
People First - Co-Founder @SentirVzla. Family, 💃+ 🏀& driving positive impact #ExtraordinaryTogether |🇻🇪 in the heartLIFE4JC: John14:6.Tweets are my own
Joined February 2010
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Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
Didas had a big week at Microsoft Ignite! Check out his experience exploring the conference, attending sessions and making some new friends along the way. #MSIgnite
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
Group photo time 📸 The whole WWT + Softchoice crew at Booth #551, plus one very small robot who refused to miss the photo.
Thank you for a great week, #MSIgnite!
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
Happening now 🎙️ Brian Feldt joins Gerardo Amaya of @Microsoft and Craig McQueen of @Softchoice as they discuss the gap between #AI capability and business value in a live recording of the AI Proving Ground Podcast.
Come by the booth to listen in!
Check out our CTF Challenge Lab powered by our Advance Technology Center 👀⬇️
#MISAPartner #MSIgnite
Didas is checking out the Capture the Flag 🚩 Challenge at the WWT ATC kiosk. #MSIgnite
Experience the capabilities of WWT’s Advanced Technology Center (ATC) with hands-on demos that show how we help organizations prove out solutions before they scale. 🔗 ms.spr.ly/6011x1MqR
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+1 to this comment. At @Microsoft's Ignite show @BNYglobal CIO Leigh Ann Russell said. ”I firmly believe that if you build in governance and security at the heart of a project, that's how you scale fast. If you do it later, it becomes a break, and that slows things down. #MSIgnite SO true especially with AI
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Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
We hope you had as much fun as Didas on day one at #MSIgnite! Thanks for stopping by and tuning in today.
Tomorrow, we've got a schedule full of mini-theater sessions, starting at 9:00 AM and even more live podcast recordings at 3:00 PM and 4:00 PM. See the full lineup 👉 wwt.com/events/microsoft-ign…
Grear conversation today live at #MSIgnite for our AI Proving Ground Podcast
annnnd we're live 🔴
The AI Proving Ground Podcast is recording now at Booth #551. Amy Bahlo of @Cisco and Francis Gotopo of @softchoice are discussing how to build and secure the connected infrastructure behind enterprise AI. Drop by and listen in! #MSIgnite
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Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
Leah gives us a quick explainer about the Blind Spot Capture the Flag 🚩experience at the WWT and Softchoice booth. #MSIgnite
Come by and get hands-on access to Microsoft Defender and Microsoft Purview in the Advanced Technology Center (ATC) Kiosk. @msftsecurity
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
For 30+ years, WWT and @Microsoft have worked together to help enterprises modernize, scale and succeed.
Now, we're doing the same with #AI! At #MSIgnite 2026, our leaders will be on-site sharing how enterprises can scale AI for enterprise-wide impact, and how our Advanced Technology Center lets you prove solutions before you invest.
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
Now generally available, Microsoft Perception brings red, blue and green team agents together through playbooks to simulate attacks, detect threats and remediate, delivering security outcomes at machine speed, with you always in control. #MSIgnite
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You're going to want to keep this tab open. 👀 Follow the Microsoft Ignite live blog starting November 17. #MSIgnite msft.it/6001xDgJJ
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It's #MSIgnite and I am on my way!
Are you attending? Make sure you come to our World Wide Technology and Softchoice Booth 551, don't miss our sessions and let's connect! Check our must-see guide in the comments ⬇️
Excited for a fantastic week ahead!
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Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
More details on the root cause can be found in the Microsoft 365 Admin center, and an abridged version can be found below.
We are deeply sorry for the impact to all our customers and recognize the impact that this has on their normal business & operations.
The incident on Thursday, November 12th, 2026, was caused by three main factors that together caused a global outage for the networking gateway that fronts many Microsoft 365 services.
First, a latent defect caused servers to become overwhelmed and unresponsive under certain load conditions. This was due to lock contention inside an internal process which caused the machine to become unavailable. This defect was the result of a fix that was prepared specifically for Microsoft 365 networking gateway servers; neither the underlying defect nor the fix applies to broader Windows deployments.
The initial change in behavior first started deployment in July of this year. The update went through safe deployment and saturated globally over several weeks, during which time no issues were observed. For more than three months, the change was deployed worldwide without impact.
Our normal load testing did not detect the latent issue because the different traffic and SKU mix used in our test labs. The contention issue is worsened on machines with more cores and newer hardware; whereas our load testing tended to focus on our weaker hardware SKUs with fewer cores.
Second, a surge in load increased the likelihood for the networking gateways to encounter the contention. Within Microsoft 365, we maintain two independent and heterogenous network gateway systems designed for isolation and high availability. This allows many Microsoft 365 services to fail to/from them during outages or disruptions. Approximately fifteen hours before the outage, Teams failed over from the alternative networking gateway to the ‘primary’ gateway that also supports Exchange Online. This increased the load on the networking gateway and changed its traffic patterns. This type of failover is part of normal operations and is integral to standard Microsoft resiliency efforts.
Third, at the same time, nearly 14% of server capacity for the networking gateway was out of service due to an unrelated issue from the previous day. This server capacity was on track to be returned to active service through routine maintenance and health processes. The service had sufficient capacity headroom, so the reduction in server capacity had no impact on its own.
Taken together, the increased load and the reduced server capacity, caused the network gateway to encounter the latent bug from July. This caused requests to build up until servers ultimately stopped responding. This occurred during the peak window of traffic in the United States.
When servers lose connectivity, our traffic management systems automatically route users to other healthy endpoints. This happens often and is critical to avoiding any interruption due to hardware, software, or network defects and is normally what makes the service resilient. However, the redirected traffic increased the likelihood for the same problem to occur on the remaining endpoints. This caused a cascading failure from server to server as the same amount of load was spread across fewer servers. In less than two hours, the previously unknown defect was encountered across our fleet and rendered them unresponsive. At its lowest, more than 80% of servers were unresponsive.
Normally, the network gateway is composed of thousands of ‘capacity units’ which represent shards of capacity, hardware, and networking infrastructure. These ‘capacity units’ are then organized into regions. In this case, due to a separate issue, the normal bulkheads between these different partitions did not stop the cascading failure. This is what allowed the impact to spread across our network gateway infrastructure globally.
Several services like Teams, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Office apps failed out of the faulty network gateway infrastructure. That is why those services were restored earlier, with Teams chats and meetings functioning without issue for most of the outage. But not all services, like Exchange Online, can fail out of this network gateway.
Recovery took longer than usual because as servers returned to service, they were immediately overwhelmed by waiting traffic and became unresponsive again. Our normally automated recovery processes were not designed to restore service from this broad unresponsive state. Additionally, since the main code defect was a latent bug from several months previous, our normal rollback, flighting, and feature flags were unable to quickly revert the change.
After engineers confirmed the defect as the cause, we developed an update that returned the code path to the previously known good state. To effectively apply this fix, and to slowly bring the service online again, we took groups of servers out of service, applied the change, and restarted them before returning them to service. This process was carefully applied to large quantities of infrastructure at a time (e.g. 50%+ of a region).
The final Post-Incident Review (PIR) will provide more details later this week.
Replying to @MSFT365Status
We have released the Preliminary Post-Incident Report of last week’s outage, which is accessible via the Admin center under MO1550821 and EX1550543.
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
We have released the Preliminary Post-Incident Report of last week’s outage, which is accessible via the Admin center under MO1550821 and EX1550543.
Do not click on links on emails. Stay alert! 👀
Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed an active phishing campaign exploiting the Microsoft 365 service disruption on November 12. The messages impersonate Microsoft 365 service health notifications and reference the legitimate Exchange Online incident EX1550543.
Some of the phishing emails Microsoft detected on November 13 falsely claim that messages were held during the outage and will be deleted within 24 hours unless recipients click to restore them.
Observed subjects follow the pattern "Outage - [six-character code]," with sender display names using organization-specific prefixes followed by "Outage Notification" or "Service Health."
The campaign uses three sender domains, moments-notice[.]com, planetmaison[.]com, and newbooker[.]com, with recipient-specific SendGrid click-tracking links redirecting to reallifeaccounting[.]com, including the observed path /themelist0.html. Similar messages targeted organizations across multiple US sectors.
The activity is consistent with credential phishing, although credential collection and malware delivery have not been confirmed.
Security teams can use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Threat Explorer and Microsoft Defender XDR advanced hunting (EmailEvents, EmailUrlInfo, and UrlClickEvents) to identify suspicious messages, examine embedded URLs, and investigate user clicks.
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Safe Links provides time-of-click protection against malicious URLs when properly configured. Organizations should verify their Safe Links policies, investigate potential user interactions, and confirm service disruptions directly through the Microsoft 365 admin center.
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Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
BREAKING: Major airlines could shut down operations for the rest of tonight as the FAA outage continues. — CNN
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
I want to share what we know so far. This was not a cyberattack or an issue caused by AI tooling. Our amazing team was able to work through a very challenging situation to restore service.
Our investigation points to technical challenges and failure modes (cascading failures + thundering herds at our network perimeter) that made recovery more difficult than normal. I'm working closely with the engineering team to complete the full post-mortem. We will publish the post-mortem shortly covering the step-by-step timeline and our many repair items to avoid similar outages in the future.
We take our responsibility to our customers seriously and will do everything we can to learn from this and prevent it going forward.
We are deeply sorry for the disruption this incident has caused our customers and partners. We know the trust they place in our services and take that responsibility extremely seriously. We are seeing broad recovery and stability across our services.
This was a technical issue not related to cyber or AI / agents. The incident was introduced by an issue during an earlier network capacity upgrade that surfaced following a recent network change. We have addressed the underlying issue and continue to restore service to remaining customers and regions.
Given the scale of demand, we restored services gradually, validating stability at each stage. While this took longer, it helped ensure a stable restoration.
We will provide a full post-incident report once our review is complete.
Francis Gotopo🇻🇪🇨🇦 retweeted
We are deeply sorry for the disruption this incident has caused our customers and partners. We know the trust they place in our services and take that responsibility extremely seriously. We are seeing broad recovery and stability across our services.
This was a technical issue not related to cyber or AI / agents. The incident was introduced by an issue during an earlier network capacity upgrade that surfaced following a recent network change. We have addressed the underlying issue and continue to restore service to remaining customers and regions.
Given the scale of demand, we restored services gradually, validating stability at each stage. While this took longer, it helped ensure a stable restoration.
We will provide a full post-incident report once our review is complete.





























