Martin Prendergast 🇮🇪⚽️☘️

Credit: Footage thanks to Stick to Football. Seamus Coleman recently spoke about Ireland’s 2 all draw away to Serbia ten years ago and an argument he had with Roy Keane at half time. Keane was demanding that Coleman got out to the ball quicker every time Serbia switched play diagonally. Coleman’s response was that he could not simply jump out to press because the underlap was available inside him. From a coaching perspective, Coleman was absolutely spot on. This is also a great example of why coaches must value the information coming from players. They are the ones on the pitch constantly scanning, solving problems and making decisions based on pictures that can look very different from the touchline. The important coaching question is not simply, “Why are you not getting out quicker?” The question is, “What is creating the hesitation?” So we went back to the actual game and included the exact sequence they were discussing. And John O’Shea is getting away with murder by not being mentioned here. Throughout the game, O’Shea and Richard Keogh were far too laboured when shifting across as Serbia circulated the ball from side to side with those switches of play. When the ball travels across the pitch, the movement of the defensive line has to happen while the ball is travelling! That distinction is huge. If the centre backs shift early enough, Coleman can travel with the pass, arrive closer to his opponent and apply pressure with far more aggression if he can effect the wingers first touch. But if the centre back is slow to slide across, the distance between full back and centre back becomes too large and hesitation in that wide area duel is then created. Now Coleman has two problems. If he jumps aggressively to the wide player, Serbia can attack the space inside him with the underlap. If he protects the inside space, he arrives late to the player receiving wide. That is not simply a full back pressing problem. It is a collective back four problem. The defensive line needed much more intensity and synchronisation when sliding across the pitch. The nearest centre back had to move earlier and reduce the horizontal distance to Coleman, while the rest of the line continued to travel across and protect the spaces inside. That then allows the full back to press forward knowing the inside channel is protected. Serbia recognised those distances were far to open and repeatedly attacked the half spaces with underlapping runs. So while the instruction to Coleman to get out quicker sounds correct in isolation, the bigger tactical picture explains why he was hesitant. Before demanding more intensity from an individual player, coaches have to understand whether the structure behind that player actually gives him permission to be aggressive. Sometimes the player who looks late is actually compensating for a problem somewhere else in the defensive unit. That is why listening to the player matters!