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while most of crypto is still debating whether the quantum threat matters,
the team @trailofbits currently auditing zond ($qrl 2.0) is actively reducing the resources needed to attack secp256k1.
think about that for a minute.
Quaverick retweeted
Clicking "don't ask again" can publish your passwords.
When you approve an exact command in Claude Code, it can save that command word for word, secrets included, in .claude/settings.local.json. @apiiro found 1,122 public GitHub copies of that file holding at least one secret, including 379 database passwords, 43 SSH logins and 23 AWS keys.
Deleting the file doesn't fix it, because old copies stay in git history and forks. Rotate the secrets first. Then run git rm --cached, add the file to .gitignore, and pass secrets as $VARIABLES.
Hmmm... WHO COULD HAVE PREDICTED THIS?
thehackernews.com/2026/11/cl…
@AnthropicAI @TheHackersNews #CyberSecurity #DevSecOps #AppSec #ClaudeCode
Quaverick retweeted
Replying to @quantum_safe
Fair caveat from @NCSC. State is the hard part of XMSS. A blockchain helps: every used one-time key index is public on-chain. FYI - QRL has been running XMSS since genesis, 2018. At that time there were 70+ NIST candidates. QRL picked one. Two survived XMSS and LMS for hash-based signature schemes. Running mainnet ever since, QRL testnet V3 for QRL 2.0 coming...... SOON.
Quaverick retweeted
Why a bunker? A powerful enough quantum computer could use an exposed #Bitcoin or #Ethereum public key to work out the private key and spend the coins.
On November 3, Justin Drake said, “This month there is going to be a breakthrough paper that further reduces the run time by an order of magnitude.”
His “bunker mode” proposal is a precaution holders can take today. Move coins to a fresh address that keeps the public key hidden while waiting for quantum-resistant upgrades. That wait could last years.
$QRL took a different approach from day one. Since 2018, it has used quantum-resistant signatures so you can reveal your public key when you spend without giving a quantum attacker a way to forge your next payment.
Quaverick retweeted
120 qubits in Chicago. An attack estimate below 500,000.
@IBM's Nighthawk at UChicago has 120 qubits. Google estimates Bitcoin key attacks below 500,000 physical qubits under its hardware assumptions.
news.uchicago.edu/story/ibms…
research.google/blog/safegua…
A wide gap—not a countdown.
Quaverick retweeted
Solidity developers: you've spent months/years building on blockchains whose underlying cryptography is vulnerable to quantum computers.
That doesn't have to be the case moving forward.
With QRL 2.0, you can bring your Solidity skills to a blockchain built with post-quantum security in mind from the very beginning (sigh of relief).
Start building 👇
qrlecosystem.com
Quaverick retweeted
It is official.
Chains still running quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms now have a deadline to switch to the recommended algorithm.
This is from NIST’s final report on the transition to post-quantum cryptography standards, and it asks @Starknet a fair question: if you are the most agile one, why are you still on elliptic curves?
____________
The simple answer is this. Starknet’s perfect agility score was not about already being post-quantum. It was about being able to switch cryptography without a hard fork.
By design, it can move from elliptic curves to the recommended algorithms. The work is still ongoing in stages.
Before that, let's walk through what NIST just locked in and what is already obtainable on Starknet.
On 27 October, NIST published the final version of Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards.
Two parts matter for high-impact chains:
> Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030
> And are disallowed after 2035
The vulnerable designs include ECDSA, EdDSA, and RSA, still used by most wallets today.
As replacements, NIST points to:
> ML-KEM-768 as the default for keys
> ML-DSA and SLH-DSA for signatures
> LMS and XMSS for hash-based schemes
Starknet’s native account signature uses ECDSA on the STARK curve. That sits in the same NIST quantum-vulnerable bucket.
But Starknet already runs a post-quantum signer for every user, and the account can swap that ECDSA lock for something like ML-DSA or Falcon, while keeping the same address and funds on the chain.
They have already started the transition. Here is what is live so far:
1. The proving layer already uses STARKs, which are hash-based. That covers proofs, not account signatures.
2. Starknet v0.14.3 replaced Pedersen with a BLAKE2s-256 construction for OS program and configuration hashes. That is live on mainnet.
3. OpenZeppelin’s Falcon-512 accounts have moved real value on Starknet mainnet. Experimental and unaudited. Ordinary users cannot adopt it yet.
4. The Falcon Challenge cut verification gas roughly in half in under a week, which makes a post-quantum verifier cheap enough for real wallets to consider.
@EliBenSasson has been saying this for weeks; every chain needs to migrate.
Going post-quantum ready is no longer a choice. Five years from now, if your chain is still exploitable by quantum computers, it'd be serious a skill issue.
The post-quantum path @Starknet is taking is revealing more serious loopholes in blockchain design than I thought.
StarkWare built a framework from NIST's 'general crypto-agility guidance' to test how agile blockchains are, and only one chain scored 8/8.
Bitcoin itself passes 7 of the 8 tests, tied for second among the 10 chains scored, yet it faces one of the hardest migrations.
NIST wrote the guidance but doesn't rate chains, so StarkWare built the 8 questions and scored the networks itself.
It's a bit technical, but let's review it.
➥ Based on NIST's guidance on crypto agility, the 8 questions ask whether a chain can replace its cryptography and keep running:
1. Can an existing account switch to a new signature without a network upgrade?
2. Can its formats handle bigger keys and signatures?
3. Can one cryptographic part be replaced without redesigning the rest?
4. Can old and new signing run side by side undedr migration?
5. Has the transition been tested?
6. Can an attacker be stopped from forcing a weaker algorithm?
7. Can the old algorithm be switched off after migration?
8. Can existing data be migrated?
A point only counts if the path works today under current rules. Anything that needs a future upgrade scores zero.
Across 10 networks the scores are @Starknet 8, @Bitcoin 7, @Algorand 7, @NEARProtocol 7, @QRLedger 6, @Zcash 6, @ethereum 3, @solana 2, @Optimism 2 and @RobinhoodCrypto 1.
➥ The test that separates Starknet from the 7s is the first one.
On Starknet every account is a smart contract, so a wallet can replace its signature check and keep its address and funds. StarkWare confirmed this with @ready_co.
A coin on the Bitcoin network has to move to a new address to use new cryptography, and NEAR and Algorand accounts can only choose schemes the protocol has already switched on, nothing more.
What I respect most is what the score does not claim. It is not a security rating.
QRLedger scores 6 yet shows lower exposure on the same Hub, because its signatures are already hash-based.
Starknet's standard accounts still sign with elliptic curves, and its post-quantum Falcon-512 account is an unaudited mainnet demo that ordinary users can't adopt yet.
So my takeaway is that being able to change and having already changed are two different things, and a chain needs both.
Next, I'll break down where Starknet stands on the second. For now, what's your take on this?
Quaverick retweeted
"This month there is going to be a breakthrough paper that further reduces the run time by an order of magnitude." -Justin Drake, 3 November
What impact could this have on quantum-resistant cryptocurrencies?
$QRL #QuantumSafe #Cryptography #Google
Quaverick retweeted
When the world is hit by a storm, a safe haven makes all the difference. 🌊
Quantum-resistant since 2018, $QRL was built for the future we're moving toward.
A quantum-safe haven for your digital money.
#PostQuantum #QRL
Quaverick retweeted
The post-quantum path @Starknet is taking is revealing more serious loopholes in blockchain design than I thought.
StarkWare built a framework from NIST's 'general crypto-agility guidance' to test how agile blockchains are, and only one chain scored 8/8.
Bitcoin itself passes 7 of the 8 tests, tied for second among the 10 chains scored, yet it faces one of the hardest migrations.
NIST wrote the guidance but doesn't rate chains, so StarkWare built the 8 questions and scored the networks itself.
It's a bit technical, but let's review it.
➥ Based on NIST's guidance on crypto agility, the 8 questions ask whether a chain can replace its cryptography and keep running:
1. Can an existing account switch to a new signature without a network upgrade?
2. Can its formats handle bigger keys and signatures?
3. Can one cryptographic part be replaced without redesigning the rest?
4. Can old and new signing run side by side undedr migration?
5. Has the transition been tested?
6. Can an attacker be stopped from forcing a weaker algorithm?
7. Can the old algorithm be switched off after migration?
8. Can existing data be migrated?
A point only counts if the path works today under current rules. Anything that needs a future upgrade scores zero.
Across 10 networks the scores are @Starknet 8, @Bitcoin 7, @Algorand 7, @NEARProtocol 7, @QRLedger 6, @Zcash 6, @ethereum 3, @solana 2, @Optimism 2 and @RobinhoodCrypto 1.
➥ The test that separates Starknet from the 7s is the first one.
On Starknet every account is a smart contract, so a wallet can replace its signature check and keep its address and funds. StarkWare confirmed this with @ready_co.
A coin on the Bitcoin network has to move to a new address to use new cryptography, and NEAR and Algorand accounts can only choose schemes the protocol has already switched on, nothing more.
What I respect most is what the score does not claim. It is not a security rating.
QRLedger scores 6 yet shows lower exposure on the same Hub, because its signatures are already hash-based.
Starknet's standard accounts still sign with elliptic curves, and its post-quantum Falcon-512 account is an unaudited mainnet demo that ordinary users can't adopt yet.
So my takeaway is that being able to change and having already changed are two different things, and a chain needs both.
Next, I'll break down where Starknet stands on the second. For now, what's your take on this?
Quaverick retweeted
Most "quantum-safe" coins have a whitepaper.
$QRL has Trail of Bits audits, NIST-standard crypto (ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024), university research grants and a seat in the Post-Quantum Cryptography Alliance.
Receipts, all sourced: theqrl.org/contributions
(I hold $QRL. NFA.)
Quaverick retweeted
The ECDSA.fail challenge just crossed 70.0%. 👀
Will crypto migrate to post-quantum security in time?
$QRL #PostQuantum
Quaverick retweeted
Q-Day in 2029?
Justin Drake on November 3:
"Behind closed doors, the CEO of a particular multi-billion dollar quantum company is saying that he has 99% conviction that Q-Day will happen in 2029."
Drake himself puts the probability of Q-Day by 2029 at 10%.
Quaverick retweeted
What if AI breaks our cryptography before quantum computers do?
Justin Drake on November 3:
"AI is coming up with new alien mathematics that may be able to break our cryptography without quantum computers."
Justin Drake on Shor's algorithm runtime for breaking ECDSA...
"This month, there's going to be a breakthrough paper that further reduces the runtime by an order of magnitude. We're going to go from minutes to seconds."
Source: youtube.com/watch?v=rqJ5ir-8…
Most "quantum-safe" coins have a whitepaper.
$QRL has Trail of Bits audits, NIST-standard crypto (ML-DSA-87, ML-KEM-1024), university research grants and a seat in the Post-Quantum Cryptography Alliance.
Receipts, all sourced: theqrl.org/contributions
(I hold $QRL. NFA.)
























