Defense Researcher / Engineer @RAND | future tech, drones, air defense, EW & Russia-Ukraine war | Husband, father, skier | Views my own. RT ≠ endorsement.
Joined March 2009
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So I got a lot of questions about the A-50U and Russia. Here is an update that explains why these aircraft are so important for air defense. I'll also explain why Russia won't be getting replacements anytime soon
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft are basically flying quarterbacks. They are able to see farther than most sensors. They can talk to almost everyone. Their crews can control many assets.
This all comes down to understanding the curvature of the Earth. The figure with the Red and Gray "blobs" is an annotated image of the reasonable area a radar can cover. Most radars must have a line of sight to the target. Because of the curvature of the Earth, a surface radar can only see a low flying object 10 to 20 miles away. An airborne radar can potentially see it from over 200 miles away.
This has two major implications. The first is it provides much earlier warning. Up to an hour for a strike drone and 10 to 30 minutes for a cruise missile. The second is it covers a much larger area easily replacing a dozen or more surface radars.
This means those ground radars can stay turned off until they need to target a missile. A radar that is turned off is much harder to find as there are no radar emissions to detect.
This line of sight advantage extends to communications as well. These aircraft have crews specially trained to control air and ground assets. They see and talk to almost everything.
Ukraine has spent considerable effort hitting these on the ground and the air. They take a lot of time to replace. The last A-50 was produced around 1992. Even with upgrades over the years, they have been out of production for a while. Note that the base IL-76 airframe is still produced, the radar requires special structures and reinforcements.
The replacement, the A-100, has still not entered serial production after over a decade. The radars are very expensive to build and require a lot of specialized parts. In 2025, Ukraine targeted one of the facilities with FP-1 drones, destroying the test aircraft and damaging the factory. Work has likely been on hold since.
New aircraft are unlikely for several years.
Russia is stuck with the half dozen or so they have for now. Basically just enough to protect Putin and occasionally help Russians fend off increasingly frequent Ukrainian FP-1 and FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles. The fact Ukraine has sent UK Storm Shadow missiles at near max range into Russia shows how far these A-50U aircraft are kept from the front.
Until tomorrow. Have a nice Sunday.
Russia was able to use one of its last remaining A-50U airborne to provide aerial surveillance.
Its radar unobstructed by the curvature of the Earth was able to detect Ukrainian FP-5 Flamingo cruise missiles from far away and defeat them.
This employment is likely exploitable.
Ukraine spent significant effort over the past few years to destroy A-50 aircraft for this very reason. These are officially called "Airborne Early Warning and Control" AEW&C for a reason. There powerful radars can see far and their onboard crew is able to direct aircraft and other assets.
While the exact number operating is unknown, it is reportedly in the low single digits. You need 4 to keep one up 24/7 and with 7 you can almost keep 2 up 24/7.
Given Russia is now being tracked as using these, Ukraine can plan operations around them where before they had to take the risk the sircraft were in the air.
Now that Russia is using them, Ukraine's drone strikes will be less effective due to early warning, but Ukraine can also plan around it. It may be a wash in terms of air defense.
Michael Bohnert retweeted
As someone that studied SAR for my master’s thesis, the fact that Russia chose a SAR satellite to mess with is kind of cool. Obviously I condemn the action, but ICEYE must be causing them a lot of trouble to do this.
Cosmos 2612 has been maneuvering closer to an ICEYE SAR satellite. Using OEL, I created these visualizations to help understand what’s going on.
The animation shows a 3D RIC frame animation of the recent motion
The second figure shows how individual parameters evolved over time. You can see that 2612 matched the orbital plane of the SAR satellite and closed the in-track separation.
The third figure shows that between gaps in TLEs the motion of 2612 changes in an unnatural manner. This indicates that a maneuver occurred.
The last figure shows 2D cuts of the 3D animation.
What do you think it’s up to?
This is a militarized space equivalent of a child playing the "I'm not touching you" as they move their finger incredibly close to your eye.
Getting this close and being this overt is not an inspection, it is signaling. It is demonstrating that COSMOS 2612 could hit ICEYE at any time.
Here is the problem, if the two satellites collide, you could get the Kessler Effect/Kessler Syndrome. The Kessler Syndrome is when space debris is created that keeps colliding in an uncontrolled manner. This could render that and other orbits unusable for a very long time.
This is a very dangerous action as one mistake has global implications for generations.
Nice work by @HamWa07 to stay on this and report so well. Do watch his video.
🛰️ Right now, a Russian satellite is flying in close formation with a Western commercial-ish radar satellite, and makes another close pass in the next ~10 minutes.
COSMOS 2612 has matched orbits with ICEYE-X36, a Finnish-built commercial-ish radar (SAR) satellite. They're circling the planet together under half a kilometer apart, making a close pass almost every orbit (~95 min), the next one around 01:38 UTC (18 Oct), every one at essentially zero relative velocity.
Being upfront: at these separations (sub-km, down to tens of meters), the exact distance is below the precision of public tracking, so treat specific metre figures as indicative. What ISN'T ambiguous is the orbit match and the ~0 m/s closing. This is deliberate, controlled formation flying, the behaviour associated with close-up inspection, not a chance conjunction (collision).
And it's targeted. Cosmos 2612 is the ONLY one of a six-satellite cluster (Cosmos 2609–2614) to have maneuvered: it raised its orbit in the public data ~47 km, drifted into phase with X36, then dropped back to settle alongside it. The other five never moved.
The Vampire system is probably the most cost effective existing solution against cruise missiles and high-speed jet drones. Here is why.
For those new to the system, it takes existing battle tested Hydra 70 mm rockets with seekers and off-the-shelf optics to make a capable SAM out to a few kilometers. It has optional integration with Link-16 for network coordination, electronic warfare systems for jamming+passive detection, and modern radars. The whole package can be mounted on any vehicle or physically deployed in a container.
The biggest advantage of these and similar systems is the off-the-shelf nature. The Hydra 70 rockets are an upgrade from a 1940s design with newer propellant that has been upgraded in 1972. It has a very proven track record with multiple producers of compatible rockets including the Canadian CRV7 and Turkish Cirit. Further, there are more than a half dozen seeker options by different developers. That is a very diverse supply chain by defense standards.
The cameras are also relatively common with multiple possible vendors. These could be stripped from other legacy military and commercial systems if necessary.
Latest costs are reported in the $20,000-$30,000 range per missile. This is a cost advantage over jet OWA drones.
Given that it can be put on the back of standard pickup trucks and small boats really lowers the threshold for force integration and costs. Defenses can be rapidly moves around populated areas for local point defense.
The small size of the rockets allows dozens of reloads to be carried in the truck. The ~25 pound weight also means a single person can reload the system. This is a major advantage over larger SAMs.
These systems can be stored for years in a compact form and deployed only when needed to defend cities.
A less mentioned advantage is it can be fired against ground and maritime targets. Same vehicle can provide defense against almost any mid-tier threat.
Its biggest drawback is lack of range. While Hydra missiles have a high peak velocity sufficient to stop cruise missiles, it has sufficient energy/g's over limited ranges ~1 km. Its range is longer versus lower speed Banderols and Geran-5s but jet drone interceptors can defend a wider area against those threats.
I expect more competitors soon, but the VAMPIRE and similar systems will likely be a very common battlefield and city defensive system. These are a "write the check" solution to jet drones.
Ukraine needs more and so will the West.
For more information on VAMPIRE and similar systems l3harris.com/all-capabilitie… en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hydra_… and en.defence-ua.com/news/how_m…
Ukrainian strikes on Yandex and Sber data centers are eroding Russia’s compute and data sovereignty.
These facilities do far more than host AI models. They handle large-scale data storage and retention, enable information flows between companies, and support corporate research, fraud detection, digital security, and the smaller services that keep everyday systems running.
Sber’s Balakovo site is not a minor backup. It is a multi-year expansion project intended to more than double Sber’s capacity. Construction began years ago and still has phases remaining.
Data-center equipment currently carries multi-year lead times. Replacing or expanding capacity at scale requires capital and time Russia is unlikely to spare. Russian businesses and government entities will face growing pressure to contract these services from outside the country.
The practical result is a further loss of domestic data-center and compute control. Chinese providers are the most likely to absorb the displaced demand. Looking at the included chart shows the top 10 countries with data center capacity. Russia isn't there. This is another concrete example of Russia continuing to fall behind in critical digital infrastructure.
Figure from @IDCAorg
This is the perfect example of military engineering.
As a defense engineering research, these types of creative adaptations are what I love seeing.
The camouflage is spot on. The angles are covered and the shape matches the flatness of the terrain. Even though the tank was made larger, the camouflage pattern broke up the characteristic dimensions.
Characteristic dimensions are the measurable aspects distinctive features of the system. The are often what is detected first and critical for classifying a target (realizing it is an armored vehicle) and identifying a target (it is an Abrams tank).
On this grassy terrain, the characteristic feature length has gone from the length of the tank to either the vertical height of the treds or the tank barrel. Easily a 10X reduction. The biggest signature is the grass moving behind it.
The cage has great separation from the vehicle with no clear angling that matches the angles of the tank nor direct positioning. An off-angle explosion does less damage.
As I have mentioned before, the biggest drawback isn't the limited mobility of the turret. It is lack of 360 degree firepower. I assume they have cameras on the sides to get 360 degree views.
These tanks must operate as part of a team. Either drones in the air, drones on the ground, or people. Given these are support vehicles, likely not a problem. However, it does make command and control slightly more complicated as the tank has to keep better dynamic positioning relative to its peers.
Overall, one of the better tank mods seen to date.
Finally, the biggest surprise is I didn't realize any Abrams tanks were still functioning in Ukraine.
And here is another video that includes a Bradley modified the same way xitter.cf/NOELreports/status/210…
Ukraine’s CODE 9.2 launched a mechanized raid toward Anishchyne and Vodiane, using a tank and Bradley equipped with specially designed anti-drone protection to fire directly on Russian forward positions. Reconnaissance and Vampire attack drones covered the armored vehicles, while a CODE 9.2 FPV intercepted and destroyed a Russian FPV approaching the tank. The unit says all objectives set by 475th Separate Assault Regiment commander Oleksandr Nastenko were achieved. #Ukraine
Ukrainian strikes have repeatedly hit Yandex data centers in recent days.
Yandex is Russia’s dominant search engine and ride-hailing platform, a distant third in e-commerce, and a significant but not leading player in cloud infrastructure and domestic AI.
Most service disruption should be temporary. The harder constraint is hardware. 1/4
Restoration is still constrained by the global AI hardware queue.
U.S., Chinese, and other hyperscalers are absorbing available CPUs, GPUs, high-bandwidth memory, and related components on multi-year contracts. Yandex cannot match that purchasing power under sanctions and tight supply.
Replacing or expanding capacity at the affected sites will take years even if the company remains intact.
3/
One near-term observable effect is already visible in network data.
AS13238 (Yandex) is overwhelmingly bot traffic. The Cloudflare Radar chart shows a sharp drop in HTTP requests from that ASN coinciding with the recent strikes.
Russian-origin bot volume is likely to stay lower for a while as infrastructure recovers.
These are great interceptors for defending a densely populated country like Japan. Their range and speed can intercept most propeller based cheapter threats. Japan's mountain terrain gives these a slight range advantage versus having to start from kow flat lands.
Co-production could start almost immediately and benefit Japan, Ukraine, and other partner nations.
Japan has signed a contract for interceptor drones from Ukrainian firm SkyFall, Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said. Model, quantity, price and delivery date were not given. He said Tokyo is pushing for a fast delivery.
SkyFall builds the P1-SUN family that Ukrainian crews fly into Shaheds. The company claims more than 3,500 kills in six months.
The JetKiller, shown at Farnborough in July, is listed at 370 km/h (230 mph), 30 km (18 miles), 9,000 m (29,500 ft) and a 500 g (1.1 lb) warhead. Footage in late September was said to show one hitting a Geran-5. SkyFall is aiming for 50,000 a month and has an Airbus C2 deal.
Japan separately ordered Terra Drone’s Terra B1 into mass production on 25 August after a 38-firm competition.
#Japan #SkyFall #P1SUN #Ukraine #Interceptor #CUAS #DroneWars
Last night Ukrainian forces struck the Redkino Experimental Plant in Tver region.
The facility produces components of Decilin-M, a high-energy synthetic fuel used in Kh-55 and Kh-101 cruise missiles. Russian officials have stated it extends range by 250–300 km. That is roughly 10% over earlier fuels. It also supplies a broader set of chemical additives used across Russian military systems.
A 10% range gain is not dramatic on paper. In practice it changes the operating assumptions for the rest of the kill chain. Launch platforms can stay farther from defended airspace, or the missile can fly a longer, more survivable route. Lose the margin and those choices reverse: aircraft must close the distance (more airframe hours, higher exposure) or the missile must take a shorter path (easier to detect and intercept).
For the Ukraine war the effect on Kh-101/Tu-95 pairings is limited; the baseline range already covers the relevant geography. The same 10% becomes material in a higher-end contingency against NATO air defenses, and it matters immediately for shorter-range systems that operate closer to the edge of their envelopes.
Fuel and munition additives also affect more than range. They can improve handling safety, storage stability, and the consistency of performance. In some cases, the difference between a clean detonation and a partial one, or between a routine fueling evolution and an accident, sits inside that same narrow band.
Loss of the plant is recoverable through substitution or stockpiles. The substitutes will force more restrictive planning assumptions such as tighter geographic limits, more conservative routing, and higher maintenance margins until full capability is restored.
A really good write-up on Decilin-M is here bmpd.livejournal.com/1748599…
A thank you to @DomNicholls and the @Telegraph for having me on the Pod where we also discuss the latest developments in drone warfare and gps jamming resistant navigation.
A Russian glide bomb struck a bus stop and two civilian buses in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, killing at least 33 people.
Regional Governor Vadym Filashkin said: “The Russians are targeting civilians. For them, a bus with passengers is an attractive target precisely because one hit can kill as many people as possible."
On today’s episode of Ukraine: The Latest, @DomNicholls and RAND Engineer @mbohnert discuss whether the location was deliberately targeted.
Listen here: linktr.ee/UkraineTheLatest
Ukraine says its strikes have taken out more than half of Russia’s refining capacity. Live crude runs do not show that.
My bottom-up tracker (41 refineries plus the mini-tail, version 2) puts national throughput at about 3.22 mb/d as of 6 Oct. That is down 0.36 mb/d over the last 30 days.
Prewar runs were about 5.5–5.6 mb/d. A 3.2 reading is roughly a 40% cut, not a fall through half. Other estimates sit lower. Some are closer to 3.7.
Nameplate capacity is higher than either number. It is never fully used. Maintenance and demand always leave slack. Skipping turnarounds will cost Russia later. It is not what is binding this week.
Runs have actually ticked up over the past week as the strike tempo on refineries eased. This is the third time throughput has fallen to about 40% below prewar and the refinery campaign has then slowed. Last fall, July, and now
3.2 mb/d is the bottom of the historical domestic-demand band (about 3.2–3.8). That is roughly where Moscow has gotten uncomfortable before.
The attached chart is the 30-day range with errors and demand.
Sources and methods links are attached
Here is a more detailed post from @KSE_Institute that mote closely matches mine. xitter.cf/KSE_Institute/status/2…
1/9 🛢️ Russia’s crude oil and oil product exports fell to their lowest level since 2018 in August. Despite higher prices, oil export revenues increased by just $0.3B to $13.9B. September Russian Oil Tracker by @KSE_Institute 👉 e.surl.li/jwjdin
Here is my refinery snapshot and a link to the Methodology
xitter.cf/mbohnert/status/210306…
