Please repost this warning to promote awareness and help protect the industry from scammers. 🚨 PHISHING ALERT: FAKE CARRIER411 EMAILS Carrier411 was recently notified about phishing emails appearing to come from: • [email protected] • [email protected] These email addresses and domains are not affiliated with Carrier411. Do not click any links, open attachments, provide login credentials, or respond to emails from those domains. Legitimate emails from Carrier411 are sent only from addresses ending in carrier411.com.

Maybe the driver ran out of paper, Sharpies and packing tape, so he upgraded. Introducing the Chameleon Carrier Placard of the Week: reusable dry-erase authority. 😂

DRY-ERASE AUTHORITY This week's Chameleon Carrier Starter Kit apparently includes: • One whiteboard marker • One ELD sticker • Three trucks reported • Three inspections since 2020 • One FreightGuard report alleging repeated service failures, fraudulent activity, and unethical or deceptive business practices The truck displayed Immanuel Trucking LLC MC1091231 and USDOT 3393867 in erasable marker. Nothing says "permanent federal identity" quite like information that can disappear with the swipe of a dry eraser. Brokers, a handwritten MC number is not verification. Connect the carrier to the truck, VIN, plate and driver before releasing the load.

WHAT THE PINK CHEETAH CASE IS REALLY ABOUT The Pink Cheetah case is being cited in the growing debate over broker transparency. But what did the court actually decide? Here's what really happened if you are not familiar with Pink Cheetah Express, LLC v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC In January 2023, motor carrier Pink Cheetah hauled a load of ice cream arranged by freight broker TQL. Pink Cheetah later requested TQL's transaction records under 49 C.F.R. § 371.3, which gives each party to a brokered transaction the right to review the broker's record of that transaction. TQL refused, relying on language in its broker-carrier agreement stating that Pink Cheetah had waived that right. Pink Cheetah complained to the Department of Transportation. FMCSA subsequently emailed TQL, telling the brokerage to remove the waiver language and comply with the broker transparency regulation. TQL declined to follow FMCSA's guidance, and Pink Cheetah sued. The carrier argued that FMCSA's email constituted an enforceable agency order. In September 2025, the federal district court dismissed the lawsuit. The judge determined that FMCSA's email was guidance, not an enforceable order that Pink Cheetah could privately enforce through that lawsuit. That was a narrow procedural ruling. The court did not decide that broker transparency waivers are valid. It did not decide that TQL never had to provide the records. It certainly did not establish that freight brokers are subcontractors of motor carriers. Pink Cheetah appealed, and the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments on September 11, 2026. An appellate decision is still pending. Based on the narrow legal question before the appellate court, I think TQL will ultimately prevail. This case is about access to broker transaction records and whether a carrier can enforce an FMCSA communication in federal court. It is not a broker liability case involving a crash, negligent carrier selection or a court placing brokers beneath carriers. Do you think the appellate court will uphold the dismissal or send the case back? Follow @realcarrier411. I will break down the ruling and explain what it actually means for brokers and carriers when the decision is released.

BROKER TRANSPARENCY: WHAT EVERY FREIGHT BROKER NEEDS TO KNOW Broker transparency is no longer an issue freight brokers can afford to misunderstand, dismiss or ignore. Here is what the current federal regulation actually requires. Under 49 C.F.R. § 371.3, a broker must maintain a record of each brokered transaction for three years. That record must include: • The consignor • The originating motor carrier • The bill of lading or freight bill number • The broker's compensation and who paid it • Any related non-brokerage services and compensation • The freight charges collected and the date the carrier was paid Each party to that brokered transaction has the right to review the record. But understand what that right does and does not mean. It does not require public disclosure. It does not require disclosure before the load is negotiated. It does not give carriers a legal right to renegotiate an accepted rate after delivery. It does not regulate broker margins or determine what a broker may earn. FMCSA has proposed requiring brokers to maintain electronic records and provide them electronically within 48 hours of a request. That proposal is not currently a final rule. Then there is the unresolved waiver issue. Many broker-carrier agreements contain language stating that the carrier waives its right to review transaction records. The Pink Cheetah Express v. TQL litigation brought those waivers into the spotlight, but the district court did not broadly decide whether broker transparency waivers are valid. The court dismissed the lawsuit because an FMCSA email was guidance, not an enforceable agency order that Pink Cheetah could privately enforce through that case. The appeal remains pending. Freight brokers should not assume the TQL dismissal permanently settled the waiver question. Instead, every brokerage should: • Retain complete transaction records for three years • Establish a consistent process for receiving and documenting requests • Review transparency and confidentiality provisions with legal counsel • Train employees to distinguish existing regulations from proposed rules and agency guidance • Follow the Pink Cheetah appeal and FMCSA rulemaking Broker transparency gives parties access to specific records concerning a completed transaction. It does not convert the carrier into the broker's auditor, regulate the broker's margin or erase the rate the carrier contractually accepted. Know the regulation. Understand what may change. Protect your brokerage. Would your brokerage be prepared if a transparency request arrived today?

KRAFT HEINZ: WE FOLLOWED THE USDOT NUMBERS Ketchup. Mac and cheese. Lunchables. Oscar Mayer. Some of America's most familiar foods travel across the country by truck under Kraft Heinz brands. But what do FMCSA records reveal about the broader crash histories of carriers identified in roadside inspections naming Kraft Heinz, Kraft, Kraft Foods or Heinz as the shipper? Carrier411 followed the inspection records, identified the USDOT numbers and connected the data. We wanted this analysis to be as specific as possible. Instead of searching for every Kraft Heinz product brand, we limited the inspection records to shipper names associated with: • Kraft Heinz • Kraft and Kraft Foods • Heinz We reviewed hundreds of potential shipper names and excluded unrelated paper companies, packaging manufacturers and businesses that merely contained similar names. After consolidating 217 credible spelling, punctuation and formatting variations, our query of FMCSA's current Vehicle Inspection File data identified: • 4,512 roadside inspections • 2,150 distinct USDOT numbers • September 12, 2023 through September 10, 2026 We then followed those 2,150 USDOT numbers into FMCSA's current Crash File data for the same analysis period. Here is what the FMCSA data shows: • 37,285 crash records • 1,542 USDOT numbers with crashes • 12,081 crashes reporting injuries • 16,379 total injuries • 1,015 crashes reporting fatalities • 1,158 total fatalities These figures do not mean Kraft Heinz freight was aboard during every crash, that Kraft Heinz selected every carrier or that the company caused any crash. They represent the crash records reported under those USDOT numbers during the same analysis period for carriers identified through Kraft Heinz related roadside inspections. The FMCSA Crash File data does not identify the shipper or cargo owner involved in each crash. The shipper name starts the investigation. The USDOT number reveals the history. If you value original transportation data, carrier-safety analysis and the stories hiding inside FMCSA records, follow @realcarrier411. We connect the data others overlook.

TQL WINS DISMISSAL IN IMPORTANT BROKER LIABILITY RULING After the Supreme Court's ruling in Montgomery and the $604 million advisory verdict involving C.H. Robinson, freight brokers have every reason to follow liability cases involving carrier selection. Freight broker Total Quality Logistics (TQL), one of the largest freight brokerages in the nation, has now secured an important victory in federal court. The lawsuit arose from a tragic June 2024 crash in Colorado. According to the complaint, a tractor-trailer struck another vehicle, causing steel beams to spill onto the highway and onto a pickup driven by Scott Miller. Miller died from his injuries. TQL was identified as the freight broker for the shipment. The plaintiff sought to hold TQL liable under several legal theories. U.S. District Judge Nina Wang dismissed every claim against TQL because the amended complaint did not allege sufficient facts establishing that: • TQL employed or hired the driver • TQL controlled the driver or the operation of the truck • TQL had a principal-agent relationship with the driver or Monique Trucking • TQL could be held vicariously liable for the driver's conduct • TQL and the other defendants operated as a joint venture or joint enterprise • TQL negligently selected or supervised the driver or motor carrier • TQL affirmatively assumed a specific duty to protect others This distinction matters. The Supreme Court's ruling in Montgomery allows certain state law negligent selection claims against freight brokers to proceed despite federal preemption. It does not create automatic broker liability. Plaintiffs must still allege and ultimately prove the facts necessary to hold a freight broker responsible. Serving as the broker for a shipment does not automatically make the broker the motor carrier, the driver's employer or the party controlling the truck. The claims were dismissed without prejudice, so the plaintiff may attempt to amend or pursue them again. The court did not rule that TQL could never be held liable. But based on the allegations presently before the court, TQL is no longer a defendant. That is an important victory for TQL and freight brokers. The ruling sends a clear message: A freight broker's involvement in arranging a shipment, by itself, is not enough to establish liability for a motor carrier's actions. For transparency, @TQLogistics has been a Carrier411 customer for more than 21 years. Follow @realcarrier411 for transportation data, freight fraud investigations and legal developments affecting freight brokers and motor carriers.

These are serious MOTUS data problems, but brokers should understand exactly what the article reported. The stranded carrier was not shut down for an equipment or driver violation. According to Overdrive, the carrier appeared inactive after its long-standing BOC-3 designation disappeared from MOTUS. The six issues were highlighted during a CAB webinar and reported by Overdrive. They demonstrate why brokers should not rely on a single status field or data source when selecting a carrier. Carrier411 processes all six FMCSA MOTUS registration datasets: Carrier, Authority History, Insurance, Insurance History, BOC-3 and Revoke/Suspend. We also process other FMCSA datasets and incorporate our own proprietary data. We compare current records with historical filings because a vetting platform may accurately display the data it receives from FMCSA even when the underlying federal record is incomplete or incorrect. Brokers should examine authority, insurance, BOC-3 and registration history. They should also look for recent changes, missing filings and inconsistencies between datasets. When the data conflicts, investigate before booking or rejecting the carrier. A legitimate carrier should not lose a load because of a data error, and an unsafe or uninsured carrier should not receive one because of that same error.

This is officially the funniest transportation video of the week. 😂

COSTCO: WE FOLLOWED THE USDOT NUMBERS After analyzing FMCSA inspection and crash data associated with Amazon, USPS, Walmart, Sam's Club and Tesla, we turned our attention to Costco. We started with FMCSA's current Vehicle Inspection File data and identified roadside inspections where the shipper name field contained Costco. The data was not recorded under one consistent name. We identified 555 recorded variations and normalized Costco related shipper names, including: • Costco • Costco Wholesale • Costco Wholesale Corporation • Costco Depot • Costco Logistics • Costco Warehouse • Costco Business Center • Numbered warehouses • Regional distribution facilities • Numerous misspellings Those variations appeared in 9,050 roadside inspection records involving 4,299 distinct USDOT numbers between September 11, 2023 and September 9, 2026. Then we followed those USDOT numbers into FMCSA's Crash File data using the same three-year analysis period. Here is what we found: • 51,497 total crash records • 2,670 USDOT numbers with crashes • 16,830 injury crashes • 1,425 fatality crashes • 614 crashes involving both injuries and fatalities • 17,641 unique crashes involving injuries, fatalities or both • 22,937 reported injuries • 1,631 reported fatalities That does not mean Costco merchandise was aboard the vehicle during every crash. It does not establish that Costco caused the crashes, owned the trucks, employed the drivers or directly contracted with every carrier. It means the carriers appeared in roadside inspections containing Costco related shipper names and also had crashes reported under their USDOT numbers during the same period. The trucks may belong to Costco, direct contractors, subcontractors, private fleets, refrigerated carriers, dry van carriers or other transportation providers appearing in Costco related inspection records. A company name on the freight tells us where to begin. The USDOT numbers tell us where to look next. Follow @realcarrier411 for original transportation data, freight-fraud investigations and the stories hiding in FMCSA records.

TESLA: WE FOLLOWED THE USDOT NUMBERS After analyzing FMCSA inspection and crash data associated with Amazon, USPS, Walmart and Sam's Club, we turned our attention to Tesla. We started with FMCSA's current Vehicle Inspection File data and identified roadside inspections where the shipper-name field contained Tesla. The data was not recorded under one consistent name. We identified and normalized 311 variations of Tesla-related shipper names, including: • Tesla • Tesla Inc. • Tesla Motors • Tesla Gigafactory • Tesla Energy • Tesla Service • Tesla warehouses • Tesla distribution centers • Location-specific Tesla facilities Those variations appeared in 6,060 roadside inspection records involving 1,643 distinct USDOT numbers between September 11, 2023 and September 9, 2026. We then followed those USDOT numbers into FMCSA's Crash File data using the same three-year analysis period. Here is what we found: • 28,727 total crash records • 983 USDOT numbers with crashes • 9,598 injury crashes • 777 fatality crashes • 352 crashes involving both injuries and fatalities • 10,023 unique crashes involving injuries, fatalities or both • 12,996 reported injuries • 883 reported fatalities That does not mean Tesla freight was aboard the vehicle during every crash. It does not establish that Tesla caused the crashes, owned the trucks, employed the drivers or directly contracted with every carrier. It means the carriers appeared in roadside inspections containing Tesla related shipper names and also had crashes reported under their USDOT numbers during the same period. The trucks may belong to Tesla, direct contractors, subcontractors, vehicle haulers, parts carriers or other transportation providers appearing in Tesla-related inspection records. A company name on the freight tells us where to begin. The USDOT numbers tell us where to look next. Follow @realcarrier411 for original transportation data, freight-fraud investigations and the stories hiding in FMCSA records.

WE FOLLOWED THE WALMART AND SAM'S CLUB USDOT NUMBERS Our analysis of current FMCSA roadside inspection data identified: • Walmart: 35,488 inspections involving 6,733 distinct USDOT numbers • Sam's Club: 1,861 inspections involving 979 distinct USDOT numbers • Overlap: 371 USDOT numbers appeared in both lists • Combined: 7,341 distinct USDOT numbers These inspection records covered September 10, 2023 through September 8, 2026. We followed those 7,341 USDOT numbers into FMCSA's Crash dataset for the same period. Here is what we found: • 77,717 crash records • 4,539 different USDOT numbers with crashes Those crash records included: • 25,629 crashes involving at least one injury • 2,206 crashes involving at least one fatality • 977 crashes involving both • 26,858 crashes involving an injury, fatality or both • 35,032 total reported injuries • 2,523 total reported fatalities That does not mean Walmart or Sam's Club freight was involved in every crash. It also does not mean Walmart or Sam's Club caused them. It means the same carriers appeared in roadside inspections naming Walmart or Sam's Club as the shipper and in FMCSA crash records during the same period. This analysis is based entirely on USDOT number matching between FMCSA's Vehicle Inspection and Crash datasets. Important: The data does not establish that Walmart or Sam's Club freight was being transported when these crashes occurred. It identifies crash records associated with the same USDOT numbers found in the qualifying inspection records. Not every truck carries a Walmart or Sam's Club logo. But when we follow the USDOT numbers, the scale of the transportation network comes into focus: thousands of company-operated and third-party carriers moving freight through Walmart and Sam's Club facilities across the country. The logo tells only part of the story. The USDOT numbers reveal the network behind it. If you value original transportation data, freight fraud investigations and the stories hiding in FMCSA records, follow @realcarrier411. We connect the data others overlook.

The @ICEgov tip line to report CDL fraud is now LIVE. Call 866-347-2423 to save American lives by reporting dangerous and fraudulent CDL practices.

TWO CARRIERS. ONE ALLEGED WIRE FRAUD SCHEME. One of our Carrier411 broker customers submitted two related FreightGuard reports today. MC1606200 Eagle Creek Transport, LLC Williamstown, KY MC1435908 Venice Freight, LLC Commerce City, CO The broker alleges the two carriers participated in a coordinated scheme involving an impersonated customer, fabricated load tenders, deceptive dispatch communications, forged paperwork and a "ghost fleet" used to obtain broker funds. According to the FreightGuard reports, the broker preserved digital evidence, IP records, email headers and documents for law enforcement. The broker also states that a felony police report and an FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center complaint were filed. Neither reported company provided a response before the reports were released. These are allegations submitted by a Carrier411 broker customer. FreightGuard reports reflect the reporting company's account and should be evaluated alongside independent verification and all available evidence. When two carriers appear in the same alleged scheme, investigate the connection, not just the individual MC numbers.

WE FOLLOWED THE USPS USDOT NUMBERS After we followed the USDOT numbers from FMCSA roadside inspections naming Amazon as the shipper and matched them against FMCSA's current Crash File data, someone suggested we evaluate the United States Postal Service (USPS) the same way. So we did. FMCSA data in the current Company Census File shows 49,154 active registrants that indicated they haul U.S. Mail. That is self-reported MCS-150 cargo information. It does not prove that every one of those registrants currently transports U.S. Mail or holds a USPS contract. The FMCSA Census data figure provides context. But for our analysis, we focused on querying data in FMCSA's current Vehicle Inspection File, which contains roadside inspection records. Our query found 26,744 inspections where the shipper name matched one of 299 normalized variations associated with USPS, U.S. Mail, postal facilities and mail transportation. Those roadside inspections involved 4,069 distinct USDOT numbers between September 9, 2023 and September 7, 2026. We matched those USDOT numbers against FMCSA's current Crash File data using the same analysis period. Here are the results: • 42,498 crash records • 2,585 different USDOT numbers with crashes That does not mean USPS mail was involved in every crash or that USPS caused them. It means those carriers appeared in FMCSA roadside inspection records containing USPS related shipper names and also had crashes reported under their USDOT numbers. Again using FMCSA Crash File data, we found 42,498 crash records involving the 4,069 USDOT numbers identified through USPS related inspection records. Those crash records included: • 14,001 involving at least one injury • 1,115 involving at least one fatality • 483 involving both • 14,633 involving an injury, fatality or both • 19,084 total reported injuries • 1,257 total reported fatalities This analysis is based on USDOT number matching between FMCSA's current Vehicle Inspection File and Crash File data. FMCSA notes that its Crash File data may contain separate records for multiple commercial vehicles involved in the same crash. These are crash records, not necessarily 42,498 unique crash events. Important: This does not establish that USPS mail was aboard the vehicles when these crashes occurred. It also does not establish that every carrier held a direct USPS contract. It shows that the same USDOT numbers appeared in roadside inspections containing USPS related shipper names and in FMCSA crash records during the analysis period. Some may represent USPS operated vehicles. Others may be contractors, subcontractors, consolidators or carriers moving mail through a larger transportation network. The USPS eagle logo may not be on every trailer. The data still reveals the enormous transportation chain connected to America's mail.

WAS THE TRACKING LINK A TRAP? FreightGuard reports involving stolen freight and high-value electronics are climbing today. This report describes a load of high-value electronics that never reached its destination. The broker reported having photographs of the truck at the shipper and alleged the tracking information was fraudulent. The carrier responded that someone posing as a representative sent what appeared to be a normal rate-confirmation link. The carrier says that link was then used to compromise its email and phone, steal its operating identity and book loads with other brokers. Who and what do you believe? This is how sophisticated freight theft works: • Compromise a legitimate carrier • Take control of its communications • Book freight using its identity • Provide fraudulent tracking • Disappear with the load Tracking data is only as reliable as its source. A tracking link does not prove it is connected to the truck carrying your freight. When high-value freight is involved, brokers and shippers must take extraordinary steps to verify the carrier, dispatcher, driver, truck, trailer, VIN and plate before releasing the shipment.