
Horn Observer is an independent news portal covering #Somalia and #HornofAfrica. Email: info@hornobserver.com
Somalia, Horn of Africa
Joined August 2015
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Horn Observer retweeted
Alhamdulillah! 🎓🎊
Honored to have graduated with my second M. degree, M. Public Policy at @BlavatnikSchool, @ExeterCollegeOx
Deeply grateful to my family, mentors, & @UniofOxford for making this journey possible through a full scholarship.
A World Better Led, Better Governed
Horn Observer retweeted
NO PRESIDENT IS ABOVE SOMALIA’S CONSTITUTION.
I welcome Robert Stryk’s statement from Washington DC. I call on Somalia’s leaders to respect the Supreme Court’s independence and on international partners to support a peaceful path to credible elections.
#Somalia #RuleOfLaw
Horn Observer retweeted
The dismissed supreme court chief justice Bashe Yusuf has called on president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to respect the ruling by five supreme court judges declaring his presidential mandate expired.
The ruling also rejects the removal of the chief justice.
Horn Observer retweeted
Editorial: #Somalia's Security Dilemma: Can a Nation Dependent on Foreign Forces Defend Itself Against #Al-Qaeda? -
ow.ly/leTY5104oEU via @hornobserver
Horn Observer retweeted
PRESS STATEMENT
Kampala, Monday, November 2, 2026
UPDF Commences Withdrawal of Bilaterally Deployed Troops in Somalia
The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) has embarked on the drawdown of troops deployed in Somalia under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government effective immediately. The first cohort of troops under the phased withdrawal operation have already arrived back in Uganda. The operation to withdraw troops deployed in Somalia under bilateral arrangements will be completed in the next few days.
The UPDF will gradually withdraw all its forces in Somalia, including those currently deployed under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) by the close of 2027. This will mark the end of Uganda’s enduring 20-year peace and stabilization support operations in Somalia, permitting the Somali Armed Forces to assume full responsibility for security in the country.
CHRIS MAGEZI
Colonel
Acting Director Defence Public Information (DDPI)
Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs/UPDF
Horn Observer retweeted
Jawar Mohammed, blaming Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and foreign media for the Moyale crisis is a convenient way to outsource Ethiopia's own failures. Moyale is divided between Oromia and the Somali Region, both governed under Ethiopia's federal system.
The fighting even involved regional police and militias. Reducing a decades-old territorial and administrative dispute to two clans fighting, while inventing a grand foreign conspiracy without presenting evidence, is political deflection. Where is the accountability of Ethiopia's regional leaders and federal government?
The Quartet-Tsimdo Alliance’s Eastern Front Gambit
The Moyale incident was yet another round of clashes between the rival Borana and Gari clans. It erupted over a minor dispute, as communal violence often does. Fortunately, the fighting did not spread beyond the immediate locality and has since subsided. Yet some politicians and sections of the media have made relentless efforts to turn the conflict into a broader confrontation between Oromos and Somalis, and even between Somalia and Ethiopia.
Growing indications suggest this media agitation may have been part of a broader effort by the Quartet alliance, comprising Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, to open new pressure points -along Ethiopia’s southern and eastern fronts. Such a move would have compensated for setbacks on the northern and western fronts, where Quartet member states sought to wage a proxy war against the Ethiopian government by supporting the Tsimdo (Survival) alliance.
→ The Northern and Western Setbacks
Initially, the Quartet sought to use the Tsimdo alliance to mount a two-front offensive against the Ethiopian government. In the north, TPLF and Wollo Fano forces were expected to advance against federal positions. In the west, the plan reportedly envisaged TPLF’s Army 70 advancing from Sudan, linking up with Gumuz militants, Gojjam Fano, and the OLA, and opening another front.
The plan assumed that TPLF and Wollo Fano forces could quickly break through federal positions along the Raya-Kobo and Sekota fronts. That calculation failed when TPLF forces suffered a major defeat in the opening days and retreated from the area. The speed with which ENDF and TPF forces subsequently advanced into Tigray, capturing Mekelle within ten days and establishing control over much of the region within two weeks, appears to have caught the Quartet and its Tsimdo allies off guard.
The plan to open a western front also failed to materialise for several reasons. The first setback came when an ammunition shipment intended for TPLF forces in Sudan was reportedly bombed near Shiraro on 6 June, disrupting preparations for an offensive. The second came on 1 August, when TPLF’s Army 13 suffered a devastating defeat in the fighting at Shererina. Together, these setbacks severely undermined plans to launch offensives along the western approaches, from both the Humera and Asosa directions.
Beyond these operational setbacks, TPLF’s rapid defeat on the northern front left other alliance members, particularly Fano and the OLA, with less incentive to intensify their own offensives against the federal government.
→ The Eastern Front Calculation
Against this backdrop, the Moyale incident may have appeared to the Quartet as an opportunity to shift its approach. By exacerbating the dispute and attempting to transform it into widespread communal violence across southern and eastern Ethiopia, with potential spillover into neighbouring countries and territories, including Somalia, Kenya, Somaliland, and Djibouti, the strategy would have served several tactical objectives.
One objective would have been to distract the federal government from the northern theatre and potentially compel it to redeploy some military resources to contain the situation. This, in turn, could give the TPLF breathing space to regroup and strengthen its insurgency, while potentially delaying an Ethiopian response to Eritrean military movements.
The resulting instability could also create an opportunity for the Quartet to direct additional resources towards strengthening Eritrea’s defences, resupplying the TPLF and other armed groups, and fomenting further communal violence in other parts of Ethiopia.
→ Why the Strategy May Backfire
The apparent effort to open a southern and eastern front has so far failed to produce the wider escalation. The Moyale conflict was contained, and although the inflammatory agitation was followed by attacks against Oromo migrant workers in Borama, the violence did not spread into the wider conflagration that the alleged plotters may have hoped to provoke.
The consequences of the attempt to open an eastern front could ultimately prove contrary to the Quartet’s objectives.
Rather than forcing the federal government to withdraw troops from the northern theatre, the Moyale crisis did not even compel it to deploy federal forces stationed in southern and eastern Ethiopia to the conflict zone. Instead, the government managed the crisis through internal political mechanisms within the ruling party.
The more serious possibility is that, rather than distracting the federal government, the agitation in the east could accelerate a confrontation with Eritrea. Abiy Ahmed may conclude that allowing the situation to drag on would give Eritrea and its allies more time to foment instability inside Ethiopia. If that calculation prevails, the effort to open an eastern front could end up hastening the very confrontation the Quartet may have hoped to manage on its own terms.
Horn Observer retweeted
Another 169 Somalis were flown home from Libya this week. That's good news, and the government deserves credit. But every count I found measures who left, and none measures who stayed.
Libya's own anti-migration department told Somalia's human rights commission in August that nearly 300 Somalis are still held in its prisons. I couldn't find a published list of them, or of where they are.
Two young men from the first flight say what happens to them: beatings, for men and for Somali girls. I checked what I could against UN, Amnesty and MSF records. Some of it matches. Some I couldn't confirm.
opr.org.so/news/the-count-st…
169 Somalis flown home from Libya this week: third landing in under 7 weeks. But a young man on the first flight says his worry is the friends he left behind, where officers beat men and girls alike. The count stops at the airport.
opr.org.so/news/the-count-st… @Ismailabukar_
Horn Observer retweeted
#Somalia CPJ calls on authorities in the breakaway republic of Somaliland to release journalist Abdirahman Mohamed Ege, who has been held without charge since October 22 in the city of Hargeisa after interviewing a presidential aspirant.
Read more: cpj.org/?p=630590
Horn Observer retweeted
The army sent more than 200 vehicles and about 2,000 troops down the road to Burhakaba after a force coming from Baidoa had already been ambushed and turned back hours earlier.
That is the part of Monday's Jameeca disaster nobody in government has explained.
The defence ministry says 75 militants were killed. Al-Shabaab says it killed 321 soldiers. AFP could verify neither. Soldiers told Reuters their dead were in the dozens, and one said he helped carry 40 bodies to Mogadishu hospitals. The ministry has published no figure for its own losses.
My argument is that this defeat was predictable, and may have been anticipated by the other side. I cannot prove what Al-Shabaab knew. But the operation was announced publicly on 24 October, the plan was a pincer, the column was heading down a road where its own side had just been ambushed, and a source told me jets left Mogadishu only after the ambush began, though I could not confirm the timing.
When all of that is true, the question is not only how Al-Shabaab won. It is who ordered the advance, what air cover was planned, and what those jets hit.
A 2023 statement by the information minister said security and government staff were passing information to Al-Shabaab. My interviews with more than 500 convicted members point the same way.
Full piece in @hornobserver:
hornobserver.com/articles/37…
Horn Observer retweeted
Ogaal Party presidential candidate @abdulkareemjama hosted a working luncheon today with presidential candidate @OmarSharmarke. The two leaders discussed the country’s political situation and stressed the need for broad political consensus on an inclusive electoral framework.
Horn Observer retweeted
The Southwest State Somalia conflict is now entering a new phase.
AI is now joining the force to spread fake news and AI-altered images being shared as real evidence.
One such example is the use of altered Al-Jazeera English photos of 2016 which included Al-Shabaab's then Galgaduud Governor "waali", Hassan Yaqub Ali, who appeared in Al Jazeera interviews in November 2016.
However, the same image is now being circulated to looklike that Hassan Yaqub Ali was among fighters that captured Diinsoor town, Baay region, on 16 October 2026 alongside pro-Laftagareen's forces.
@sjs_Somalia found the image was altered to add to the Diinsoor monument as background to the photo.
It is also strange that how sudden certain Somali speaking media are spreading that the Southwest State conflict is being accused of Kenya and Ethiopia.
READ THE FULL REPORT:
sjsyndicate.org/2026/10/19/a…
🚨On Sunday, 18 October 2026, an AI-altered photo was widely circulated by some Somali media outlets, journalists, and numerous social media influencers in Somalia and beyond, claiming that “senior Al-Shabaab leader Hassan Yaqub Ali has reportedly appeared” among the fighters who seized Diinsoor town in the Bay region of Somalia’s Southwest State on 16 October, following an offensive by pro-Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed “Laftagareen” forces.
🔴 Some news sites and social media accounts went further, claiming that the conflict across Southwest State “was part of a foreign-funded campaign” allegedly “facilitated by Ethiopia and Kenya”.
🔴 These posts and the AI-altered photo garnered thousands of views across various platforms, including Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube.
Horn Observer retweeted
Somalia’s government arrests journalists. It has also found a quieter method: giving critics government jobs.
Hussein Abdulle Mohamed owned SYL Somalia TV. NISA arrested him in April 2024. In May 2025 he was publicly accusing security forces of night raids on journalists’ homes. In June, Benadir made him its Information Director. By September he was praising the president’s leadership as “100 percent” good.
@golfyare posted a caption in May 2025 about politicians who criticize the government as opposition, then do the same things once in power. Five months later he became Villa Somalia’s communications director. Six days after that, police in Mogadishu detained six journalists. He said nothing.
Not every case fits. Daauud Aways Jama, a longtime BBC Somali journalist, became Minister of Information. CPJ tried to reach him about the 2025 arrests and couldn’t. Al-Caddala is a different story: he came up through state media, so he’s a loyalist rewarded, not a critic silenced. Ali Yare, a government defender, was also given a post.
That’s the point I make in the piece. The job itself guarantees the silence. Hiring a well-known critic isn’t only about gaining a friendly voice. It removes an unfriendly one.
I checked every case against dated records and said where the proof is thin. Full piece for @pambazuka @Pambazuka_News News, with 17 sources:
pambazuka.org/Who-Tells-Soma…
@NUSOJofficial @pressfreedom
Horn Observer retweeted
Fighters loyal to former SW state president seize Burhakaba
via @hornobserver
hornobserver.com/articles/37…
Horn Observer retweeted
#Somalia: High #flood risk reported at Jowhar; river levels expected to reach bankfull in coming days. Flooding from river breakages between Jowhar and Balcad may affect farms and villages.
Flood peak at Doolow has decreased, but Juba river levels at Luuq may rise in coming days.
faoswalim.org/resources/site…
Horn Observer retweeted
#ElNiño flooding and river breakage started in some areas in Middle Shebelle in #Somalia. #SRCS/#BishaCas teams, with the support of
@ICRCSomalia_
already on the ground to dispatch sandbags to fix the breakage.
Horn Observer retweeted
📍Somalia | Millions face a potential climate disaster as a record El Niño looms. Families risk losing their homes, and farmers their crops to floods or leave their fields unplanted, raising the risk of hunger next year.
📽️ Footage available for media 👇🏽
ms.spr.ly/6018aSm8g
Horn Observer retweeted
Over 1,000 Kenyan men were allegedly tricked into joining Russia’s military through false promises of lucrative civilian jobs, according to the US.
Kenyan records confirm 354 Kenyans linked to the conflict, with 84 killed or missing in action.
Amnesty International calls this human trafficking and documents how recruiters across several countries use false promises of jobs, high salaries, legal status, and citizenship to lure foreign nationals into Russia’s military.
Read the full report: amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2…
Horn Observer retweeted
I strongly caution against the provocations and military movements by forces acting under the instructions of outgoing President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, around the homes of former national leaders in Mogadishu. These actions are reckless, endanger lives, and risk plunging the capital into insecurity while deepening an already serious political crisis. It should be made unequivocally clear that the outgoing President will bear full responsibility for the consequences of these provocations.
I reiterate, military force, threats and intimidation cannot resolve Somalia’s political crisis or its wider national challenges. The only way forward is through inclusive dialogue and a political agreement on the elections, one that restores certainty, safeguards stability and delivers a government with genuine political legitimacy.
Horn Observer retweeted
#SWALIM Forecast (7–13 Oct): 50–150 mm of rain expected across much of northern & central Somalia, Bay, Bakool & Hiiraan, posing flash flood risk. Shabelle river levels rising rapidly posing moderate flood risk at Jowhar and downstream; Juba remains low.➡️:faoswalim.org/resources/site…

































