
乗り物🚅🚞🚗🚌🚒🚛✈️⛴️🛑🛣️(欧州被れですが欧州以外も興味あり)/SUPER EUROBEAT🕺/可愛いもの💖/他 アイコンは #推しごと女子メーカー2 ⚠️思想は皆様の期待に添えない場合がございます TL見てないので御用はリプ引用DMで🙇
Joined June 2014
- Tweets142K
- Following888
- Followers866
- Likes151K
Pinned Tweet
The ‘Japanese Model’ India rejected — signaling system was never in the yen loan
#BulletTrainIndia #MumbaiAhmedabad #MAHSR #MumbaiAhmedabadBulletTrain #IndianRailways #HighSpeedRail #Shinkansen
The ‘Japanese Model’ India rejected — signaling system was never in the yen loan(ENG) | series0008 #pixiv pixiv.net/novel/show.php?id=…
「インドが蹴った『日本型』——円借款条件に含まれなかった信号システムが問うもの」の英訳版を作りました。
If the MAHSR were to be constructed under the Shinkansen development scheme, the following scenario could be envisaged. The construction and operational entities would be separated. A public body equivalent to Japan’s Railway and Transport Organisation would construct and own the infrastructure, whilst an Indian operating company (such as Indian Railways) would pay a lease fee to operate the service. The lease payments would be calculated within the limits of the ‘benefits derived from the commencement of operations’ and would be paid at a fixed rate for a certain period following the opening (approximately 30 years in Japan). The financing structure would change significantly. Instead of large-scale, low-interest loans from Japan via yen loans, the majority of the construction costs would be borne by the Indian central government and the states along the route (Maharashtra and Gujarat). In Japan, the balance after deducting the lease payments is shared between the national government (two-thirds) and local authorities (one-third); however, if this model were applied in India, the burden on state governments would increase, necessitating political coordination. Furthermore, the separation of the management of parallel conventional lines may also be conditional upon reaching an agreement with the states through which the line passes. Flexibility regarding the opening date and technical specifications will be further reduced. For Shinkansen projects, there is a system in place whereby conditions such as the funding outlook, financial viability, the consent of the operating entity and the treatment of parallel conventional lines are politically confirmed prior to the start of construction. If this were applied to the MAHSR, conflicts between Japan’s provision of technology and India’s requirements for localisation and compliance with international standards would become more likely, increasing the risk of further delays to the opening beyond current levels. Furthermore, as ownership of the infrastructure will remain with public bodies, decision-making regarding future technological upgrades and system modifications is likely to become more complex.
ihra-hsr.org/en/hsr/_pdf/con…
IHRAは整備新幹線スキームまで「輸出」する気か!?
純粋に日本特有の国内事情でしかないでしょあんなの
2
218
ihra-hsr.org/en/hsr/_pdf/con…
IHRAは整備新幹線スキームまで「輸出」する気か!?
純粋に日本特有の国内事情でしかないでしょあんなの
ihra-hsr.org/en/
Whilst the IHRA is an organisation that ‘raises awareness’ abroad of the advantages of Japan’s Shinkansen, it does not promote the development of a common platform for export or facilitate technical exchanges between the various JR companies.
ihra-hsr.org/en/hsr/data.htm…
This site fails to mention that the domestic Shinkansen network is effectively divided into two (or, in reality, three) separate, independent systems—a fact that renders through-service impossible. Furthermore, this very situation is packaged as an integral part of the overall system being offered for export.
1
77
Shinkansen Network and Development Types
ihra-hsr.org/en/hsr/_pdf/net…
This PDF outlines how the objectives behind Shinkansen construction have evolved over time—from "Type 1" to "Type 2" and then "Type 3"—but this progression represents an increasing departure from the core strength of the Shinkansen model: the use of dedicated lines that are completely separate from conventional railway tracks.
Of course, it also fails to reflect the fact that the network is, in reality, completely partitioned—but that’s another matter…
81
ihra-hsr.org/en/hsr/shinkans…
Japan still seems to cling to a dichotomy—contrasting its own Shinkansen system, which operates entirely on dedicated tracks, with the European model, where high-speed trains also run on conventional lines. Yet, if every section were built on dedicated tracks, the two approaches would effectively be the same.
Replying to @series0008
The answer is none
Siemens Velaro the high speed used in China,Spain, Germany, Turkey,Egypt,Russia,Channel Tunnel and later on Italy, USA, Vietnam didn't succeed because it was rigid
It was flexible
Flexible for signalling,coach width, gauges and local making
That's why it's sold everywhere
2
443
If you were to ask those in the Japanese online sphere who criticize India, "Well, then, which country would buy an entire Shinkansen system—lock, stock, and barrel—without any hesitation?" they would likely be unable to provide a concrete answer.
Replying to @series0008
They are looking for an ideal small to medium country that is not too big to host full scale manufacturing and rich enough to buy thier trains
Well shit why would they
1
1
253
Please excuse me; I am interested in Japan’s export of its Shinkansen technology, as this represents the first instance of an attempt to enter a market involving the development of a large-scale network—a sector that is currently seeing a great deal of activity.
I have absolutely no intention of disparaging India. On the contrary, my comments are a critique of the structural issues on the Japanese side.
This quoted post is unavailable.
serie0008@避難先はpixiv見てください retweeted
「リニアが開業しないということはありえるのか」
今までタブーだったこの質問が出たということは、相当雲行きが怪しくなってきた証拠。様々な事実が明るみに出てきた今、現実的な話をせざるを得なくなったのだろう。
nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOFD1…
If there was an assumption that "India, lacking experience with high-speed rail, would simply accept the package recommended by Japan," such a view may have bordered on over-optimism—or even arrogance—presuming that "while they might compare it with European alternatives, they will ultimately settle on the Japanese system." In reality, India showed an interest in domestic production and international standards from an early stage; perhaps this was dismissed too lightly, under the assumption that "they simply don't know enough about high-speed rail."
However, if the Japanese side merely attributes this to the fact that "it was India" and fails to address its own insularity and inflexibility regarding exports, it is likely to encounter similar failures in projects with other nations.
Replying to @series0008
There's a chance they underestimated india capabilities to negotiate. Japanese companies have historically looked down upon india. Be it honda, nintendo or this.
Setting aside the situation within Japan, I believe there is no future for Shinkansen exports—nor should there be—unless we move beyond the current framework, which forces a choice between a mere replica of the Tokaido Shinkansen or one of the Tohoku Shinkansen.
1
8
488
新幹線が「国内事情に特化した特殊な高速鉄道」だというのは売る側は分かりきっているはずなんだから、「特殊な国内事情とは違う場所」に売るなら、輸出向け評価の実験線なり一部実験区間なり、「東海道のコピペか東北のコピペか」ではない専用の試験車両なり(過去の試験車両は高速化が基本目標で、輸出は明確に意識はしていない)を国内で整備するほうが良いと思うけど、そういうこと一切やらないでしょ?
そういうとこ見ると、国とJR各社で新幹線輸出に対する温度差があるんじゃないかって疑うよね
The sellers surely know full well that the Shinkansen is a "specialized high-speed rail system tailored to unique domestic circumstances." If they intend to sell it to regions with different conditions, it would make sense to develop the necessary infrastructure within Japan—such as dedicated test tracks or experimental sections designed for export evaluation, or specialized test trains that aren't merely carbon copies of the Tokaido or Tohoku lines (previous test trains focused primarily on increasing speed, with no clear intent for export). Yet, they don't do any of that, do they?
Looking at this, one can't help but suspect that there might be a difference in enthusiasm—or a gap in commitment—between the government and the various JR companies regarding Shinkansen exports.
2
186
serie0008@避難先はpixiv見てください retweeted
To emphasize my point, Honda has always held off on selling it's best in india (which lead to tvs taking its market share and companies like royal enfield rising) even in games. Japanese companies never tried to expand in india. There's a historic president.
If there was an assumption that "India, lacking experience with high-speed rail, would simply accept the package recommended by Japan," such a view may have bordered on over-optimism—or even arrogance—presuming that "while they might compare it with European alternatives, they will ultimately settle on the Japanese system." In reality, India showed an interest in domestic production and international standards from an early stage; perhaps this was dismissed too lightly, under the assumption that "they simply don't know enough about high-speed rail."
However, if the Japanese side merely attributes this to the fact that "it was India" and fails to address its own insularity and inflexibility regarding exports, it is likely to encounter similar failures in projects with other nations.
「新幹線」の世間的・対外的なポジティブイメージ(残念ながら日本政府もこちら側でしょう)と、その技術的な複雑さの実態(劣っているという意味ではない)のズレも、他国との摩擦の一因であるように思う
要するに、「新幹線」というブランドの強さが、技術的な実態の複雑さを覆い隠してしまっている面があるんじゃないかということ
9
470
serie0008@避難先はpixiv見てください retweeted
RRTS is so popular that many don't even know Meerut Metro exists, and operates on the very same tracks.
この「地域分割した各社同士で競争」という国鉄末期の謳い文句、度々批判してきたけど「ヤードスティック競争」を制度的に導入するスキームだったなら理解できるんですよね
実際は後付けのようですが…
jstage.jst.go.jp/article/tps…
1
1
130
地域分割で会社間の競争を企図するなら、こういった第三者機関の設置が必要だっと思います(古いポストの引用失礼します)
👇
xitter.cf/houmeisya/status/19000…
Replying to @houmeisya
そのうえで、利用者保護の(消費者保護の)公的な機関は「絶対に」必要でしょうと。
競争原理が働かない(働かすのが難しい)ことの代償だと言える。
※二種鉄道事業者を「推奨」して、寧ろ積極的に競争原理持ち込む思想もありだとは思うけど、うまくいくかどうか想像がつかない。
1
2
74
serie0008@避難先はpixiv見てください retweeted
黒罐と225のストライプがお似合いでした。
krl.ldblog.jp/archives/47955…




















