The Royal Navy in October 2026: A Paradox of Ambition and Decline Views my own, comments, corrections and strong debate welcome. 1/25 The Royal Navy of late 2026 is a force of extremes. It operates two large aircraft carriers that are notionally operational, a small number of highly sophisticated Type 45 destroyers and Astute-class attack submarines, and a nuclear deterrent that has never broken Continuous At-Sea Deterrence. At the same time, the surface and subsurface fleets required to protect those carriers, sustain the deterrent and meet routine tasking are thinner, older and less available than at any point since 1945. This is not the result of a single review or a sudden funding cut. It is the cumulative outcome of decisions stretching back to the late 1970s, accelerated by the 1998 Strategic Defence Review and deepened by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review. The Royal Navy has repeatedly chosen exquisite individual platforms over the numbers needed to keep them at sea, deferred hard choices on infrastructure, and operated under a culture in which responsibility is diffused until it disappears.

How much air and missile defence does Britain actually need? I took every UK base, command node and city an adversary would strike — ~100 targets — and worked out the layered force to defend them. The number is large, finite, and knowable. 🧵

How about we get out of the game of naming carriers for presidents and go back to tradition. Saratoga, Lexington, Ranger, Hornet and Yorktown are all available.

German Sd.Kfz. 9 half-track towing a Panzer IV tank on a Sd. Ah. 116 heavy transport trailer in North Africa in the Summer of 1942

Footage shows the combat operations of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Mi-28NM “Night Hunter” attack helicopter crews showing launches of Kh-39 Light Multipurpose Guided Missiles (LMUR) in the Special Military Operation (SMO) zone.

🇺🇦 Some highlights from a recent interview with Lt. Col. Vitalii Korniienko, commander of 7th Artillery Brigade "Gregit". - Artillery systems can only be moved into position safely after interceptor UAS crews have systematically taken down the Russian recon UAV in the area. - A large amount of the targets presented by the RUAF currently presented on the battlefield are not worth an artillery fire mission, which led to the prevalence of cheaper fires options like FPVs. - Despite that, artillery cannot be abandoned, as there are things that drones can simply not do. Weather conditions and EW are ever prevalent obstacles that a 155mm shell simply does not care about. - The brigade primarily works at a depth of about 10km from the forward line of troops (FLOT). - The turn eround time for repairing a Bohdana family howitzer is measured in days rather than weeks or months, as can happen with Western donated systems. - The ballistic radar that is appearing on recent production 2S22 is a great help in correcting firing angles between different propelant types, as the range difference between them is often big enough that it is not feasible to correctly identify shell impacts from recon drone feeds. - Korniienko personally requested that his brigade receive 2P22 Bohdana-BG, as these towed guns are much smaller, making them easier to conceal. Simultaneously, they are also harder to destroy with drones than a 2S22. - Marta, having a smaller build and shorter barrel, is a better fit for this war, as it is easier to conceal. The reduction in range by 3-4km is a worthwhile trade-off. - Focussing solely on longer-range Ammunition is a bad idea, as they come with their own drawbacks, like increased barrel wear and reduction in ammunition availability. A mix of 40% shorter and 60% longer ranged shells seems optimal. - Firing longer-range shells makes it easier to be spotted through the increased thermal signature caused by larger and more powerful propellant charges. - Shells sourced from Asian manufacturers seem to be produced to a much lower QA standard than western or domestic ones. Shell weights can vary up to a kilogram from the manufacturer spec, and there have been several recorded catastrophic failures with shells from one manufacturer in particular. - While working in the Serebryanka direction, Russians being shells by 105mm guns reported that they were under mortar fire and had their recon UAV look for those in positions 4-6km away from the actual gun. - 105mm guns, like the L119, are lightweight, easy to conceal, and move while producing almost no thermal signature when firing. This makes them useful in this war. - Korniienko would like to continue the development of 203mm systems, as he states that 2S7 Pions are capable of penetrating two floors of a building or a deeper dugout position. - Korniienko Advocates for starting development on a fully overhauled version of the Bohdana so as not to run into a situation in a couple of years where the guns have become too outdated to properly operate. oboronka.mezha.ua/chi-vizhiv…

France’s Modular Rampart Point Defense Launcher Has Gone To Sea The launcher that can fire laser-guided rockets, small missiles, and more has emerged on a Mistral class amphibious assault ship. twz.com/sea/frances-modular-…