rnd @chaoslabs defi hip hop 📚 fully personal pov on crypto and stuff
Joined November 2023
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Ramil Amirov retweeted
This April I put $32k of savings into starting a quantum computing company.
Six months later that money's gone and I have a published blueprint for a 10-qubit machine, costed line by line: 57 parts, part numbers, suppliers, lead times, ~$100k hardware cost.
What I don't have is a technical co-founder.
The offer: 50% of the company, as an equal partner. No salary until the $500k lands; I'm not paying myself before then either.
What you'd be building: a 10-qubit quantum computer on NV centres, desktop scale, running near room temperature. Triple Peltiers get it to about -74°C for under $250, so there's no $300k cryostat. It ships calibrated and stays that way, so the buyer never calibrates or maintains anything.
I've done the blueprint, the costing and the suppliers, and I'm raising the money. Designs go in for the February 2027 fab run. What I don't have is someone who has built hardware with their hands at a quantum company, a semiconductor one, or anywhere the physics had to survive a fab line. I need someone who hates design by committee, isn't married to a modality, and wants to invent new physics.
Quantinuum's 98-qubit Helios paper had 186 authors. I want to do this with 5.
UK based, but I'd move for the right person. DMs open.
The parts list: docs.google.com/spreadsheets…
The mission: thenewcomputers.com/mission
Ramil Amirov retweeted
absolute cinema, must watch
gg @imyoungsparks
Around The Block: Korea 🇰🇷
Do Kwon & The Korean Comeback Cycle
Out now on YouTube: youtu.be/2SyPdDuPrDc
Presented by @BNBCHAIN
nice vaults tutorial for russian speakers, with a small parts featuring me as an “expert”
if you are interested in vaults curation and its future, watch this!
youtu.be/_DwLXLss204?is=0SS-…
Ramil Amirov retweeted
I have a different view on the @ArrakisFinance attack, analyzed by @exvulsec... (xitter.cf/exvulsec/status/209152…)
The root cause has nothing to do with spot oracle price manipulation! (While it is true that the protocol uses the spot oracle price.)
Instead, the attacker stole the unclaimed LP fees with a "sandwich" attack. Here is why:
The mint and redeem functions both require the input and output to be proportional to the `deposited LP + unclaimed fees + idle balance` in the two tokens. That means, if the pool holds x:y of token A:token B (in the LP position, plus fees and idle balance), your input/output will also be proportional to x:y. Thus, you cannot manipulate the price to fool the vault, because no matter how the tokens are priced, your minted vault shares are simply proportional to your deposit relative to the actual amounts of the two tokens.
However, when burn() is called, the fees are collected. These fees are then compounded into the pool. This creates the vulnerability.
The attacker then performs: swap1 → mint → swap2 → burn → swap3. After swap1, and later when burn() is called, the collected fees add more liquidity back to the LP, so when swapping back in swap3, the attacker can end up with more tokens.
To sum up, the root cause is an "atomic sandwich attack" on the idle balance plus unclaimed swap fees, not "oracle manipulation". This also explains why the hacker left a significant amount lot of LP in the vault untouched.
Fun fact: I reviewed their code back when Gamma (another Uniswap V3 liquidity manager) was exploited in 2024. Arrakis's vault requires proportional input/output, so it is not vulnerable to the same issue (while Gamma allows you to input tokens in any proportion and reads the spot oracle price).
🚨 EXPLOIT ALERT | Ethereum
@ArrakisFinance
The Arrakis V1 / G-UNI ENS–WETH liquidity-manager vault (0x7c687f775a3b73bbab0e15832f24caab5d53bdde) was drained via a Uniswap V3 spot-price manipulation.
Root cause: the vault's mint() and burn() value its Uniswap V3 position off the instantaneous pool.slot0() spot price, with NO TWAP or deviation guard on the user deposit/withdraw path. The vault does have a TWAP check — but it only guards the manager's rebalance() swap, never mint/burn.
Attack flow (one tx):
1. Flash-loan 1,800 WETH from Morpho Blue
2. Swap ~145 WETH → ENS on the UniV3 pool to skew the tick / spot price
3. mint() vault shares at the distorted valuation (deposit ~1,253 WETH + ~13,160 ENS → ~4,487 shares)
4. Swap back to restore the price
5. burn() the shares → redeem a richer token mix than deposited
6. Convert surplus, repay the loan
Attacker profit ≈ 2.94 WETH. No privileged access required — pure permissionless flash-loan + spot manipulation.
Attacker: etherscan.io/address/0xa3B09…
Exploit contract: etherscan.io/address/0x028d9…
Vault: etherscan.io/address/0x7c687…
Tx: etherscan.io/tx/0x6ae3af4b2f…
wake up new wmt alpha challenge just dropped!!
last year's challenge was really fun, you can ask any participant, and they’ll tell you the same thing
I finished 7th last time, and it gave my career a nice boost - some big guys noticed me, and I ended up joining one of them)
I have no doubt that @FrankResearcher and his team did a wonderful job putting together another challenge for all of us, and I’ll try my best to solve every task this year as well
strongly recommend everyone give it a shot!!
Ramil Amirov retweeted
it's hard for me to support "distillation attack" as a term when enormous amounts of online material got "distillation attack"ed during the big webscrape pretraining era
i get it, but it's a very strange double standard that's hard to get behind.
what is so different in the @wintermute_t select vault?
while 95% of vault curators on @Morpho supply stablecoins into the most basic BTC/ETH/yield stablecoins markets, wintermute is doing things more interesting, and the flow of money here is very interesting
🧵
A big step for Wildcat's composability across DeFi. @wintermute_t´s Armitage Select vault on @Morpho now lends against v-wmtUSDC: the ERC-4626 wrapper of their Wildcat USDC market token.
Wildcat debt is now usable as collateral in secondary lending markets. The composability loop is now live.
app.morpho.org/ethereum/vaul…
5/ so what's happening? wintermute is borrowing at ~8.5% via wildcat and supplying it back into its own vault at ~4.3% (or ~6.2% counting only the v-wmtUSDC market)
of course, this negative carry on the seed is not sustainable, but the seed is what makes the loop spin, and every loop is levered demand for wintermute's own unsecured debt.
great bd by morpho
w @maccanomics
Pulled this stat today and was surprised by just how much of @Morpho's activity is tied to @coinbase's.
USDC and cbBTC account for 53% of all deposits on Morpho. Looking deeper, Coinbase users make up 83% of cbBTC deposits and 59% of USDC deposits on the protocol.
The influence extends to the borrowing side as well. Roughly $1.2B of the $2.3B USDC borrowed on Morpho comes from Coinbase users borrowing against their cbBTC.
At this point, Coinbase is not just a distribution partner. It has effectively become the growth engine behind Morpho.
In many ways, the relationship is symbiotic.
Coinbase acts as the distribution layer, onboarding users and assets, while Morpho acts as the yield layer, helping those users put their capital to work onchain.
A good reminder on how distribution is often a stronger moat than tech.
big bank put $100 tag on ethereum:0x1f9840a85d5af5bf1d1762f925bdaddc4201f984 for 2030 and the token pumped ~25% in a couple of days
I want to support @Kunallegendd article that maybe Uniswap will not succeed from RWA in the future
🧵
trading on AMMs is looking questionable too, compared to the alternatives.
consider perp DEXes: most of the majors are building their own internal spot markets while staying decentralized, and they offer a better deal - lower fees, order matching, less slippage.
propAMMs have the same advantages, without even the hassle of bridging in and out of "perp" chains.
the only use case I see for AMMs going forward is low-liquidity markets: the long tail that doesn't have enough demand to support proper quoting and market-making on the book
xitter.cf/haydenzadams/status/20…
