Serco is operating a nuclear missile detection radar at RAF Fylingdales. Genuine question: at what point did we decide that tracking incoming nuclear warheads was a job for an outsourcing company? This is a facility within the US Missile Defence network. It detects ballistic missile launches. It provides early warning of nuclear attack. It operates 24/7/365. It is one of the most sensitive military installations on British soil. And it's run by the company that couldn't staff the Olympics and charged the taxpayer for tagging dead people. What happens when the contract expires in five years? Serco renegotiates. From a position of strength. Because by then THEY have the institutional knowledge. THEY have the trained staff. THEY understand the system. The MoD has nobody who can replace them because the capability was outsourced five years ago. That's the outsourcing trap. Year one: competitive tender. Year five: sole supplier. Year ten: permanent dependency. The contractor becomes irreplaceable because the client gave away the capability to replace them. Missile defence should be: Operated by RAF personnel. Trained in-house. Knowledge retained in the military. No contractor dependency. No five-year renegotiation cycle. No profit margin on nuclear early warning. If the radar fails at 3am who's accountable? An RAF commanding officer in the chain of command? Or a Serco shift manager reporting to a regional director reporting to a board in London reporting to shareholders? When the thing that detects nuclear missiles is run by a company whose primary obligation is shareholder returns, the priorities are no longer aligned with national security. They're aligned with the contract. builduk.club defence charter. Sovereign capability. In-house operation. No outsourcing of existential infrastructure.