founder of finance academy ||| explaining complex finance world in simple terms

Joined August 2026
David Equalizer retweeted
Cornelius Vanderbilt died in 1877 with $100 million, more money than the U.S. Treasury. In 1973, 120 of his descendants gathered at Vanderbilt University. Not one of them was a millionaire. His great-great-great-grandson is Anderson Cooper. At 14 he was walking up the stairs at home and heard his mother, Gloria Vanderbilt, on the phone: "Well, I'll always be able to make money." "I remember stopping and freezing… and thinking: we are doomed." At 13 he'd been telling her to open a savings account. By 14 he was working as a child model. By 1885 the Commodore's son had more than doubled the fortune, to about $230 million. Then the next generation's wives decided to take over New York society. "And then the spending begins." Worked out. $230 million in 1885. Left alone at a plain 5% a year until 1973: about $17 billion. Split 120 ways: about $140 million each. What the 120 actually had: not one had $1 million. Spending only the 5% would have paid the family $11.5 million a year, in 1885 dollars, forever. Keep this part. A fortune doesn't need a thief. It only needs each generation to spend a little more than it earns, and more heirs to split what's left. Gloria inherited what remained, then made her own money with jeans. Anderson's parents made sure he knew: "There wasn't some pot of gold waiting for me, and I'm glad." The clip is three minutes. Watch him on the stairs, then decide. You have $100 million and one child. How much do you leave them?
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David Equalizer retweeted
Richard Kuklinski was a contract killer for the Gambino crime family. He claimed to have murdered between 100 and 250 people. He earned the nickname "The Iceman" because he froze his victims' bodies in industrial freezers for years to confuse medical examiners and make it impossible to determine time of death. He used guns, knives, crossbows, cyanide, and his bare hands. No signature. No pattern. Impossible to track. For decades he lived a double life in New Jersey as a quiet family man while working as one of the most feared hitmen on the East Coast. In the video below, Kuklinski sits across from a psychoanalyst in a prison interview - and within two minutes the doctor pushes the wrong button and watches a man who killed over a hundred people start to lose his composure in real time. The doctor asks how much someone would have to humiliate him before he'd become obsessed with killing them. Kuklinski doesn't flinch. He says it depends on his mood. If he was edgy - it wouldn't take much. If he was passive - the person might get away with it. Then the doctor says something and Kuklinski stops. "You almost made me mad," he says quietly. The doctor asks what triggered it. Kuklinski says he doesn't know. He feels a little flushed. A little annoyed. Then he says the one thing that makes the whole room go cold: "I don't think it's gone to the point that I'm actually going to do anything stupid." The doctor keeps pushing. Asks who used to criticize him most. Kuklinski doesn't hesitate. "My father." A man who froze bodies to hide his crimes, sitting in a prison chair, still flinching at the memory of his dad. Was Richard Kuklinski born a killer, or did someone make him one long before the Gambino family ever found him?
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David Equalizer retweeted
Peter Scully was an Australian crminal sentenced to life in prison plus 129 years. His victims were children. The youngest was just 18 months old. He held young girls captive, subjected them to horrific abse, filmed his crimes, and distributed child exploitation material to offenders around the world. After fleeing Australia, he operated in the Philippines until authorities finally arrested him in 2015. When they caught him, prosecutors from 60 Minutes to the FBI called him the most depraved individual they had ever encountered in over two decades of law enforcement. In the video below, a reporter from 60 Minutes Australia sits face to face with Scully inside a Philippine maximum security prison - and describes it as the most disturbing moment of her 26-year career. She refused to watch his videos before the interview. She said once you see something like that you can't unsee it. Colleagues who did watch them were visibly traumatized for days afterward. Sitting across from him was worse than she expected. He was smug. Arrogant. He smiled at her questions. When she asked about remorse he paused, looked her in the eye and said: "That's a good question. Well done." She walked through the house afterward. Up the same stairs those children were taken up. In broad daylight. With a police officer beside her. She said even that was enough to make her skin crawl. There was a shallow grave in the yard. Interpol. The FBI. The Philippine National Police. It took three major law enforcement agencies to bring him down. What finally broke the case was a single local officer following a gut instinct nobody else believed in. The reporter said she got to go home after the interview. She wasn't sure how long his smugness lasted after she left. Some people sit across from you and you understand immediately that the word "monster" was invented specifically for them.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Ted Bundy murdered at least 30 women across 7 states. He drove them in a Volkswagen Beetle - same car, same smile, same routine. The FBI called him the most organized serial killer in American history. Netflix made a $30 million series. Zac Efron played him on screen. He was executed in Florida in 1989. His little brother Rich was 12 years old, rafting rivers with him on weekends, sitting in the back seat of that same Volkswagen, thinking his big brother had everything figured out. In the video below, Rich Bundy tells the story of the moment he realized Ted had sent him home early to go murder someone. They were at the airport. Rich was upset - Ted had cancelled their plans out of nowhere, no explanation. As they waited to board, Rich glanced over at his brother's face. Ted was staring into the distance. Horrified. Disgusted. By something only he could see. Rich didn't understand it then. He does now. Ted had been loading the Volkswagen with rope, handcuffs and a crowbar before their trips together. He would pick up young women on the same roads they drove. Rich was in the back seat for some of those drives without knowing what the bag in the trunk was for. Ted sent him home that day because he felt the urges coming and didn't want his little brother in the car when it happened. That one decision broke Rich completely. He spent decades sitting alone in a camper, sometimes not leaving for three days at a time. Can't hold a normal life together. Says he's gotten used to jimmying his way through existence. Ted protected him from one night. The knowledge of what that night was destroyed the rest of his life anyway. Was Rich Bundy a victim of his brother, or did surviving that family come at a price nobody could have paid?
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David Equalizer retweeted
In 1993, Jeffrey Dahmer was 33 years old, serving 999 years inside a maximum security prison in Wisconsin. Three guards escorted him everywhere. One on each arm. Handcuffs on at all times. The most dangerous human being in America - kept alive only so he could rot in a cell. This interview was never meant to be seen. It sat in the Inside Edition archives for 30 years. In the video below, a monster wearing a human face sits across from journalist Nancy Glass and answers the one question nobody expected him to answer honestly. Are the urges still there? He paused. Then said he wished he could tell her they were gone. But no. Even locked inside concrete and steel, serving nearly a thousand years - the compulsions that turned him into a predator were still hunting inside his head. He didn't kill out of rage. Not out of hatred. He said he killed 17 men because he wanted to keep them. That the obsession grew until skulls and skeletons weren't enough. Then came cannibalism. Spoken the same way a normal man would describe a habit he couldn't shake. He asked for several breaks during filming. His hands wouldn't stay still the entire time. Fourteen months after this interview, another inmate killed him in prison. When asked what he deserved, Dahmer didn't hesitate for a second. "I deserve death," he said. Some people are beyond saving. Some things wear a human face and never were one. Was there ever a version of this story that ended differently?
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David Equalizer retweeted
Warren Buffett disowned his granddaughter in 2006, writing that he had never accepted her as his grandchild, legally or emotionally. Buffett has largely avoided publicly discussing what happened between them. In the video below, Nicole Buffett tells her side of the story. Nicole had grown up as part of the Buffett family after Warren’s son Peter adopted her. She visited Warren in Omaha, called him Grandpa, and Warren’s wife Susan even referred to Nicole as one of her “adored grandchildren.” But being the granddaughter of one of the richest men in the world never meant living like one. Warren paid for her education, but Nicole didn’t have access to his fortune. She worked with children at Family Human Services in San Francisco and built her own life while carrying one of the most famous surnames in American business. Then their relationship fell apart after Nicole appeared in The One Percent, a documentary about wealth inequality. She later received a letter from Buffett telling her that he had not emotionally or legally adopted her as a grandchild, and that the rest of his family had not adopted her as a niece or cousin either. One detail made the letter even more painful. Buffett signed it simply “Warren.” Nicole still had a card from only a year earlier signed “Grandpa.” One of the richest men in the world had spent years as her grandfather. Then a letter told her he no longer considered himself one. Do you think Buffett had the right to draw that line, or did he take it too far? Save the video to finish Nicole’s story later, and follow for more heartbreaking stories from behind the lives of the world’s most famous billionaires.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Sam Altman invited Peter Thiel to Stanford to teach a lesson most entrepreneurs still ignore. His message? “Competition is for losers.” In his famous 2014 Stanford lecture, Thiel explained why the biggest businesses don’t win by fighting competitors. They win by building something nobody else can offer. Stop asking how to beat your competition. Ask yourself: What can I build that makes competition irrelevant? Because the goal isn’t to win the same game. It’s to create a game nobody else can play.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Steve Jobs literally predicted the iPhone, the Internet, AI and the next 50 years of technology in a single speech from 1983:
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David Equalizer retweeted
In 1986 a guy got kicked out of every casino in Vegas for counting cards. So he flew to Hong Kong with $180,000 and started betting on horses instead. He walked away with almost $900 million. It was Bill Benter. He realized horse racing was just another counting problem same math, more moving parts. He and a partner built a computer model that estimated the true odds of each horse. If his numbers showed an edge, he bet. If not, he skipped it. That’s the whole trick: Expected value. EV = p · b − (1 − p) Only bet when the probability of winning × the potential payout is greater than the chance of losing. What’s even crazier is that Benter once gave a 45-minute lecture explaining the math behind his system. That recording was never supposed to become public. And almost nobody knows it exists. This is the lecture that professional bettors and hedge fund analysts studied. The answer is in this video.
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David Equalizer retweeted
two gas stations across the street can't stop destroying their own margins ben polak, yale university, econ 159 game theory, lecture 1. then the baseline. quebec city, over 300 gas stations, margins averaging 5.64 cents per liter in the late 1990s, about 9 percent of the price. then the collapse. a price war starting january 2000 drove those margins from 5.64 cents to nearly zero, and it lasted almost a full year. then the reason nobody blinks first. pricing just 2 cents above a neighboring station could cost a station 36 percent of its volume. then the transfer. both stations do better holding price high together, but each is individually better off undercutting, so undercutting is what happens. watch the moment he calls undercutting 'bad for the firm, bad for industry profit.' the price war was never bad strategy. it was the dilemma working exactly as predicted.
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David Equalizer retweeted
The fund that just beat the market was always going to stop beating it peter kempthorne, mit 18.s096, mathematics with applications in finance, lecture 6. then the base case. of large cap funds top quartile as of december 2022, zero percent stayed there two years later. pure chance predicts 6.25 percent. then the longer window. funds top quartile as of december 2020 did worse, not better. not one stayed top quartile four years later. then the exception. small cap funds held up slightly better, 6 percent of the 2022 top quartile stayed there two years on, down from 10 the year before. then the transfer. buying last year's best fund bets against a pattern that erases itself faster than random chance would. watch the moment he shows a fitted line pulling extreme points back toward the average. the hot streak was never a trend. it was the part of the data closest to disappearing.
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David Equalizer retweeted
A bbb credit rating is a coin that only remembers its last flip john tsitsiklis, mit 6.041sc, probabilistic systems analysis, lecture 16, markov chains. then the matrix. s&p's own data, 1981 to 1996, a bbb company stays bbb 82.49 percent of the time in one year. nothing further back matters. then the slide. 5.81 percent of bbb companies get downgraded within that year, to bb, b, or ccc. real risk, ignored by most bond buyers. then the default. outright default inside that year hits only 0.17 percent of bbb companies, 34 times rarer than a plain downgrade. then the transfer. a markov chain predicts next year from this year's grade alone. the real risk in a bbb bond is the slide, not the cliff. watch the moment he shows the next state depends only on where it stands now, not how it got there. the rating was never a cliff edge. it was always a slope, graded in percent per year.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Your revenue forecast runs on an equation that has zero exact solutions gilbert strang, mit 18.06 linear algebra, lecture 16, projection matrices and least squares. then the problem. three months of data, reaching 1, 2, 2. no straight line passes through all three, zero exact solutions exist. then the fix. solve the normal equations, 3c plus 6d equals 5, 6c plus 14d equals 11. answer, d is one half, c is two thirds, one best line. then the leftover. that line predicts 7 sixths, 5 thirds, 13 sixths. actual was 1, 2, 2. the miss never hits zero, only its smallest size. then the transfer. that equation, a transpose a times x equals a transpose b, runs every model forecasting revenue, pricing risk, or reading gps. watch the moment he calls this equation the most important one in statistics. the line was never going to hit every point. the math was how close it could still get.
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David Equalizer retweeted
A five year track record tells you less about skill than the number on the slide andrew lo, mit 15.401 finance theory i, portfolio theory part iii, sharpe ratios, 2002. then the report. a fund shows a sharpe ratio of 1.0 over 5 years, 60 monthly returns. lo's own math puts the standard error at 0.158. then the real range. at 95 percent confidence, that reported 1.0 could be anywhere from 0.69 to 1.31, nearly double its low end. then 3 years instead. same reported 1.0, only 36 months of data, the error jumps to 0.204. the range widens to 0.60 to 1.40. then the transfer. most track records shown to investors run 3 to 5 years. the same math tests whether a backtested edge is real or noise. watch the moment he draws the tangency portfolio and names its slope the sharpe ratio. the number on the slide was never the answer. it was the center of a much wider guess.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Warren Buffett bought a shoe company for $433 million. That mistake is now worth over $18 billion. 1993. Dexter Shoe. A factory in a small town in Maine. Buffett called it a "business jewel." Said it "needs no fixing." He paid with 25,203 shares of Berkshire Hathaway. Not cash. Stock. By 1999, 93% of shoes bought in America were imported. Cheap labor overseas. Dexter couldn't compete. Profits dropped from $85 million to $17 million in five years. By 2001, the shoe business lost $46 million. The company folded. 1,600 workers in a small Maine town lost their jobs. Many were too far into their careers to start over. Buffett lost his entire investment. But the real loss wasn't $433 million. Those 25,203 shares he traded for shoes? Worth over $18 billion today. He gave away 1.6% of Berkshire Hathaway for something worth zero. He called it his "most gruesome mistake." Said it "deserves a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records." In his shareholder letter, he wrote: "I clearly made a mistake in paying what I did for Dexter. By using Berkshire stock, I compounded this error hugely." He didn't lose a shoe company. He gave away $18 billion in Berkshire stock for a factory that no longer exists. $433 million for shoes. $18 billion in smoke.
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David Equalizer retweeted
In 2005 Bill Gates and Warren Buffett told 92 Nebraska students how they could legally live the rest of their lives without paying a dollar of income tax. Only students could ask. Neither man saw a question in advance. One lunch with Buffett sold for $19 million in 2022. Fifty-five minutes of him and Gates answering these students is free. That September Forbes ranked them first and second in America: Gates at $51 billion, Buffett at $40 billion. The video is Nebraska public television's cut of that afternoon at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Buffett's old school. Between jokes about Halo 2 and losing at ping-pong to a nine-year-old, they lay out six rules. The newspaper test. Before any decision, imagine a smart, unfriendly reporter writing it up for your family tomorrow. Anything close to the line is out. The blank calendar. Gates said one of his favorite lessons from Buffett was a calendar with almost nothing in it. You have to be good at saying no. No committees. Buffett said brilliant investment decisions never come out of a large committee. Poll enough people and you buy what everyone already owns. You are the asset. Getting comfortable with public speaking, he said, pays off for 50 or 60 years, and avoiding it costs you just as long. Omissions. His worst mistakes never hit a statement: about $10 billion in profits from deals he understood and skipped, or made too small. The unsold gain. Tax arrives when you sell. His version: hold the stock, borrow against it every year to live on, and let the estate pay off the loan. He said he could have done it for decades and called it very unfair. His 1989 letter to shareholders has the math. Double $1 twenty times, selling after each double at a 34 percent tax, and you end with about $25,250. Hold through all twenty doubles and sell once, and you keep about $692,000. Same returns. The only difference is when the tax gets paid. "They have really taken care of the rich." That is Buffett on the cuts that took capital gains and dividends to a 15 percent tax. Gates answered: "I go along with that wholeheartedly." Everyone in his office paid payroll tax on their first $90,000 plus income tax, and he said their rate was often the same as his, maybe higher. Every paycheck you get loses 7.65 percent before income tax starts. A stock that rises and stays unsold has paid nothing. Billionaires do not avoid income tax by earning less. They avoid it by selling less. Price the tax bill before you cash out your next winner.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Warren Buffett bought See's Candy in 1972 for $25 million cash customers would pay 30 cents more per pound and keep buying 30 cents across 16 million pounds adds $4.8 million in pretax profit
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David Equalizer retweeted
In 1990, Donald Trump owed $3.4 billion and went on NBC acting like nothing was happening. He's 44. Sitting in Trump Tower. The Taj Mahal just opened for $1 billion, funded almost entirely by junk bonds at 14% interest. Revenue projections are already falling short. Contractors aren't getting paid. He owes money to over 70 banks. $800 million of it he'd personally guaranteed. He doesn't flinch. A year earlier he was on the cover of every magazine in New York. He owned a yacht, an airline, three casinos, the Plaza Hotel. Forbes pegged his net worth at $1.7 billion. By summer 1990, regulators warned of "the possibility of a complete financial collapse of the Trump Organization." The Taj Mahal filed for bankruptcy in 1991. Trump Castle and Trump Plaza followed in 1992. The Plaza Hotel filed the same year. His yacht was sold. The airline shut down. The banks put him on a personal budget. The New York Post ran the headline "UH-OWE!" His father sent a lawyer to one of his casinos to buy $3.5 million in chips. Not to gamble. To inject emergency cash. The Casino Control Commission fined them $30,000 for the illegal loan. The banks could have buried him. They didn't. They calculated that the name on the building was worth more than the debt behind it. So they restructured. He gave up equity, sold assets, and clawed back deal by deal. In 1995 he declared a $916 million loss on a single tax return. By 2004 he was hosting the most watched show on television. By 2016 he was President of the United States. The man on this tape is $3.4 billion underwater and talking like he owns the room. That's either delusion or the reason he survived.
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David Equalizer retweeted
In 2008, Tim Ferriss stood in front of 31,000 people and asked Warren Buffett how to invest his first million. Buffett told him to buy an index fund and go back to work. May 3, 2008. Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting. Qwest Convention Center, Omaha. Over 10,000 shareholders had slept on the sidewalks overnight. Ferriss had a #1 New York Times bestseller. Didn't matter. His voice was shaking. He walked to one of 13 microphones. "Hi, my name is Timothy Ferriss. I'm a guest lecturer at Princeton University." He asked: if you were 30, had your first million, and couldn't invest full-time, what would you do? Buffett was worth $62 billion. He laughed. "I'd put it all in a low-cost index fund that tracks the S&P 500 and get back to work." Munger added: "Vanguard index fund." Ferriss had waited hours. He got two sentences. He started angel investing. Put $25,000 into Uber at a $3.7 million valuation. Backed Shopify as its first advisor. Invested in Facebook, Twitter, and Duolingo. Uber went public at $75 billion. His podcast hit 1 billion downloads. The 4-Hour Workweek became a #1 bestseller in 40 languages. He later said Buffett was right for 99.99% of people. He put $25,000 on being the exception.
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David Equalizer retweeted
Professional poker player Phil Ivey won $9.6 million at the Borgata. The casino paid him, then sued to get it back. At London’s Crockfords, he won another £7.7 million. They refused to pay. In the video below, Ivey says his job is to play the game, find a weakness in the casino and use it to win. He calls the casino his opponent and points out that it spends millions of dollars protecting its games. He wanted a specific brand of cards, a Cantonese-speaking dealer and the same decks reused. The casinos agreed. His playing partner, Cheung Yin Sun, asked the dealer to rotate certain cards, presenting it as a matter of luck. The cards had tiny differences along their backs. Once high-value cards faced one way and the others faced the opposite way, those differences helped identify what was coming next. Ivey never marked the cards. The dealer handled them. But the casino didn’t understand what those requests were doing to the odds. He called it an advantage. The casinos called it cheating. In 2017, the UK Supreme Court ruled against him: persuading the dealer to arrange the cards crossed the line. The casino had approved his requests while expecting to win. Ivey knew something about its own cards that it didn’t. Was he cheating, or should a casino know its own game before accepting someone’s money?
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