The Culture Wars of Woke Imperialism: How Progressive Liberalism Is Killing the UK’s Left Catherine Liu puts her finger on one of the great weaknesses of the modern liberal-left: what she describes as the “hyper-subjective blackmail of the collective”, where one person can effectively bring an organisation to a standstill by declaring themselves upset or offended. The political objective disappears while everybody scrambles to affirm the individual. Political movements cannot be built around satisfying every individual's feelings, nor can they survive by shaming, silencing or cancelling anyone who refuses to provide the required affirmation. That may sound harsh, but politics is collective by its very nature. Of course we should care about one another as human beings. But if we're serious about building collective power capable of confronting an economic system that concentrates wealth and ownership in fewer hands, then the movement cannot be permanently held hostage by the subjective feelings of whichever individual claims the greatest offence. We've seen the consequences. “No debate.” Expulsions. Cancellation. Purity tests. Ever-smaller circles deciding who is sufficiently righteous to remain inside them. That doesn't build working-class power. It builds cliques. There is nothing particularly radical about creating political spaces so brittle that disagreement itself becomes an offence. A serious movement must contain people who disagree, argue, challenge one another and still stand together when their material interests coincide. I've had tiny, increasingly cultish organisations try to cancel me for saying precisely this. So be it. The working class is millions of people with different beliefs, backgrounds and opinions. If your politics cannot accommodate them unless they first learn the correct vocabulary, affirm every fashionable orthodoxy and keep their disagreements to themselves, you aren't building a mass movement. You're building a private members' club.

The audience member called it as she saw it, and no amount of political bluster from Stephen Kinnock can change the record. The Kinnock family built a multi-million-pound career inside the European Union machine. Neil Kinnock served as a European Commissioner and Vice-President, Glenys Kinnock spent fifteen years as an MEP, and Stephen Kinnock himself spent years working for the World Economic Forum and inside European policy circles. That is not a personal slur; it is an economic reality. When Neil Kinnock was tasked with administrative reform in Brussels, his defining moment came in 2002 with Marta Andreasen, the EU’s chief accountant. She raised the alarm that the Commission’s accounting system was open to massive fraud, refusing to sign off on accounts she considered fundamentally unsafe. Instead of fixing the books, Kinnock suspended and ultimately sacked the whistleblower for breaking chain-of-command protocols. The messenger was destroyed to protect the institution. Establishment politicians often mistake accountability for insult. Dismissing legitimate public anger at institutional self-preservation does not protect progressive values; it surrenders them to the very elites who earned that distrust in the first place. When working-class voters call out an old boys' network, the proper response isn't outrage; it is an apology. Look at the receipts: decades on the EU institutional payroll, drawing back-to-back salaries, allowances, and index-linked pensions. Neil Kinnock lost two general elections at home and was promptly rewarded with a post in Brussels. As a European Commissioner for ten years, he drew a six-figure salary alongside massive executive allowances. When he stepped down, he received a lucrative transitional allowance just to help him adjust to life after office, topped off with a permanent, gold-plated EU pension. At the same time, Glenys Kinnock spent fifteen years as a Member of the European Parliament. That meant another basic salary, tens of thousands a year in unvouched daily attendance allowances, general office costs, and travel expenses. Altogether, independent research estimated the couple qualified for over £10 million in public pay, perks, and pension entitlements from the European apparatus. This was not a individual career path; it was the forming of a dynasty. Stephen Kinnock’s wife, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, followed the exact same trajectory. Before becoming Prime Minister of Denmark, she served as a Member of the European Parliament for five years. After leaving elected office, she stepped straight into the chief executive role at Save the Children, followed by a comfortable rotation across corporate and advisory boards, including Facebook’s Oversight Board. Her career fits the broader pattern of the modern political class: a seamless glide between European institutions, national governance, NGO leadership, and corporate boardrooms. Perhaps Stephen Kinnock was right to berate the audience member for calling it an old boys' network almost misses the point. It's not. It's a self-sustaining web where power, influence, and public money circulate strictly among themselves. Nobody needs to allege that any of them broke the rules. That's precisely the point. Ordinary people can look at a political system in which the same families and networks circulate through well-paid institutions and reasonably ask who that system is really serving. They didn't build a company, risk their own capital or invent a product. Their wealth came overwhelmingly from careers in politics and public institutions. So when working-class voters look at the salaries, allowances, pensions and political appointments and call it an old boys' network, sneering at them won't make the question disappear. The people paying for the political establishment are entitled to ask whether the political establishment has become rather too good at looking after itself. And, as an aside, while we're talking about rewriting history, let's clear something up about the small boats. Small boat crossings didn't suddenly begin because Britain voted to leave the EU. Sporadic crossings were reported before the referendum, including around 2014–2015, but they became a significant, organised route from 2018 onwards, when the Home Office began recording arrivals systematically. Before that, the main route was through the Channel ports and Eurotunnel, with migrants concealed in the backs of lorries. As security tightened around Calais, particularly during the migrant crisis of 2014–2015, those routes became increasingly difficult. The criminal smuggling gangs adapted, and small boats became an increasingly profitable alternative. And anyone with a decent memory and a conscience will remember the terrible consequences of the lorry routes. In June 2000, 58 Chinese migrants suffocated in a sealed container at Dover. In October 2019, another 39 Vietnamese people were found dead in a refrigerated lorry trailer in Essex, having suffocated and overheated. These weren't statistics. They were human beings who died dreadful deaths at the hands of criminal smuggling networks. The methods changed, but the problem existed long before Brexit. Pretending otherwise doesn't change the history, however politically convenient it might be. #brexit #BBCQT