Gamlingene trakk opp stigen.
Det er kanskje ikke så rart unge trekkes til fløyene og setter fyr på nabolagene sine mens det "liberale, maktbærende sentrum" kjemper for status quo.
Replying to @PepsiGro
Apropos glimrende: Har du lest denne? Ganske mange sjokkerende grafer.
ft.com/content/6986a3b5-12ed…
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Replying to @Winter_arrived @DanielKral1
Orange is growth without Pharma. 2,9 % in 2026
Sigmund Aas retweeted
I know I've been winding people up on the whole dotcom thing. Its intentional. BUT the scariest thing I found in my analysis of 2000 was that the Fed was still taking comfort from "shortages", "bottlenecks" and "order backlogs" in the tech ecosystem SIX MONTHS after the bubble had already burst, and earnings expectations had already plunged.
Then in December, Greenspan reveals:
"I've gotten calls from a number of senior high-tech executives who are telling me that the market is dissolving rapidly before their eyes. But I suspect that a not inconceivable possibility is that what is dissolving in front of their eyes is their own personal net worth! [laughter]".
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Synes det er interessant at folk sier vi er i en "safety stock" boble.
Selv eier jeg Walmart, Coca-Cola, Fastenal, Cintas og mange av disse selskapene som har nådd historisk høye multipler.
La oss ta et eksempel hvis vi hadde kjøpt et selskap for 1 USD i 2000 til en p/e på 15, i 2005 så har inntjeningen doblet seg og la oss si p/e'en til selskapet ekspanderte til 60 så har du gjort 8x fortjeneste på 5 år. Vi velger å holde selskapet og selger ikke, de neste 5 årene holder inntjeningen seg flatt og verdsettelsen halveres til en p/e på 30. Kursen er på 4 USD. Dumt ja?
Men som vi sa vi eier et kvalietsselskap og fra i 2010 til 2020 vil earnings firedoble seg (studier viser at dette ikke er for optimistisk estimat for et selskap av høy kvalitet). hvis da multippelen øker med 50 % fra 30 til 45 så vil aksjekursen være 24 USD i 2020.
Da har du en annualisert avkastning på 17 % over 20 år. Dette er jo mye bedre enn 8x om vi solgte selskapet i 2005. Dersom vi hadde solgt pga pris for å gå for et annet middelmådig selskap så er sannsynligheten større for at vi gjør feil.
Walmart handlet til en p/e på 50 i 2018. Hvis du satt på aksjen siden da har du fått 18,5 % i annualisert avkastning medregnet utbytter. Dette med en multippel kompresjon fra 2018 ned til p/e 43 på forward-estimater. Jeg kjøpte aksjen til en p/e på 22 i 2022.
Walmart hadde en EPS CAGR fra 2006 til 2016 på 5,5 %. Tar man de siste 6 årene har Walmart økt EPS-veksten sin med det dobbelte og de har en e-commerce CAGR på godt over 23 % som begynner å bli en stor del av omsetningen/bunnlinjen. Fortjener den en p/e på 40? Nei.
Jeg vil heller si at vi er i den største techboblen heller enn "safety-boble". Jeg stusser over folk som mener S&P500, techaksjer osv er billige når EPS-veksten der er basert på Financial engineering. Det er her techentusiastene mister meg. Det virker som folk ikke forstår eller vet hva de eier, de skjønner ikke regnskapene i det hele tatt eller "Law of numbers". Så og si alle techselskapene, spesielt Microsoft, Google, Nvidia og Meta (Amazon i mindre grad, og Apple minst) har en EPS som er betydelig "bolet" opp med kunstige tall - fughazi rett og slett. Skal man se på EPS eller den faktiske inntjeningsveksten til techselskapene bør man se på operating Income, årsaken til det er at EPS er proppet opp av mark-to-market gevinster på investeringer i enkelte år. Disse techselskapene har jo blitt like ille som eiendomselskaper. De opp- og nedjusterer verdiene sine med Financial engineering. Ja, Google og Co leverer sterk underliggende vekst, men GAAP EPS er volatil og inkluderer betydelige poster som ikke er operasjonelle (real cash). Fjerner du disse blir bildet mindre attraktivt enn ved første øyekast.
Ser du på NON-GAAP EPS så har Google en CAGR på 13 % (tar du adjusted er den 18 %), men ser du på Coca-Cola så er den faktisk 11 %(!) i samme 5 års perioden.
Hvorfor skal ikke Coca-Cola ha en multippelekspansjon?
EPS-en har ikke bare kommet pga prisøkninger, men de har også økt eps pga salg av bottlers, franchise og blant annet av Monster som ikke er en del av omsetningen til Cola. Se på Equity income. En annen ting er at de har bedret operasjonell effektivitet som bedrer marginene mer enn selve prismiksen. De har også høyere volumer. De har akselerert veksten de seneste årene hurtigere enn de gjorde mellom 2010-2020. Ikke glem at de er største eier av Monster også (som også har handlet til premier som en normal heller enn ikke).
Hvem gir deg penger tilbake først i form av ren fcf-generation Cola eller SP500? Selv etter nesten 50 % oppgang på KO i år. Jo, Coca-Cola. Statisk tilbakebetalingstid for Coca-Cola er 30 år vs 35 for S&P500.
At disse safe-haven aksjene har blitt dyrere, ja 100 %, men boblen er mer rettet mot indeks og hyperscalerne heller enn de mest eksepsjonelle selskapene i verden ala Walmart, Costco, Fastenal, Cintas, Coca-Cola osv.
Som jeg har sagt tidligere "old economy stocks" vil være vinnerne i AI-racet. Hyperscalerne brenner penger, aksjonærenes penger. Gode gamle blue chips har blitt kapitallette og mer effektive mens techselskapene har blitt kapitaltunge.
Hva tenker du om det Ulf - rettferdig eller ei?
Sigmund Aas retweeted
I’m sticking with my belief that if your reasonably competent 12-year old can’t be trusted navigating your city independently either you are overly protective or your city is seriously messed up.
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Under pure inflation targeting, this is inevitably going to happen
Under flexible inflation targeting, this is usually going to happen
Sigmund Aas retweeted
To be clear, I still think it is still a mistake to hike, and definitely a mistake to hike 50 bps in December.
What that mistake means is that the Fed will have to cut sharply in 2H 2027,
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Some people do not learn from mistakes: the European Commission's new fiscal rules of 2024 use 90 percent debt ratio as an additional rule for guiding debt reduction, while this number was debunked more than 10 years earlier. This is not evidence-based but error-based policy.
A 28-year-old UMass graduate student got a homework assignment to reproduce a famous economics paper, couldn't make the numbers match, and found a spreadsheet mistake in a study that politicians had used to argue for budget cuts.
His name is Thomas Herndon.
In 2010, two Harvard economists, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, published a short paper called Growth in a Time of Debt. Its headline finding: once a country's public debt goes above 90% of its economy, growth falls off a cliff. In their numbers, average growth for that group was minus 0.1%.
It came out right after the 2008 financial crisis, and it spread fast. In the US, the Paul Ryan budget cited it as its only evidence on what high debt does to growth.
In Europe, an EU commissioner pointed to the research in a speech. In Britain, George Osborne cited the authors by name.
Herndon was a PhD student at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, taking a class called Econ 753: Applied Econometrics. The big assignment was to pick a well-known paper and replicate it.
He picked this one. He couldn't get the same results.
He asked the authors for their spreadsheet, and they sent it. When he spotted the problem, he called his girlfriend over to make sure he wasn't seeing things.
He wasn't.
> One formula stopped five rows short
> That quietly left out five countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Denmark
> Some available years of data for other countries weren't included
> The way the averages were weighted let a single bad year in one country count as much as decades in another
Herndon and his professors, Michael Ash and Robert Pollin, published the critique in April 2013. Fixing the problems, average growth for the high-debt countries came out to 2.2%, not minus 0.1%.
Reinhart and Rogoff publicly admitted the spreadsheet error. They disputed the other criticisms and defended their broader view. Economists still argue about debt and growth today.
But the formula was wrong, and for about three years nobody had publicly caught it.
A student doing homework did.
Most people assume famous research has been checked many times. Often the first person to really check it is someone with nothing to lose and an assignment due.
Have you ever found a mistake in your boss's spreadsheet and kept quiet?
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Replying to @ole_b_peters @chamath
This difference between expectations and real-life outcome for most is called broken ergodicity in mathematics. We wrote a textbook about redeveloping economics from the starting point of recognizing broken ergodicity.
I'll buy you a copy if this is sounds helpful to you, @chamath.
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Really interesting (and worrying) polling on French pensions
The electorate estimates that for every pensioner we have 6 workers.
In reality it's 1.8/1... Even in 1960s we weren't close to 6/1.
Melenchon's supporters think its 13/1.
Sigmund Aas retweeted
No one needs walkability as much as small children
Non walkable, car-centric environment is an absolutely psychotic, pathological landscape to grow up in
A child needs to roam, and he needs the freedom of roaming, the earlier, the better
This quoted post is unavailable.
Sigmund Aas retweeted
I wanted to prove FSD is safer than human drivers. Genuinely. I went to the data expecting to find the number everyone quotes: one accident per six million miles on FSD versus one per 670,000 for humans. Nine times safer. Case closed.
The claim cannot be made. Not "the data is weak." The comparison itself does not exist.
Start with the equipment. The "human driver" baseline is every car on American roads, and the average American car is over twelve years old. That baseline includes bald tires, worn brake pads, cracked mirrors, and drivers with no emergency braking, no blind spot warning, no lane keeping. A modern Tesla is a rolling sensor suite with the best crash-avoidance hardware ever sold to consumers. So I went looking for the honest comparison: FSD miles versus miles in comparable modern EVs with the same braking, comparable sensors, comparable warning systems. That dataset does not exist in any usable form. Nobody publishes it. Tesla certainly doesn't.
Then the miles themselves. FSD engagement is self-selected. Drivers turn it on in good weather, in daylight, on roads they trust it with. The owner's manual itself warns the system "may not operate as intended" in rain, snow, fog, and low light, which happen to be the conditions where humans crash most. So the FSD number is computed over the easiest miles in the newest cars with the richest, most insured drivers, while the human number absorbs every drunk at 3am and every teenager in a beater.
And it's supervised. Every mile in the FSD column had a human babysitter whose interventions, whose saves, get credited to the machine. The comparison isn't machine versus human. It's machine-plus-human versus human alone, with all credit assigned to the machine.
Darrell Huff described this exact move in How to Lie with Statistics in 1954: if you can't prove what you want to prove, demonstrate something else and pretend they are the same thing. Rolf Dobelli in "Art of Thinking Clearly" calls the other half of it the swimmer's body illusion: swimmers have great bodies because bodies select swimmers. Teslas crash less because new luxury cars with safety suites driven by affluent middle-aged owners crash less. Selection, not software. When Forbes decomposed Tesla's own 2020 report by road type, the Autopilot advantage shrank to about four percent, inside the margin of error. Tesla has refused every request since to release the breakdown.
So here is where I landed. I wanted the claim to be true and provable. It is neither provable nor disprovable with the data that exists. The honest sentence is "we don't know." Anyone who tells you FSD is statistically safer than humans is guessing. Anyone who tells you it's statistically more dangerous is also guessing. The difference is that only one of those guesses is attached to a stock price, a monthly subscription, and a man telling you the feature will be finished next year, every year, since 2016.
When someone quotes you the nine-times-safer figure, ask one question: compared to whom, driving what, in what weather, measured by whom? The silence is the answer.
Sigmund Aas retweeted
sometimes - just sometimes - it is useful to look at macro data in LEVELS.. and from that perspective, the trajectory of the US labour market has clearly shifted in 2026.
no wonder the Fed is comfortable with rate hikes
Sigmund Aas retweeted
This sort of thinking is analogous to the German concept of 'Sippenhaft' or collective responsibility and punishment. It's fascistic and anti-humanist to the core but also incredibly commonplace in the age of hyperpolarisation and identitarian social politics.
Replying to @NewLeftEViews @Will___lloyd
wild how British people obliterated their own lives and just wallow in it. truly the most fucked population on earth. im not sure they even have a future until they stop being such racist muppets. invite immigrants in and the economy will boom. look at spain, this isn't hard
Sigmund Aas retweeted
I can’t shake the feeling that selling your high-beta tech stocks already down 40-70%, to buy low/no growth consumer names at 30-100x earnings…might not be so smart, either.
Sigmund Aas retweeted
No surprise that the Nordic economies are undergoing a boom in datacentre construction - they have the lowest electricity prices for non-household consumers (industry) in the EU and a relatively quick system for planning permissions.
In the first half of 2026, average gas prices for EU households fell to €0.11 per kilowatt-hour (kWh). ♨️
🔸 Prices decreased by 10.2% compared with the second semester of 2025.
More data on household gas prices ➡️ link.europa.eu/vqQ8Xg
Sigmund Aas retweeted
Check out the latest article in my newsletter: Ukesmakro uke 45 2026 linkedin.com/pulse/ukesmakro… via @LinkedIn
Sigmund Aas retweeted
“Demanding economic growth has become unfashionable among some people in Europe” — no serious believes this. It’s a fringe belief amplified by a self-serving half-paranoid, half-delusional media bubble. The real disagreement is about what growth and kind of policies are conducive to growth.






































