Empirical IO economist researching strategic information disclosure | PhD candidate at @econ_uzh
Zurich, Switzerland
Joined August 2016
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🚨NEW WORKING PAPER🚨
"Preregistration and Credibility of Clinical Trials"
(with Marco Ottaviani)
Pre-approval drug trials preregistered at ClinicalTrials.gov appear considerably less p-hacked than non-preregistered trials. 💊💉📝
👉🏻medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/…
🧵(1/5)
Christian Decker retweeted
How do humans interact with pricing algorithms within firms❓
We explore this question using two large-scale field experiments in collaboration with @ZalandoTech in a new WP.
This work is a collaboration with Tobias Huelden, @VJascisens and @LarsRoemheld.
🧵Thread below.
Christian Decker retweeted
Paolo Varraso (@PaoloVarraso) is a macroeconomist whose research focuses on the role of financial markets and intermediaries in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks and policies. Learn more at paolovarraso.github.io/
Christian Decker retweeted
Meet our #Econjobmarket candidates!
👉 Learn more about Vardges Levonya on his personal website sites.google.com/site/levony…
Christian Decker retweeted
Meet our #Econjobmarket candidates !
👉 Learn more about Claude Raisaro @claude_raisaro on his personal website clauderaisaro.github.io/
Christian Decker retweeted
📣 CALL FOR PAPERS 📣
Join us on 6-7 October 2023 in Zurich for the 2nd @econ_uzh Market Power Workshop!
We have two amazing keynote speakers:
Nathan Miller (@NateHMiller) and Tommaso Valletti (@TomValletti)
For more information: sites.google.com/view/market…
Christian Decker retweeted
@econ_uzh: the NZZ wrote about my JMP (now forthcoming at the AER @AEAjournals ) -- :)
Ein runder Bauch kann in armen Ländern ein Statussymbol sein – und sogar beim Bankbesuch helfen.
nzz.ch/international/in-ugan…
Christian Decker retweeted
Forthcoming in the AER: "Worth Your Weight: Experimental Evidence on the Benefits of Obesity in Low-Income Countries" by Elisa Macchi. aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.12…
A huge thank you to @econ_uzh, @ubscenter, and my supervisors @GregorySCrawfor, Armin Schmutzler, Marco Ottaviani, and Holger Sieg--also not to forget my wonderful PhD colleagues and friends! 🍾
🎉Congratulations @chris_de92. Christian’s research investigates the interplay between economic incentives and the strategic disclosure of information with empirical applications to digital platforms and the clinical research process. All the best!
Christian Decker retweeted
New CEPR Discussion Paper - DP18180
Preregistration and Credibility of Clinical Trials
Christian Decker @chris_de92 @UZH_en @econ_uzh Marco Ottaviani @Unibocconi
ow.ly/tQPg50OFvFW
#CEPR_IO, #CEPR_OE, #CEPR_PE
This sounds somehow familiar to you? Indeed, these patterns are remarkably similar to the seminal @ArielRubinstein -Ståhl sequential bargaining game taught often in intro micro classes. (11/11)
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In the infinite-horizon version of the game with no restrictions on the length of the debate, there is an unambiguous first-proposal advantage. (10/11)
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My simulations show that
➡️if first and last proposer coincide, there is an unambiguous first-proposal advantage (C)
➡️otherwise, the first proposal-advantage prevails if impatience dominates bias, and the last-proposal advantage prevails if bias > impatience (A,B)
(9/11)
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2⃣ In the finite-horizon version of the game, there is a mechanical last-proposal advantage as all remaining types of the other juror are assumed to concede in the final period. The more biased jurors are, the more likely they insist until this last period. (8/11)
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I identify two possibly opposing forces:
1⃣ Jurors' impatience triggers a first-proposal advantage. Waiting costs push them towards conceding early on. (7/11)
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This question is relevant for jurors to decide whether to seek to propose first or for the designer of debating and cloture rules, who may or may not want to favor one juror by a specific order of move. (6/11)
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My paper analyzes when the order of move (Hawk makes first proposal vs. Dove makes first proposal) affects the final verdict and which impact this has on jurors' ex-ante payoffs. I do so with numerical examples as such an exercise is not tractable analytically. 😅 (5/11)
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If you want to learn more about the intriguing properties of this game and how equilibria look like, have a look at this terrific paper by Meyer-ter-Vehn, @LonesSmith, and Bognar. (4/11)
👉🏻 doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdx07…
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Jurors are impatient (waiting cost per period delay), differently biased ('Hawk' more concerned about acquitting the guilty, 'Dove' more concerned about convicting the innocent), and receive a different informative private signal about the true state (guilty/innocent). (3/11)
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