
sooper retweeted
🚨 I've obtained a list of secret watchlists the Department of Homeland Security uses to keep tabs on American citizens
kenklippenstein.com/p/ices-s…
sooper retweeted
After years running SEAL 911 and coordinating incident response, we've identified a critical gap: while many protocols have strong smart contract audits, there's no standardized way for them to demonstrate operational security maturity.
Today we're issuing an RFC for our newest initiative: SEAL Certifications
Full announcement: radar.securityalliance.org/r…
sooper retweeted
you either accept all digital space is ruled by those currently in power, or you demand digital space is its own nation free from the shackles of current regimes.
The Bank of England is proposing a cap on individual stablecoin holdings, limiting ownership to just £10,000–£20,000 per person in the name of “systemic risk.”
This is absurd, and we need to push back against this kind of regulation. Stablecoins issued onchain do not pose greater risks than traditional electronic money issued on more fragile electronic databases.
ft.com/content/d80b21d7-2c7b…
sooper retweeted
hot take
the most underrated reason that crypto will win is because "don't trust, verify" is the only solution for a world that has completely lost trust in every institution it inhabits
sooper retweeted
☆* ・゚ WHAT IS BLOCKSPACE? 。★・
🛸 if you want to learn about crypto but have no idea what's going on, welcome to blockspace!
🌌 all content comes from scratch and is vetted by people who know nothing about crypto
🪐 the official site will be public soon (with a fun twist)
sooper retweeted
VCs who have now deigned themselves to dignify memecoins construe them as “tokenizing community, tokenizing culture, creating new asset classes” and we’re all like, actually we just like playing musical chairs why are you saying all of that stuff it’s making me uncomfortable
sooper retweeted
How much does it cost to 51% attack Bitcoin and Ethereum?
To find out, we simulated what an attack would look like.
Our paper, Breaking BFT, was published today with some interesting results ⬇️
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.…
sooper retweeted
1/ 90% of Arbitrum transactions were inscriptions before the chain stopped
src: dune.com/queries/3287642
sooper retweeted
Anoma Intents: To Infinity And Beyond
What if you could combine ChatGPT with crypto?
What if we could execute transactions with a simple text prompt?
How would that change our behavior? What would that future look like?
I found myself revisiting these questions over and over while I researched @anoma and their intent centric architecture
Anoma’s vision is bold
And in this thread, I want you to understand the implications of what they’re building, so you walk away from with the same feeling I had after my research
If they pull this off, Anoma will change the world
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Intents vs Transactions: What’s the difference?
Transactions
Transactions specify execution path
E.g. I go to McDonald’s two blocks down to buy a Big Mac meal with fries and coke zero for $8
This is your typical onchain transaction:
A specific store (DEX)
At a specific location (Chain)
For a specific item (Token)
At a specific Price
By specifying an execution path, you specify the counterparty and trust it will uphold the quality and availability of your purchase.
However, both factors are out of your control
If the cook undercooks the fries to serve more customers during peak hour, your fries are soggy
If that particular Mickey D’s runs out of patties, you don’t get your Big Mac, and you waste time and resources traveling
It's not the best dynamic for us as buyers, but we're accustomed to it
+++++
Intents
Intents specify desire
e.g. I want a burger with fries and coke zero
As buyers, we express intent and allow third parties to fulfill our desire in exchange for value
You specify your requirement and some conditions for fulfillment, without specifying where it’s from or how it’s obtained
Think of intents as unfulfilled transactions
McDonald’s can fulfill your intent. So can Five Guys, In-N-Out, or the bodega at the street corner
Most of us already use intent-based applications
Every time you use @bananagun, Trip(.)com, or Uber Eats, you're tapping into an intent network
Which typically provide greater access to information and sellers, and complete txns far more effectively and efficiently
However, the effectiveness of intent-based applications is capped by the size and architecture of its network, imposing limitations to the detriment of all participants
I outline a few key issues on the supply and demand side below:
Real life examples these issues, in the context of UberEats, include:
- Surge pricing
- Minimum order size + delivery fees
- Geofenced or unserviceable restaurants
To quote @pumatheuma, intent-specific apps do not scale. Intents do
Which is the perfect framer and segway into...
+++++
Anoma
Anoma is a framework
More specifically, blockchain architecture that allows an infinite # of users (intents) and sellers (solvers) to join and scale the network
Anoma's structure can be broken down as follows:
Anoma intents lay the technical groundwork for a hyper efficient and decentralized economy
When you express an intent in Anoma, you specify the txn and fulfillment terms and “market make” in a literal sense
Users can customize intents with unparalleled modularity, and even run complex algorithms as intents
Intents are shared between nodes to maximize its awareness. After a node receives an intent, it signs the message and passes it to other nodes, who repeat the same process
When the intent is fulfilled, all nodes on the signature trail are eligible for rewards, further improving the efficiency of the counterparty matching process
Solvers compete to match and fulfill intents for rewards.
The computation-heavy nature of solving is best suited for AI agents, which can be bootstrapped from communities with specific needs (TG sniper bots) or built to facilitate core infra (bridging)
If successful, the combination of Anoma as a substrate, AI as solvers, and a universally adopted intent interface (AI prompts) will change the world
Imagine being able to:
(1) Specify all parameters of a transaction with a ChatGPT prompt
(2) Broadcast it to a hyper efficient network of incentive aligned facilitators and solvers; and
(3) Have the intent matched against millions of others for atomic fulfillment
That is the promise of Anoma intents
Here are two more examples to illustrate transactions unique to Anoma’s architecture
+++++
Thank you for reading.
If you found this helpful, please like and RT to share it with your friends
Follow me @wintersoldierxz for more!
sooper retweeted
“It’s only three million dollars” is one of the most terminally online things I’ve ever read
Some of you need to flip burgers again for a few months
sooper retweeted
Big announcement!
We intend to donate 10% of our $EFUT ETF profits (vaneck.com/investments/ether…) to @ProtocolGuild for at least 10 years.
Thank you, Ethereum contributors, for nearly a decade of relentless building & ongoing stewardship of this common infrastructure.
Details 👇
sooper retweeted
Alchemix was exploited with the same Flash loan & Arbitrage tactic.
The contract did not protect against manipulations of the exchange rate calculation via invalid inputs. This allowed profiting from price discrepancies across swaps.
This attack arbitraged the price difference between assets on @AlchemixFi, by exploiting the exchange rate using the flash loaned $WETH.
The key functions involved in the exploit:
-- flashLoan - borrow WETH
-- exchange - swap ETH for tokens at manipulated rate
-- withdraw - get more tokens than expected
-- repay flash loan for less ETH
The same events happened with this Alchemic exploit as with JPEG'd (Refer to the image below):
- 40,000 WETH flash loaned from Balancer to Exploiter
- 19,895 $alETH-ETH LP tokens minted by providing $WETH liquidity to the alETH/ETH Curve pool
- 34,277 more alETH-ETH LP tokens minted by providing additional liquidity to the same Curve pool
- 4,821 alETH withdrawn from Alchemix by removing some liquidity
- 19,895 alETH-ETH LP tokens burned to remove initial liquidity from the Curve alETH/ETH pool
- 15,910 more alETH-ETH LP tokens burned to remove the rest of the liquidity from the same Curve pool
- 40,000 WETH repaid to Balancer to repay flash loan
- 7,258 WETH (~$13.6M worth) is withdrawn as profit and sent to the attacker's wallet.
By providing and removing ETH liquidity from Curve, the attacker was able to profit from price discrepancies across the protocols using the flash-loaned ETH while repaying the original loan amount in the end.
There's no validation on the exchange amounts or slippage protection:
-- When swapping tokens in unknownf04f2707(), there is no check that the exchange is happening at fair market prices
-- The attacker could manipulate the exchange to effectively get more assets than they should
-- The contract directly interfaces with the WETH contract to withdraw/deposit ETH
-- This enables taking flash loans of ETH in the form of WETH
Arbitraging the DeFi Wild West for 6000 ETH (~$11M) at @JPEGd_69
Another Flash Loan + Arbitrage Exploit.
Let me walk you through this (Refer to the image below):
-- The exploiter took an 80,000 $WETH flash loan from @Balancer.
-- They provided 32,431 WETH as liquidity to Curve and received pETH-ETH LP tokens.
-- More WETH was provided to Curve, minting 82,182 more LP tokens.
-- 3,740 pETH was withdrawn by removing some Curve liquidity.
-- The initial 32,431 Curve LP tokens were burned to remove that liquidity.
-- Another 1,184 pETH was withdrawn by burning more Curve LP tokens.
-- The exploiter then exploited the price difference between $pETH and $WETH on the JPEG'd protocol.
-- 4,924 pETH was swapped for 4,285 WETH using JPEG'd's exchange.
-- 80,000 WETH repaid to Balancer to return the flash loan.
-- Subsequently, 6,106 WETH ~$11 million was retained as profit.
sooper retweeted
After sleeping on it a bit, I will try to explain my take on the Ripple case. WARNING: hyper-technical legal nerd shit ahead.
An "investment contract" *is* a contract.
Investment contracts can be express contracts that are entered into to invest in something—this is the classic kind of 'blue sky' investment contract Ripple talked about in its points & authorities.
The 33 Act and Howey jurisprudence created a new way investment contracts can exist—they can be deemed to exist as matter of law when the policy interests of the '33 Act so require. When the Howey test is satisfied, such policy concerns are implicated, and therefore an investment contract exists as a matter of law.
Ripple's theory was different—Ripple's theory was that there must be, as it were, a 'predicate contract' (a non-investment contract) in order for an investment contract to be deemed to exist under Howey. Ripple argued that predicate contract is not an investment contract, but is an 'essential element' of deeming an investment contract to exist.
Torres essentially rejected Ripple's theory—or rather, deemed it irrelevant b/c in every circumstance where she found the Howey test to be satisfied, there *was* a predicate contract (coincidentally (as it were), not (as Ripple argued) "essentially")
The reason why Torres found CEX sales and partner/employee distros were not investment contracts is *not* because they lacked a 'predicate contract'--it is because the Howey test was not satisfied by the objective circumstances of those transactions.
Torres did not find an investment contract to exist b/w Ripple and CEX buyers b/c the third element of Howey was not satisfied (XRP buyers in those txs could not reasonably expect Ripple's entrepreneurial efforts vis a vis their 'investment of money') and therefore no investment contract is implied under Howey. Those XRP buyers could not expect Ripple's efforts from their investment of money b/c they did not even know it was Ripple they were giving the money to. Not because of some lack of a predicate contract between them and Ripple. Naturally, the fact that they did not know they were dealing with Ripple also incidentally means they were not forming a predicate contract with Ripple—but that is a side-effect, not the reason why Howey fails to be met.
Torres did not find an investment contract to exist b/w Ripple and its employees and commercial partners because the employees and partners did not make 'an investment of money' and therefore the Howey test was not satisfied.
In neither of these fact patterns did Torres find that a lack of a 'predicate contract' is what caused the Howey test not to be satisfied. She stuck with the Howey test and simply measured its prongs against the facts.
The legally controversial part of Torres' opinion about CEXs, in my interpretation, is tying together the efforts and the money invested in a way that has not been done before AFAIK. She implicitly is saying that what you must expect are not entrepreneurial efforts in general—but, more precisely, efforts by the recipient of the money to use the money you invested in pursuit of the entrepreneurial efforts. This is a reasonable twist on Howey, but does indeed seem like a twist (and thus potentially controversial). It is different from how both the SEC and Ripple were thinking about the Howey test.
The legally controversial part of Torres' opinion about employees and partners is a very very narrow reading of 'investment of money'--but it could just be that the SEC did not plead enough of a quid pro quo by the employees and partners for receiving the XRP.
Overall, the reasoning of the opinion I think is debatable, but on the specific interpretation I set forth above, I think the opinion is *reasonable*. It is making more sense to me now than it did yesterday. I think most people are mistakenly portraying it as a victory for Ripple's legal arguments but this is clearly not the case, as Torres rejected Ripple's proposed 'essential elements' construal of the Howey test. Torres stuck with the plain language of the Howey test.

































