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Horn Observer is an independent news portal covering #Somalia and #HornofAfrica. Email: info@hornobserver.com

Somalia, Horn of Africa
Joined August 2015
Empty Chairs in Nairobi, Twenty-Five Years Without Answers for the Eritrea 16 hornobserver.com/articles/38…
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If this proves to be true, it will be a major blow to the Somali government.
A diplomatic note reported to have been issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of #Kosovo has expressed concern regarding the whereabouts of nine members of a delegation from #Somalia who visited the country from October 25 to October 28. The note states that on October 27, these members departed from their designated accommodations without notifying the responsible officials and failed to appear at the airport at the scheduled departure time. The press statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded that the Government of Somalia urgently provide information regarding the location, status, and safety of the nine individuals.
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Alhamdulillah! 🎓🎊 Honored to have graduated with my second M. degree, M. Public Policy at @BlavatnikSchool, @ExeterCollegeOx Deeply grateful to my family, mentors, & @UniofOxford for making this journey possible through a full scholarship. A World Better Led, Better Governed
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NO PRESIDENT IS ABOVE SOMALIA’S CONSTITUTION. I welcome Robert Stryk’s statement from Washington DC. I call on Somalia’s leaders to respect the Supreme Court’s independence and on international partners to support a peaceful path to credible elections. #Somalia #RuleOfLaw
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The dismissed supreme court chief justice Bashe Yusuf has called on president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to respect the ruling by five supreme court judges declaring his presidential mandate expired. The ruling also rejects the removal of the chief justice.
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PRESS STATEMENT Kampala, Monday, November 2, 2026 UPDF Commences Withdrawal of Bilaterally Deployed Troops in Somalia The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) has embarked on the drawdown of troops deployed in Somalia under bilateral arrangements with the Federal Government effective immediately. The first cohort of troops under the phased withdrawal operation have already arrived back in Uganda. The operation to withdraw troops deployed in Somalia under bilateral arrangements will be completed in the next few days. The UPDF will gradually withdraw all its forces in Somalia, including those currently deployed under the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) by the close of 2027. This will mark the end of Uganda’s enduring 20-year peace and stabilization support operations in Somalia, permitting the Somali Armed Forces to assume full responsibility for security in the country. CHRIS MAGEZI Colonel Acting Director Defence Public Information (DDPI) Ministry of Defence and Veteran Affairs/UPDF
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Jaw​​ar Mohammed, blaming Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan, Somalia and foreign media for the Moyale crisis is a convenient way to outsource Ethiopia's own failures. Moyale is divided between Oromia and the Somali Region, both governed under Ethiopia's federal system. The fighting even involved regional police and militias. Reducing a decades-old territorial and administrative dispute to two clans fighting, while inventing a grand foreign conspiracy without presenting evidence, is political deflection. Where is the accountability of Ethiopia's regional leaders and federal government?
The Quartet-Tsimdo Alliance’s Eastern Front Gambit The Moyale incident was yet another round of clashes between the rival Borana and Gari clans. It erupted over a minor dispute, as communal violence often does. Fortunately, the fighting did not spread beyond the immediate locality and has since subsided. Yet some politicians and sections of the media have made relentless efforts to turn the conflict into a broader confrontation between Oromos and Somalis, and even between Somalia and Ethiopia. Growing indications suggest this media agitation may have been part of a broader effort by the Quartet alliance, comprising Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, to open new pressure points -along Ethiopia’s southern and eastern fronts. Such a move would have compensated for setbacks on the northern and western fronts, where Quartet member states sought to wage a proxy war against the Ethiopian government by supporting the Tsimdo (Survival) alliance. → The Northern and Western Setbacks Initially, the Quartet sought to use the Tsimdo alliance to mount a two-front offensive against the Ethiopian government. In the north, TPLF and Wollo Fano forces were expected to advance against federal positions. In the west, the plan reportedly envisaged TPLF’s Army 70 advancing from Sudan, linking up with Gumuz militants, Gojjam Fano, and the OLA, and opening another front. The plan assumed that TPLF and Wollo Fano forces could quickly break through federal positions along the Raya-Kobo and Sekota fronts. That calculation failed when TPLF forces suffered a major defeat in the opening days and retreated from the area. The speed with which ENDF and TPF forces subsequently advanced into Tigray, capturing Mekelle within ten days and establishing control over much of the region within two weeks, appears to have caught the Quartet and its Tsimdo allies off guard. The plan to open a western front also failed to materialise for several reasons. The first setback came when an ammunition shipment intended for TPLF forces in Sudan was reportedly bombed near Shiraro on 6 June, disrupting preparations for an offensive. The second came on 1 August, when TPLF’s Army 13 suffered a devastating defeat in the fighting at Shererina. Together, these setbacks severely undermined plans to launch offensives along the western approaches, from both the Humera and Asosa directions. Beyond these operational setbacks, TPLF’s rapid defeat on the northern front left other alliance members, particularly Fano and the OLA, with less incentive to intensify their own offensives against the federal government. → The Eastern Front Calculation Against this backdrop, the Moyale incident may have appeared to the Quartet as an opportunity to shift its approach. By exacerbating the dispute and attempting to transform it into widespread communal violence across southern and eastern Ethiopia, with potential spillover into neighbouring countries and territories, including Somalia, Kenya, Somaliland, and Djibouti, the strategy would have served several tactical objectives. One objective would have been to distract the federal government from the northern theatre and potentially compel it to redeploy some military resources to contain the situation. This, in turn, could give the TPLF breathing space to regroup and strengthen its insurgency, while potentially delaying an Ethiopian response to Eritrean military movements. The resulting instability could also create an opportunity for the Quartet to direct additional resources towards strengthening Eritrea’s defences, resupplying the TPLF and other armed groups, and fomenting further communal violence in other parts of Ethiopia. → Why the Strategy May Backfire The apparent effort to open a southern and eastern front has so far failed to produce the wider escalation. The Moyale conflict was contained, and although the inflammatory agitation was followed by attacks against Oromo migrant workers in Borama, the violence did not spread into the wider conflagration that the alleged plotters may have hoped to provoke. The consequences of the attempt to open an eastern front could ultimately prove contrary to the Quartet’s objectives. Rather than forcing the federal government to withdraw troops from the northern theatre, the Moyale crisis did not even compel it to deploy federal forces stationed in southern and eastern Ethiopia to the conflict zone. Instead, the government managed the crisis through internal political mechanisms within the ruling party. The more serious possibility is that, rather than distracting the federal government, the agitation in the east could accelerate a confrontation with Eritrea. Abiy Ahmed may conclude that allowing the situation to drag on would give Eritrea and its allies more time to foment instability inside Ethiopia. If that calculation prevails, the effort to open an eastern front could end up hastening the very confrontation the Quartet may have hoped to manage on its own terms.
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Another 169 Somalis were flown home from Libya this week. That's good news, and the government deserves credit. But every count I found measures who left, and none measures who stayed. Libya's own anti-migration department told Somalia's human rights commission in August that nearly 300 Somalis are still held in its prisons. I couldn't find a published list of them, or of where they are. Two young men from the first flight say what happens to them: beatings, for men and for Somali girls. I checked what I could against UN, Amnesty and MSF records. Some of it matches. Some I couldn't confirm. opr.org.so/news/the-count-st…
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