‼️ $39,889 lost due to an address poisoning attack The victim first sent a 115.14 $USDT test transfer Phishing bot picked it up and mirrored it with a fake transaction for the exact same amount to a lookalike address When the victim went to send the rest, they probably copied the address from their transaction history Real address: 0x053DBA7292957341779cB0e9aae1AA7B139aDa3A Fake address: 0x053dc459bade1baf76AEd6E8630823f8392FDA3A The funds are already on a consolidation wallet and converted to $DAI

New post on EthResear.ch! Validator Redirected Revenue By: - clesaege 🔗 ethresear.ch/t/25248 Highlights: - Ethereum faces a persistent coordination failure: many ecosystem improvements are public goods, so voluntary funding tends to underprovide them, creating deadweight loss and harming long-term competitiveness. - Validators are structurally aligned with ecosystem growth (more usage → more demand for blockspace → more ETH burn/value), but they still get stuck in a prisoner’s-dilemma equilibrium where they hesitate to contribute unless others also commit. - The proposal adds a protocol-level mechanism where validators signal a redirect rate: if a majority (e.g., 51%) supports a non-zero rate, that rate becomes mandatory for all validators, solving intra-validator free-riding; the rate is capped (suggested max 10%, min 0%). - Validators also signal preferred funding recipients and allocations; execution clients aggregate these into a “splitter” contract using a king-of-the-hill / Condorcet-winner style process with simple protocol choices (KEEP vs CHANGE), aiming to minimize governance overhead (“set and forget”). - Key open risks include validator cartelization (majority could redirect funds to themselves), principal–agent problems (staking operators controlling votes vs delegators’ preferences), and the possibility that willingness to redirect rewards is interpreted as evidence issuance could be reduced. ELI5: Ethereum needs shared things (like security tools and maintenance) that help everyone, but it’s hard to get people to voluntarily pay because each person hopes others will cover the cost (the “free-rider” problem). This article suggests a built-in way for Ethereum validators (the people who earn staking rewards) to collectively agree to donate a small, capped slice of their rewards to fund important ecosystem work. Validators would also collectively choose where the money goes using a simple voting/competition process, so funding can happen without lots of meetings or bureaucracy—while still acknowledging risks like validators teaming up (cartels) or staking companies voting in their own interest instead of users’.

这个 @BnbLabubu 被盗 $1.1M，但这个“被盗”似乎有点可疑： bscscan.com/tx/0x8dabb60a94e… 被盗是因为 OLPC/LABUBU 交易对严重失衡导致。会失衡的原因是 OLPC 有一处“漏洞”被利用，_update 里满足条件时可以 burn 掉 value * decimalsValue 数量的 OLPC，正常来说 decimalsValue 是 1，但攻击前约 46 天被 owner 改为一个超大值 7326680472586200649： bscscan.com/tx/0xa413fdf6883… 几天后 OLPC owner 把 owner 权限丢弃，成为 0 地址： bscscan.com/tx/0x686f746b243… 今天，攻击者利用该 decimalsValue 超大值触发 Pair reserve burn 后，小额 OLPC 即可获取大量 LABUBU。攻击者最终低成本换出 111.5 万枚 USDT。 可疑点就在这个 decimalsValue 的设置上，OLPC owner 是为什么会做这个超大值设置。别告诉我又是不小心私钥泄露导致…👀 其他调查暂未展开，感兴趣的可以深挖。