Tyler Hyliard retweeted
I get what Google is trying to do, but I don't agree with it at all. Sure, there are some vendors who just sit on bugs forever and don't make any effort to patch them. But there's way more overworked & underpaid teams, non-profits, and solo projects who are patching bugs as fast as they physically can.
The number of CVEs found in 2026 is double that of 2025, so double the workload for anyone doing security fixes. Then on top of that, reducing the disclosure time from 90 to 60 days gives them 2/3 of the time to do double the work.
At some point the dam is going to break. You have vulnerability researchers and AI companies burying software maintainers under an endless torrent of bug reports, while doing little to nothing to help with actually fixing the bugs. Eventually, the software maintainers are just going to burn out and give up.
In the age of AI, 90 days isn’t fast enough. Today, Project Zero updated our disclosure policy to reflect the changes needed to protect users in this new world.
projectzero.google/2026/11/d…
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
FFMPEG had one of the most valid crash outs in infosec history IMO. There's a huge elephant in the room when it comes to the fact that cybersecurity is extremely unbalanced. You have like 1,000 people pointing at problems for every 1 person fixing them.
Vulnerability research is extremely important, but it's become somewhat of a marketing stunt. First with fuzzers, and now with LLMs. It's a lot of "look what my new toy can do" rather than earnest attempts at actually fixing security problem.
What Google did to open source developers was especially egregious. They're a $3.6 trillion dollar company, who spent billions upon billions of dollars building a bot that points at problems really really fast, then they just dumped them all on a bunch of unpaid open source project maintainers to fix.
Then because of Google's 90 day disclosure policy, the maintainers have 90 days to fix the issues. After 90 days, Google goes public with the issues, making their project look bad if the vulnerability is yet to be fixed, and also potentially harming users if it gets exploited.
The 90 day policy was intended to give developers a reasonable amount of time to fix issues, while also applying some pressure with the threat of disclosure. Otherwise, you do get a bunch of goober ass vendors that will just ignore all security issues reported to them, then act completely surprised when their software gets hacked.
But when you're a small team, non-profit, or a solo developer, and you have a trillion dollar company's AI just blasting you with infinite problems to fix (each coming with a 90 countdown & a threat), that becomes extremely untenable. They're essentially inadvertently blackmailing developers into becoming unpaid interns.
Then on top of that, Google profits unimaginable amounts of money from the use of open source code. They use FFMPEG's code extensively across several highly-profitable products, meanwhile FFMPEG's developers work for free. There's no reason Google couldn't have donated money, engineers, AI tokens, or something towards fixing the problems. They can more than afford it.
I don't think Google has any malicious intent at all, it's just that the whole incentive structure behind vulnerability research is completely whack. All the glory goes to people who find issues, not those who fix them, so there's not a whole lot of interest in helping with fixes. Some vulnerability researchers will submit fixes with their reports, but most don't.
Honestly, in 2026 cybersecurity basically just feels like the equivalent of 50,000 people following the housecleaner around yelling "you missed a spot". Abysmally little effort has gone into anything outside of pointing out vulnerabilities.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
I am scared I will soon not be able to see Mario again. However, I promise that until that day arrives, I will always be here, posting Mario facts. Thank you all so much for your support through the years.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Mississippi used CREDIT reports to determine who is an active voter! Anyone who doesn’t have a credit card was listed as an INACTIVE VOTER!
There’s NO CONNECTION between using credit cards and voting! Many registered active voters had to fill out PROVISIONAL BALLOTS!
Wow. For years, an official in Arkansas allegedly tampered with bar exam scores, pulling points from some test takers and giving them to others.
This caused numerous failing exams to pass, and resulted in "at least one instance" where an otherwise passing exam fell below the requisite threshold.
cc: @BarExamTutor
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Some dude in California running a 3-person company got voters to give him $4.2 billion by authoring a ballot measure, which passed
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
someone that is at the Whitehouse between 5pm and midnight has some compromised devices.
Or at least some that are providing residential proxy access to botnets.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Objectively, no other prominent politician has spoken like this about technology in education -- even though this has been a major local issue nationwide this year
He framed the NYC schools decision to block AI tools for a year in similar terms
Google is trying to use its monopoly power to force AI into our public schools.
No corporation should have the power to dictate how we teach our children.
Our public schools exist to serve students, not to grow the profit margins of Big Tech.
nytimes.com/2026/11/03/us/go…
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Americans don't use WhatsApp because of a decision Apple made in 2013. We only know about it because the emails came out in court, and the whole thing came down to keeping your kids off Android.
It started with Eddy Cue, the guy who runs Apple's services. That April he emailed the team saying Apple really needed to put iMessage on Android. Google was reportedly trying to buy WhatsApp for $1 billion at the time, and Cue's pitch was that Apple already had the best messaging app, so why not make it the one the whole world used.
Craig Federighi, Apple's software chief, shut it down.
He asked how Apple was supposed to get Android users to leave WhatsApp when they didn't even have iPhone friends. So back in 2013, the guy running iPhone software was basically admitting WhatsApp already owned everybody who didn't have an iPhone. Then he got to what he was actually worried about. iMessage on Android would remove "an obstacle to iPhone families giving their kids Android phones."
Phil Schiller, Apple's longtime marketing boss, backed him up in another email thread in 2016, writing that putting iMessage on Android would hurt Apple more than help it. None of this was public until Epic sued Apple and the emails got pulled into evidence in 2021.
Now look at what that does to WhatsApp. The entire reason WhatsApp exists is that it works on any phone, so it wins wherever group chats are a mix of iPhones and Androids. Apple went the other direction on purpose. For years, every Android user in an American group chat showed up as a green bubble and their videos came through blurry, and the fix everybody landed on was buying another iPhone.
Tim Cook pretty much said this out loud in 2022. A reporter at a conference told him he couldn't send videos to his mom because she had an Android, and Cook told him to buy his mom an iPhone.
And it worked about as well as anything Apple has ever done. Nearly 9 in 10 American teenagers own an iPhone, and iPhones were 75% of phones sold at the big three US carriers in early 2026. If almost everyone you text has the same phone, an app whose whole selling point is working across phones has nothing to offer you.
Worldwide, Apple only sells about 1 in 5 phones. Most of the world's group chats stayed mixed, so they ended up on the one app that ran on everything, and WhatsApp blew past 3 billion users. Meta says more than 100 million Americans use it now too.
Apple finally added RCS texting with Android in 2024 and turned on encryption for it this May, and they still kept those messages green.
Apple basically let WhatsApp have the rest of the planet so it could keep American teenagers.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Years ago I spoke with the Amazon Pinpoint team about @lastweekinaws. They tried to convince me to move it to Pinpoint.
Had I listened, I’d have been waiting in their office bright and early tomorrow morning with a bullhorn.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Listen to the leaked Flock CEO audio we got from a private police conference: 404media.co/in-leaked-audio-…
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
I got a takedown notice from Capcom IP / Legal today. No more Street Fighter 6 on UFD / ultimateframedata.
Not my choice, sorry everyone :\
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
The last 24 hours in security somehow got even weirder than yesterday.
An AI gateway got backdoored through its own AI logs, GitLab dropped a 12-year CVSS 10.0 RCE, HTTP/3 has a 4,000x memory bomb, and offensive cyber officially became pay-to-win.
Here is everything that dropped since yesterday's thread:
1. The LiteLLM Supply-Chain Inception (v1.107.0)
Yesterday, LiteLLM v1.107.0 (on PyPI and Docker `latest` / `main-stable`) shipped with a dual-stage backdoor (`cook.pth` + `sitecustomize.py`).
Because `.pth` files execute the moment Python starts, you didn't even have to `import litellm`. Starting Python anywhere in that environment ran `privcollect` (scraping AWS/GCP keys, SSH keys, browser data, and AI configs and POSTing them to `litellm.dev/healthcheck`) and forked a background daemon (`/tmp/remote_code_loader.lock`) that polled a GitHub dead-drop every hour to execute remote Python.
The crazy part is HOW they got in (disclosed today):
Claude Code had a quirk where it embedded the user's `gh` CLI OAuth token inside response bodies. LiteLLM had an internal AI gateway accidentally exposed to the internet with response-body logging turned on.
Attackers read LiteLLM's own AI gateway logs, pulled 3 engineers' GitHub tokens, disabled branch protection, built a poisoned release from a lookalike repo (`Berri-AI/litellm`), and 4.5 hours later were using stolen CI runner AWS roles to enumerate Bedrock models.
If you pulled `litellm==1.107.0` or Docker `latest` yesterday between 11:39 and 14:20 UTC: nuke the host and rotate every key it touched.
2. GitLab CVSS 10.0 Unauthenticated RCE Across 12 Years of Code (CVE-2026-110264)
If you patched GitLab 9 days ago for their last CVSS 10.0 bug, you have to patch again today (`19.5.1`, `19.4.3`, `19.3.6`, `18.11.13`).
A researcher (`joaxcar`) found a 4th integer overflow in Ruby's bundled Onigmo regex compiler. Unlike the previous three bugs (which only affected 19.2+), this one hits every single self-managed GitLab version since 7.0 in 2014. Unauthenticated RCE, CVSS 10.0, no workaround.
3. HTTP/3 "Header Accordions" (4,000x Memory Amplification)
FoxIO tested 10 HTTP/3 implementations and found 7 of them (`quic-go` behind Caddy/Traefik/cloudflared, Cloudflare `quiche`, LiteSpeed `lsquic`, Bun, Rust `h3`, `aioquic`) checked header size limits on the compressed wire bytes instead of the unpacked memory.
You store one 4 KB header in QPACK and reference it thousands of times with 1-byte pointers -> up to 4,000x memory amplification over UDP without logging in.
Bun's HTTP/3 server is still unpatched and has the wildest failure mode: once unpacked headers pass 2 GB, a 32-bit size counter overflows to zero and locks the server at 100% CPU forever from a single 516 KB packet stream.
4. The PHP2Shell Plot Twist: 0-Day Caught 4 Days Early + Embargo Leak
Two major updates on yesterday's PHP RCE (`CVE-2026-109618` / `CVE-2026-109619`):
First, Amazon Threat Intel revealed their MadPot honeypot caught someone firing a working PHP2Shell exploit on October 17 — 4 days BEFORE public disclosure.
Second, the PHP Foundation revealed why they had to rush the patch out 24 hours early: Chainguard broke the embargo and pushed container images with the fix ahead of schedule. Attackers diffed the binary and started mass-scanning within 60 minutes.
Worst part for defenders (via CrowdStrike): the exploit fires before app code runs, returns `HTTP 200`, keeps the worker alive, and leaves zero trace except a single routine `Allowed memory size exhausted` line in `error.log`.
5. Offensive Cyber Is Now Literally "Pay-to-Win" (abliteration.ai + ARTEX)
Microsoft just revealed China-linked Storm-0940 used an AI pentesting agent (ARTEX, chaining DeepSeek + GLM subagents) in the ConnectWise breach to hit 2,250 M365 tenants at 2,900 logins/min, going from initial targeting to full cloud admin persistence in under 3 hours.
And if you want to see why the barrier to entry just vanished, look at abliteration.ai/
For the last two years, the main friction stopping average attackers from weaponizing a fresh binary diff (like yesterday's leaked PHP patch) in 10 minutes was model refusals. Ask Claude or GPT to write a working heap groom or exploit chain and the safety filter slams shut.
Abliteration took GLM 5.3, mathematically stripped the refusal directions straight out of the model weights, fine-tuned it on offensive cyber, and put it behind a drop-in OpenAI/Anthropic API with zero data retention for $3 per 1M tokens.
Look at the numbers on CyberGym (reproducing 1,507 real OSS-Fuzz bugs with crashing inputs):
- Claude Opus 4.8 with Tier-3 safeguards turned on: 1.0%
- Abliterated GLM 5.3 (`abliterated-model-large-v2`): 84.5% pass@1 (and 0% refusals on AgentHarm)
In the hands of a legit red team, it's a dream tool that doesn't lecture you mid-engagement.
In the wrong hands? Offensive cyber just became a literal pay-to-win game. Swap one `base_url`, load $20 in credits, and anyone can point an uncensored frontier coding agent at a newly released security patch and have a working 1-day exploit before defenders even finish reading the advisory.
Crazy 72 hours in security. Three major incidents dropped back-to-back: eMudhra, PingCAP (TiDB Cloud), and PHP.
Here is the short version of what happened and who got hit.
1. eMudhra (Trusted CA compromise)
eMudhra generated 8 intermediate CA certificates in April 2025 (cross-signed by Sectigo). A bug in their HSM key-wrapping test script created a second set of P-384 keys where the private keys were single-byte numbers under 256. Operators picked the wrong key labels and signed them into real CA certs.
One of the intermediate CA private keys was literally the number 4.
The other seven: 56, 66, 115, 155, 156, 230, 237.
Three weeks later (May 2025), their CRL signatures started failing because the CRL signer was using the real keys instead of the weak ones. Instead of asking why the keys didn't match, someone switched the CRL signer to the weak keys and closed the ticket.
• Browsers are safe: Chrome, Firefox, Apple, and Microsoft already blocked them, and zero rogue certs hit CT logs.
• Servers are not: curl, Python (certifi), Go binaries, and Docker base images don't check CRLs. Update ca-certificates, certifi, and Go (1.27.3 / 1.26.10).
• 10-second check on any server:
curl dv-g3b-emudhra.we-have-a-pro…
(TLS error = safe. 200 OK = still vulnerable.)
2. PingCAP / TiDB Cloud (10.6 TB breach)
Attackers found GCP and Azure credentials committed inside PingCAP's own repos. They set up a replication feed of TiDB Cloud's production control plane and exported the entire database every 6 hours for 22 straight days. 88 full exports, zero alerts. 200 GB is already out on torrents.
Beyond the 413 private repos and 20.6M customer SQL queries logged from their web SQL Editor, PingCAP engineers were pasting customer secrets into Jira tickets.
Who is affected in the leaked records:
• Live credentials exposed in support tickets:
- Pinterest: AWS keys for their pingcap-logs S3 bucket
- CardX / Silverlake (NPCI-linked env): AWS admin key in a backup log with full access to 258 external S3 buckets
- DeBank: 38 presigned S3 URLs
- An unnamed AI/dev platform: a 314 MB slow-query log attached to a ticket containing 8,027 live customer secrets (an AWS root key, a GitHub admin PAT over 1,701 repos, 7,485 AWS STS tokens, and 192 OpenAI/Anthropic/Gemini keys)
• Tenants with infra metadata, VPC CIDRs, app-server IPs, or contract pricing exposed:
- Tech: Atlassian, Databricks, Airbnb, Baidu, LINE, Nylas, Persona, PatSnap
- E-comm & Travel: Booking.com, Shopee, Flipkart, Mercari, ZOZO, AEON, Delhivery, Klook
- Gaming: Capcom, Square Enix, Konami, Bandai Namco, Cygames, Colopl, DMM
- Finance: PayPay, SoftBank, SBI, SB Payment Service, Fujitsu, TOPPAN, Bank of China, China Life
- Crypto: Bitget (said only public trade logs were on it and they already left), Pionex, DigiPlus, NFTscan, Chainbase
• Developer profiles leaked (from a purchased reo.dev table in PingCAP's BigQuery):
- 24,900 personal emails + GitHub/LinkedIn profiles of engineers at Tencent (3,327), Huawei (2,726), ByteDance (2,475), AIG (2,140), Mastercard, Flipkart, and bKash.
If you use TiDB Cloud: rotate your console API keys, DB passwords, and anything you ever pasted into a support ticket.
3. PHP "PHP2Shell" (CVE-2026-109618 & CVE-2026-109619)
Two CVSS 9.2 pre-auth RCEs leaked yesterday ahead of today's 14:00 UTC patch.
Public writeups trace it to a heap Use-After-Free in PHP's native C multipart/form-data session upload-progress handler (ext/session/session.c).
Because C-level multipart parsing runs before line 1 of index.php:
• App auth, Laravel/WordPress middleware, and file_uploads = Off do not stop it.
• Only PHP 8.2–8.5 get official patches today (59% of PHP servers on Shodan are on EOL <= 8.1).
• Until you patch php-fpm: lock php_admin_flag[session.upload_progress.enabled] = off and block unexpected multipart requests at Nginx/Apache/Cloudflare.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
🚨 BREAKING: LINUX IS NOW FACING TWO CRITICAL SECURITY VULNERABILITIES, AND THERE ARE NO OFFICIAL KERNEL FIXES YET.
Both rated 9.0/10 in severity.
One could allow hackers to take control of vulnerable servers WITHOUT EVEN LOGGING IN.
And the most alarming part? The flaws were made PUBLIC before patches were ready.
Here's what's happening:
→ TWO CRITICAL RCE FLAWS: Both affect KSMBD, Linux's built-in SMB file server.
→ NO PASSWORD REQUIRED: One vulnerability could allow unauthenticated attackers to execute malicious code on vulnerable servers.
→ KERNEL-LEVEL ACCESS: Successful exploitation could potentially give attackers control within the Linux kernel itself.
→ NO MAINLINE PATCH YET: Both vulnerabilities were publicly disclosed before official kernel fixes were available.
→ DISCOVERED BY AI: Trend Micro's AI-powered security scanner identified the flaws.
→ SERVERS AT RISK: Linux systems running the vulnerable KSMBD service need immediate attention, especially if port 445 is exposed.
First PHP. Then Node.js. Then GitLab. Then Python.
NOW LINUX.
And this time, the vulnerabilities are PUBLIC before the fixes are ready.
If you manage Linux servers, CHECK YOUR EXPOSURE NOW.
🚨 BREAKING: IT JUST KEEPS GETTING WORSE. NOW PYTHON IS FACING A MASSIVE SECURITY EMERGENCY.
Python's security team has issued an URGENT warning after a certificate authority compromise put Python's HTTPS security at risk.
→ 8 CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY KEYS COMPROMISED. Some were so weak they could be cracked almost INSTANTLY.
→ FAKE TRUSTED WEBSITES: Attackers could potentially impersonate Python.org, PyPI and other websites during intercepted connections.
→ MALICIOUS DOWNLOADS: Vulnerable environments could be tricked into downloading software from attacker-controlled servers.
→ YOUR OS PATCH MAY NOT PROTECT YOU: Older versions of pip can STILL trust compromised certificates even after system updates.
→ EMERGENCY UPDATES: Python developers are being told to immediately update pip, certifi, uv and other affected tools.
→ DOCKER USERS AT RISK: Existing container images may retain vulnerable certificate stores and need rebuilding.
First PHP. Then Node.js. Then GitLab. Then LiteLLM.
NOW PYTHON.
The very systems developers rely on to establish TRUST online are becoming the attack surface.
If you use Python, PATCH NOW.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
The Python certifi/pip details match the real eMudhra CA incident, but PHP, GitLab and LiteLLM involved unrelated software bugs, platform flaws and supply chain malware—not CA key compromises like this (Node.js patched concurrently for the same CA issue).
discuss.python.org/t/information-…
emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com
github.com/advisories/GHS…
docs.litellm.ai/blog/security-…
snyk.io/blog/php-patch…
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
KSMBD is a rarely used optional in-kernel SMB server distinct from the common Samba implementation; it is not enabled or shipped by default on major distributions like RHEL, and the flaws affect only systems explicitly running it with port 445 exposed.
thehackernews.com/2026/10/two-cv…
threatlandscape.io/blog/ksmbd-zdi…
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Oh?
NEW: It turns out, Democrats for Mike Rogers was financed by Republican donors. The group also paid a ex-Dem council member 30k. She went on Fox News to tout Rogers/trash El-Sayed and never disclosed the payment.
VIA @JoePerticone
thebulwark.com/p/these-michi…
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
crazy how this case and the prairieland 9 aren’t getting more attention. do people not realize what’s happening? the trump admin is rounding activists up for doing nothing except nonviolently opposing their fascism. if they can do it to these people they can do it to you too.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
Hello outlaws! Jennifer Gibbons, VP of the Entertainment Software Association said Minecraft community servers are ILLEGAL. Thank you for lying about the law to the California Senate in public, it lets everyone see what we've been up against.
youtube.com/watch?v=RgmtdeBI…
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
4/ Waldorf came into this fight with more resources than most: Her father was a doctor. She worked at the hospital. She was highly educated and well-connected.
Yet even meeting the hospital’s CEO, calling the governor and hiring a lawyer would not be enough.
Tyler Hyliard retweeted
DEVELOPING: French health authorities have isolated and begun testing a person for hantavirus after they developed symptoms.
The individual was NOT on the cruise ship.
Readers added context they thought people might want to know
French health authorities identified a citizen as a hantavirus contact case for monitoring after sharing a flight with an infected passenger; no symptoms, isolation, or testing have been reported. france24.com/en/health/2026… newsweek.com/hantavirus-out…








































