But for future event-goers, please be mindful of what you run on your computer. For anyone interested in a deep dive: elastic.co/security-labs/thr….
🚨NEW: According to a Singapore police report filed by an attendee, organizers using the names “Apex Accelerator” and “Stone Venture” promoted a crypto security event called “Don’t Get Played” during TOKEN2049 week. They allegedly pressured attendees to install software that gave the organizers remote control of their computers.
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Devon Kerr retweeted
Analysts @HuntressLabs have been seeing an uptick of malicious MFA apps from the Microsoft Store the last few days. In some cases, they're being delivered via tech support scams through Teams, in others via malvertizing. We've been digging into it, and hopefully we'll have more info soon.
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It’s obvious to those of us established in this space that “cyber research” is being used as a tool for policy arguments and regulatory capture. Your GLM-5.3 blog acknowledges that it’s a necessary recourse for cyber defenders while primarily characterizing it ‘as dangerous as Mythos’. Given the recent vilification of open weights, releasing this blog on the same day as the President’s AI summit feels like a transparent willingness to throw defenders under the bus in pursuit of an AI regulation outcome. There’s a variety of massive categorical problems that cybersecurity desperately needs to address. AI could provide the resources for that. An IoT botnet running a distributed model at sub 10-tokens per second is not representative of any realistic concern. It’s fodder to substantiate some bizarre narrative of self-replication from a sci-fi threat model and we don’t think it’s cute.
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These fucking clowns…
Anthropic says its research found ‘signs of life for AI worms,’ that could colonize household devices. Experts say they have a point. theverge.com/ai-artificial-i…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
Anthropic's research used simplified, controlled tests on emulators with trivial unauthenticated access and did not demonstrate a self-replicating AI worm colonizing real devices; caveats and expert skepticism on hype were downplayed. anthropic.com/research/self-… reuters.com/business/ai-mo… newscientist.com/article/259398…
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I am not the only one who has used these as well, as i mention above the iSOON leak of 2024 gave us a glimpse of threat actors who act like a paid for hire APT with a vast range of capabilities Their Wifi Sesorless Implantable devices with mics allowed them to remotely monitor
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