FINILLÍN retweeted
In 1985, Carl Sagan sat in front of the United States Senate and described the weather of 2026.
Not as prediction. As physics.
Sitting across from him was a junior senator named Al Gore — who would later win the Nobel Prize, the Oscar, and build a climate investment fund worth over $36 billion repeating almost word for word what Sagan said that afternoon.
Sagan opened with Venus.
470°C surface temperature. 900°F. Hot enough to melt lead.
"Not because it's closer to the sun," he told the senators. "Venus actually reflects more light than Earth. It should be cooler."
The reason it wasn't: carbon dioxide. A runaway greenhouse effect that turned a planet nearly identical to Earth into a furnace.
Then he looked at the committee and said: we're running the same experiment here.
The senators nodded politely.
Then they went back to approving fossil fuel subsidies.
What Sagan told Congress in 1985:
Global average temperature will rise several degrees by mid-to-late next century.
Local climates will redistribute.
Glaciers will melt. Sea levels will rise.
And the problem cannot be solved by any single nation — not even if the US and Soviet Union agreed on everything — without China.
China, he said, had the world's largest coal reserves and was about to industrialize.
Every sentence was correct.
He also said something that got almost no coverage at the time:
"The initial stages of global temperature increase — one region might benefit while another suffers."
That is the sentence that explains the last 20 years of geopolitics.
Canada's growing season expanding while Pakistan floods. Russia opening Arctic shipping lanes while Bangladesh disappears. The politics of climate was never going to be clean because the physics wasn't distributed evenly.
Sagan mapped all of it from first principles, in a Senate hearing room, 41 years ago.
The part nobody quotes
He didn't say stop burning fossil fuels immediately.
He said: "That has such severe economic consequences that no one will take it seriously."
So he proposed something else — remove government subsidies from fossil fuels, accelerate solar, develop safe nuclear fission, and begin building international frameworks before the crisis made them impossible.
That's not an environmentalist's speech. That's an economist's.
Carl Sagan wrote 20 books. Cosmos was watched by 500 million people across 60 countries. He won the Pulitzer. The ideas in this testimony became the scientific foundation for a carbon market now valued at over $800 billion annually.
He said one line at the end that nobody remembers.
"We are all in this greenhouse together."
In 1985, that was poetic.
Now it's a weather report.
The full testimony is free on YouTube. 17 minutes. Almost nobody outside of climate policy circles has watched it as a complete predictive model — laid out in plain language before any of it happened.
Warren Buffett disowned his granddaughter in 2006, writing that he had never accepted her as his grandchild, legally or emotionally.
Buffett has largely avoided publicly discussing what happened between them. In the video below, Nicole Buffett tells her side of the story.
Nicole had grown up as part of the Buffett family after Warren’s son Peter adopted her. She visited Warren in Omaha, called him Grandpa, and Warren’s wife Susan even referred to Nicole as one of her “adored grandchildren.”
But being the granddaughter of one of the richest men in the world never meant living like one.
Warren paid for her education, but Nicole didn’t have access to his fortune. She worked with children at Family Human Services in San Francisco and built her own life while carrying one of the most famous surnames in American business.
Then their relationship fell apart after Nicole appeared in The One Percent, a documentary about wealth inequality.
She later received a letter from Buffett telling her that he had not emotionally or legally adopted her as a grandchild, and that the rest of his family had not adopted her as a niece or cousin either.
One detail made the letter even more painful.
Buffett signed it simply “Warren.”
Nicole still had a card from only a year earlier signed “Grandpa.”
One of the richest men in the world had spent years as her grandfather. Then a letter told her he no longer considered himself one.
Do you think Buffett had the right to draw that line, or did he take it too far?
Save the video to finish Nicole’s story later, and follow for more heartbreaking stories from behind the lives of the world’s most famous billionaires.
In 1993, Jeffrey Dahmer was 33 years old, serving 999 years inside a maximum security prison in Wisconsin. Three guards escorted him everywhere. One on each arm. Handcuffs on at all times. The most dangerous human being in America - kept alive only so he could rot in a cell.
This interview was never meant to be seen. It sat in the Inside Edition archives for 30 years.
In the video below, a monster wearing a human face sits across from journalist Nancy Glass and answers the one question nobody expected him to answer honestly.
Are the urges still there?
He paused. Then said he wished he could tell her they were gone. But no. Even locked inside concrete and steel, serving nearly a thousand years - the compulsions that turned him into a predator were still hunting inside his head.
He didn't kill out of rage. Not out of hatred. He said he killed 17 men because he wanted to keep them. That the obsession grew until skulls and skeletons weren't enough. Then came cannibalism. Spoken the same way a normal man would describe a habit he couldn't shake.
He asked for several breaks during filming.
His hands wouldn't stay still the entire time.
Fourteen months after this interview, another inmate killed him in prison. When asked what he deserved, Dahmer didn't hesitate for a second.
"I deserve death," he said.
Some people are beyond saving. Some things wear a human face and never were one.
Was there ever a version of this story that ended differently?
David Bowie sold over 140 million records. He invented three different musical personas that each defined an entire era. Rolling Stone called him the most influential artist of the 20th century. He turned down a knighthood from the Queen of England because he didn't think he deserved it.
In the mid-1970s he was also consuming so much cocaine that he later said he remembers almost nothing from that entire period. Not the albums. Not the tours. Not the interviews.
This is one of those interviews.
In the video below, the most creative mind in rock history sits across from a journalist and explains, completely unprompted, how to destroy a city.
Black noise, he says. A specific frequency that shatters everything it hits. Available in the French Patent Office until recently for about three or four dollars. A small device could kill four people in a room. A large one could level an entire city.
The interviewer stares at him.
Bowie moves on to Machiavelli. Then Diane Arbus. Then Frank Zappa naming his son Moon Unit. Then his own son Zowie. Then his wife Angela's thesis on everything. Then a book about the Trans-Siberian Express he may or may not be writing.
At one point he offers the interviewer a part in his next show.
This is the same man who wrote Heroes in a single afternoon. Who created Ziggy Stardust, Aladdin Sane, and the Thin White Duke from scratch. Who produced Iggy Pop's two greatest albums while barely sleeping.
He survived the decade. Cleaned up. Made ten more classic records.
The cocaine almost took all of it. The talent was just bigger than the damage.
Was he a genius who almost destroyed himself, or did the destruction make him the genius he became?
Poker legend Phil Ivey lost to an amateur with an 83% chance of winning the hand. That amateur won $2.5 million and helped bring a generation of paying opponents into poker.
In the video below, Ivey relives the moment an ace ended his tournament and explains what he was trying to hide from the cameras.
“Do not show how disappointed you are, do not let the world see this.”
Ten players remained in the 2003 World Series of Poker. Ivey went all in with a full house against Chris Moneymaker, an accountant who had qualified online. The final card gave Moneymaker a better full house.
Ivey finished tenth for $82,700. Moneymaker went on to win the title, giving everyone watching at home a reason to believe they could beat the professionals too.
New players flooded into poker. For experienced pros like Ivey, that meant more opponents with money and little experience. Poker sites grew, sponsorship deals followed, and Ivey benefited from the boom.
Years later, he also admitted he should have folded earlier in the hand. He could acknowledge his mistake even though the eventual outcome helped his industry.
When an amateur beats the best and everyone rushes to copy him, who really makes the money: the newcomers, the professionals waiting for them, or the casinos taking a cut either way?
The us government tested two auction formats on real debt and barely saw a difference
ian ball, mit 14.12, economic applications of game theory, revenue equivalence.
then the theorem. different auction formats, under stated conditions, pay the seller the same expected revenue.
then the real test. the treasury switched 2 and 5 year note auctions to a uniform price format in 1992, replacing the old multiple price format.
then the result. spreads to market yields landed close for both, about 0.41 versus 0.22 basis points on 2 year notes, 0.33 versus 0.23 on 5 year notes.
then the twist. only the multiple price format showed a real premium to the government, so uniform pricing edged out slightly ahead, not dead even.
watch the moment he lays out the exact conditions the theorem needs to hold.
the two formats were never identical. they were close enough that the government switched.
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In 1986 a guy got kicked out of every casino in Vegas for counting cards. So he flew to Hong Kong with $180,000 and started betting on horses instead.
He walked away with almost $900 million.
It was Bill Benter.
He realized horse racing was just another counting problem same math, more moving parts.
He and a partner built a computer model that estimated the true odds of each horse. If his numbers showed an edge, he bet. If not, he skipped it.
That’s the whole trick:
Expected value.
EV = p · b − (1 − p)
Only bet when the probability of winning × the potential payout is greater than the chance of losing.
What’s even crazier is that Benter once gave a 45-minute lecture explaining the math behind his system.
That recording was never supposed to become public.
And almost nobody knows it exists.
This is the lecture that professional bettors and hedge fund analysts studied.
The answer is in this video.
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Sam Altman invited Peter Thiel to Stanford to teach a lesson most entrepreneurs still ignore.
His message?
“Competition is for losers.”
In his famous 2014 Stanford lecture, Thiel explained why the biggest businesses don’t win by fighting competitors.
They win by building something nobody else can offer.
Stop asking how to beat your competition.
Ask yourself:
What can I build that makes competition irrelevant?
Because the goal isn’t to win the same game.
It’s to create a game nobody else can play.
Sam Altman invited Peter Thiel to Stanford to teach a lesson most entrepreneurs still ignore.
His message?
“Competition is for losers.”
In his famous 2014 Stanford lecture, Thiel explained why the biggest businesses don’t win by fighting competitors.
They win by building something nobody else can offer.
Stop asking how to beat your competition.
Ask yourself:
What can I build that makes competition irrelevant?
Because the goal isn’t to win the same game.
It’s to create a game nobody else can play.
The anecdote is real and well-documented: Joel Greenblatt ran a weekly investing class for ninth graders from Harlem, had them guess the count of jelly beans in a jar twice.
Once called out loud (avg. guess: 850) and once written privately on cards (avg. guess: 1,771, against an actual count of 1,776). His line: “the stock market is actually the second guess.” Two independent write-ups both quote this from the same talk, “Distinguished Speaker Series: Joel Greenblatt,” a CFA Society Chicago luncheon from December 5, 2018.
But I could not pull its actual captions or transcript this session, so I can’t personally confirm the exact wording and timecode from the footage itself, only from two secondary blog paraphrases. That fails rule 4 (“quotes are verbatim or they do not ship... pulled from a transcript or the frames that were actually read”), the same wall I hit on Griffin and Soros earlier in this session.
FINILLÍN retweeted
Your revenue forecast runs on an equation that has zero exact solutions
gilbert strang, mit 18.06 linear algebra, lecture 16, projection matrices and least squares.
then the problem. three months of data, reaching 1, 2, 2. no straight line passes through all three, zero exact solutions exist.
then the fix. solve the normal equations, 3c plus 6d equals 5, 6c plus 14d equals 11. answer, d is one half, c is two thirds, one best line.
then the leftover. that line predicts 7 sixths, 5 thirds, 13 sixths. actual was 1, 2, 2. the miss never hits zero, only its smallest size.
then the transfer. that equation, a transpose a times x equals a transpose b, runs every model forecasting revenue, pricing risk, or reading gps.
watch the moment he calls this equation the most important one in statistics.
the line was never going to hit every point. the math was how close it could still get.
A bbb credit rating is a coin that only remembers its last flip
john tsitsiklis, mit 6.041sc, probabilistic systems analysis, lecture 16, markov chains.
then the matrix. s&p's own data, 1981 to 1996, a bbb company stays bbb 82.49 percent of the time in one year. nothing further back matters.
then the slide. 5.81 percent of bbb companies get downgraded within that year, to bb, b, or ccc. real risk, ignored by most bond buyers.
then the default. outright default inside that year hits only 0.17 percent of bbb companies, 34 times rarer than a plain downgrade.
then the transfer. a markov chain predicts next year from this year's grade alone. the real risk in a bbb bond is the slide, not the cliff.
watch the moment he shows the next state depends only on where it stands now, not how it got there.
the rating was never a cliff edge. it was always a slope, graded in percent per year.
The fund that just beat the market was always going to stop beating it
peter kempthorne, mit 18.s096, mathematics with applications in finance, lecture 6.
then the base case. of large cap funds top quartile as of december 2022, zero percent stayed there two years later. pure chance predicts 6.25 percent.
then the longer window. funds top quartile as of december 2020 did worse, not better. not one stayed top quartile four years later.
then the exception. small cap funds held up slightly better, 6 percent of the 2022 top quartile stayed there two years on, down from 10 the year before.
then the transfer. buying last year's best fund bets against a pattern that erases itself faster than random chance would.
watch the moment he shows a fitted line pulling extreme points back toward the average.
the hot streak was never a trend. it was the part of the data closest to disappearing.
A five year track record tells you less about skill than the number on the slide
andrew lo, mit 15.401 finance theory i, portfolio theory part iii, sharpe ratios, 2002.
then the report. a fund shows a sharpe ratio of 1.0 over 5 years, 60 monthly returns. lo's own math puts the standard error at 0.158.
then the real range. at 95 percent confidence, that reported 1.0 could be anywhere from 0.69 to 1.31, nearly double its low end.
then 3 years instead. same reported 1.0, only 36 months of data, the error jumps to 0.204. the range widens to 0.60 to 1.40.
then the transfer. most track records shown to investors run 3 to 5 years. the same math tests whether a backtested edge is real or noise.
watch the moment he draws the tangency portfolio and names its slope the sharpe ratio.
the number on the slide was never the answer. it was the center of a much wider guess.
The MIT professor Congress subpoenaed in 2014 for calling the American voter "stupid" also filmed the free 26-hour microeconomics course every Goldman Sachs analyst has to know before their $250,000 signing bonus interview.
Millions have watched. Almost no retail investor has finished it.
His name is Jonathan Gruber. He is the Ford Professor of Economics at MIT and one of the two economists Barack Obama's team called into the White House in early 2009 to model the cost curve of the Affordable Care Act.
The 75-minute clip in this video is one lecture from 14.01 Princiles of Microeconomics, filmed at MIT and posted on OpenCourseWare for nothing.
MIT charges $85,000 a year to sit in that classroom. He posted the entire course for free.
Gruber covers the mathematical foundation of every decision under uncertainty in one semester. Expected utility.
The average happiness you should expect from a decision weighted by probability.
Every insurance premium on earth is priced from this formula.
Risk aversion. The reason people pay ten dollars for a policy that covers a one-dollar loss with five percent probability.
The reason almost every retail trader closes winners early and holds losers long.
Adverse selection. Why healthy people leave the insurance pool and sick people stay. Gruber used this exact equation to model the individual mandate of Obamacare.
Moral hazard. The reason people drive faster with seatbelts and gamble bigger with a bailout guarantee. Every quant fund on Wall Street pays entry level analysts $250,000 to know this material.
Every consulting firm pays McKinsey partners $500,000 to teach it to Fortune 500 clients as a workshop.
The one MIT professor who ran the policy modeling for the largest healthcare law in American history gave away the whole framework on YouTube for nothing.
"The most surprising fact about human decision-making is how systematically we violate every model that predicts it." That is a paraphrase Gruber returns to across the series.
The lectures are free on MIT OpenCourseWare. Gruber's textbook is under sixty dollars.
The math is free.
The willingness to sit through 26 hours of microeconomics before signing a mortgage, buying an insurance policy, or opening a brokerage account is a much rarer commodity than the confidence to walk in without it.
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In 1995 a 31-year-old told his parents there was a 70 percent chance they would lose every dollar they put in. They invested $245,573 anyway.
Never sold, those shares would be worth over $80 billion today.
"What's the Internet?" was his Cuban stepfather's first question.
Everything the son told them is in a 47-minute interview that has about 33,000 views on YouTube.
The stepfather is Mike Bezos, one of 14,048 Cuban children flown to Miami without their parents between 1960 and 1962. He landed alone at 16. The son he adopted is Jeff Bezos.
The interview was filmed in San Antonio in May 2001. Jeff explains why he quit Wall Street and how he spent his parents' money. Five months later Amazon stock hit its post-bubble low, about 95 percent under its 1999 peak.
His method has a name that, in his words, only a nerd would give it: the regret minimization framework.
Age 80. Picture yourself at 80 and pick the choice with fewer regrets. Most of them, he says, are things people never did. It is why he quit mid-year and walked away from his annual bonus.
Write down the odds. He gave Amazon a 30 percent chance when a typical startup had about 10. Planning on failure, he says, takes the pressure of self-doubt off.
Kill risk first. Spend the early money on the biggest problem, then the next one.
Stress is a skipped phone call. It comes from not acting on something you control. The first call or email cuts most of it.
Skip the gold rush. In 1849 doctors quit medicine to pan for gold. In 1999 people quit their jobs to do something on the internet. That almost never works, he says.
Anyone who bought the Nasdaq at its March 2000 top waited 15 years to get back to even.
"I knew that if I failed I wouldn't regret that, but I knew the one thing I might regret is not ever having tried." That is Bezos at 37. His boss had walked him around Central Park for two hours and asked him to take 48 hours before deciding.
In 1999, he says, you could raise $60 million for an internet idea with one phone call and no business plan. His own round took about 60 pitches to raise $1 million.
The next time a friend asks you to put money into their idea, ask for the odds you lose all of it. If they can't give you a number, keep your money.
In 2005 Bill Gates and Warren Buffett told 92 Nebraska students how they could legally live the rest of their lives without paying a dollar of income tax.
Only students could ask. Neither man saw a question in advance.
One lunch with Buffett sold for $19 million in 2022. Fifty-five minutes of him and Gates answering these students is free.
That September Forbes ranked them first and second in America: Gates at $51 billion, Buffett at $40 billion.
The video is Nebraska public television's cut of that afternoon at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Buffett's old school.
Between jokes about Halo 2 and losing at ping-pong to a nine-year-old, they lay out six rules.
The newspaper test. Before any decision, imagine a smart, unfriendly reporter writing it up for your family tomorrow. Anything close to the line is out.
The blank calendar. Gates said one of his favorite lessons from Buffett was a calendar with almost nothing in it. You have to be good at saying no.
No committees. Buffett said brilliant investment decisions never come out of a large committee. Poll enough people and you buy what everyone already owns.
You are the asset. Getting comfortable with public speaking, he said, pays off for 50 or 60 years, and avoiding it costs you just as long.
Omissions. His worst mistakes never hit a statement: about $10 billion in profits from deals he understood and skipped, or made too small.
The unsold gain. Tax arrives when you sell. His version: hold the stock, borrow against it every year to live on, and let the estate pay off the loan. He said he could have done it for decades and called it very unfair.
His 1989 letter to shareholders has the math. Double $1 twenty times, selling after each double at a 34 percent tax, and you end with about $25,250. Hold through all twenty doubles and sell once, and you keep about $692,000. Same returns. The only difference is when the tax gets paid.
"They have really taken care of the rich."
That is Buffett on the cuts that took capital gains and dividends to a 15 percent tax. Gates answered: "I go along with that wholeheartedly."
Everyone in his office paid payroll tax on their first $90,000 plus income tax, and he said their rate was often the same as his, maybe higher. Every paycheck you get loses 7.65 percent before income tax starts. A stock that rises and stays unsold has paid nothing.
Billionaires do not avoid income tax by earning less. They avoid it by selling less. Price the tax bill before you cash out your next winner.
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winning this auction is the exact moment you are guaranteed to have overpaid
ben polak, yale university, econ 159 game theory, lecture 24.
then the setup. a jar of coins goes up for bid in a real classroom, about 28 students call out numbers, from 1 cent to 5 dollars.
then the number. the winning bid is 5 dollars. the jar holds 2.07 dollars. the winner paid 2.93 more than it was worth.
then the reason. out of 28 guesses, the winner is whoever guessed highest, not closest. the highest guess is the most overpriced one by construction.
then the transfer. in real federal offshore oil lease auctions, when 7 or more companies bid on one lease, the average winner's profit was negative.
watch the moment he tells the winner what she owes, the gap between her guess and the real number in the jar.
more bidders did not make the price accurate. it made the overpayment bigger.
winning this auction is the exact moment you are guaranteed to have overpaid
ben polak, yale university, econ 159 game theory, lecture 24.
then the setup. a jar of coins goes up for bid in a real classroom, about 28 students call out numbers, from 1 cent to 5 dollars.
then the number. the winning bid is 5 dollars. the jar holds 2.07 dollars. the winner paid 2.93 more than it was worth.
then the reason. out of 28 guesses, the winner is whoever guessed highest, not closest. the highest guess is the most overpriced one by construction.
then the transfer. in real federal offshore oil lease auctions, when 7 or more companies bid on one lease, the average winner's profit was negative.
watch the moment he tells the winner what she owes, the gap between her guess and the real number in the jar.
more bidders did not make the price accurate. it made the overpayment bigger.






