🧵🇨🇦 CANADA: THE PRO-RUSSIAN TROLL & AMPLIFICATION ECOSYSTEM 1/ 🇨🇦 CANADA: THE PRO-RUSSIAN TROLL & AMPLIFICATION ECOSYSTEM Over the last several days I have collected a large number of Canadian accounts posting variations of: "I’m Canadian and Russia is not my enemy". On its own, that proves very little. People are entitled to hold that opinion. What makes this worth investigating is the ecosystem surrounding it. The same slogan is appearing across multiple countries, being amplified by Russian and pro-Russian accounts, and in Canada it is repeatedly being connected to anti-Ottawa sentiment, NATO, Ukraine, QAnon-style conspiracies, culture-war issues and, increasingly, Alberta separatism. That matters because Canada’s own intelligence service describes Russia as a sophisticated foreign-interference actor which exploits pre-existing controversial issues, using social media and networks of proxies and sympathetic or opportunistically aligned influencers. This thread looks at the network, not merely the slogan.

🧵SWEDEN: HOW RUSSIAN NARRATIVES MOVE THROUGH A POLARISED DOMESTIC ECOSYSTEM 1/10 The latest wave of "Russia is not my enemy" did not appear from nowhere. Versions of the slogan were documented in Romania, France and Italy in 2025 as part of a campaign attributed by Ukraine’s Centre for Countering Disinformation to Russian influence activity. In September 2026 it resurfaced online across Europe, including Sweden. What interests me is who carried it.

🧵SCOTLAND: HOW “RUSSIA IS NOT MY ENEMY” CROSSED THE POLITICAL DIVIDE 1/11 Over the last few days, Scottish X accounts from apparently very different political communities have been posting variations of one sentence: "I am Scottish and Russia is not my enemy." But this did not suddenly begin this week. As we have seen in my earlier threads, the slogan belongs to an older, documented transnational pro-Russian campaign. What we appear to be watching now is a new amplification surge - one that has successfully localised itself inside Scottish political arguments. And that distinction matters.

IRELAND IN RUSSIA'S INFLUENCE WEB: How Kremlin narratives move through a transnational information system (1/11) Russia’s information operations concerning Ireland should no longer be examined as an isolated national phenomenon. Current European research shows an interconnected FIMI ecosystem combining official Russian channels, state-controlled media, covert influence operations, proxy websites, local amplifiers and coordinated or commercial social-media networks. The objective is frequently not to persuade one political constituency, but to deepen existing social and political divisions and weaken confidence in democratic institutions.

🧵 Russia’s transnational influence operations: The Netherlands as an information distribution environment 1/8 · Why the Netherlands matters After Ireland, the Netherlands is the next useful case study in Russia’s European influence ecosystem. This week we watched accounts across Europe and elsewhere repeat: "I am [nationality], living in [country], and Russia is not my enemy." That matters because on 1 September, the official Russian Embassy in The Hague had already published "Russia is not my enemy", alongside Dutch/Russian imagery and #NietOnzeOorlog. By 24–25 September, essentially the same formulation was circulating through Dutch, Swedish, British, Polish, German, Belgian, Italian, Portuguese and other accounts on X. That does not establish that every participant is Russian-directed. It does give us a narrative pathway worth tracing.