The SA gov needs to seriously consider taking direct control over the scrap metal business in the country. State infrastructure is under a permanent seige and there is an industry behind it that the state clearly needs to manage. dailymaverick.co.za/article/…

‘The judges in green’ — The story behind the Constitutional Court’s iconic robes dailymaverick.co.za/article/…

SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO? GNU conflict dynamics in the days ahead With the ANC's victory, of sorts, in yesterday's ConCourt decision, I see that the existence of the current GNU composition is being debated again, with calls for the "removal" of the DA from various directions. We have of course been here before. Like a bad marriage, we have heard these calls for imminent divorce before, often as little more than political ploys and posturing. This specific juncture is different, given its proximity to the upcoming elections, so I think we should take the scenario seriously, and analyze it as a conflict puzzle, not as political commentary. A few of my current thoughts, immediately after these developments. Is it a ploy? Largely yes, though a ploy can still of course become reality in a few minutes. Fikile Mbalula has issued versions of this threat before, including a dare last year that the DA could leave “tonight or tomorrow”. I think we should assess this as delivered for at least three audiences: The ANC base and its rivals. The ANC’s biggest electoral threat is vote loss to MK and the EFF. Being seen to discipline the DA (“the white-capital partner”) is cheap, high-signal positioning against the left-nationalist flank. Blame displacement. The ANC lost its candidates through its own administrative failure. Turning the story into “the DA tried to disenfranchise hundreds of thousands” converts a self-inflicted wound into a grievance, and the DA’s opposition gave it a gift. The DA’s new leadership. Geordin Hill-Lewis has said the DA will defy GNU policies that block progress, with an eye on being in power in 2029. A more assertive DA leader invites the ANC to reassert hierarchy early. The tell to keep an eye on is that Mbalula speaks for the party machine, not the president. Ramaphosa’s interests differ. He needs the DA for investor confidence and as a shield against MK and the EFF, which have both targeted him. Watch whether he says anything at all. His silence is itself information. The power arithmetic without the DA The ANC and DA together hold 246 of the GNU’s 286 seats. On my arithmetic, with the DA at 87, the ANC plus the remaining GNU parties would sit at about 199, just short of the 201 needed for a majority. Two immediate implications: The ANC doesn’t need MK and the EFF wholesale. It could patch the gap with fringe crossbenchers. That is the cheap route, but it produces a fragile, minority-flavoured government that is hostage to every vote. Bringing in MK or the EFF is the expensive route. Both have signalled willingness to join if the DA leaves, and both have made Ramaphosa’s position central to their demands. Mbalula himself has argued that putting the EFF inside the GNU would finish the ANC off faster, which suggests the leadership knows the substitute is worse than the irritant. We could argue that this leans towards a poker bluff, a ploy. Pros and cons of ending it now For the ANC, the upside is narrative control before polling day and a warning shot that disciplines the DA’s public criticism. The downsides are larger: it loses the DA’s technical and fiscal anchoring, with markets, the rand and ratings all sensitive to it. It would hand the DA a martyr story and the ANC the blame for instability. It hands MK and the EFF the kingmaker role, and it would inflame the ANC’s own succession fight ahead of its 2027 elective conference. Ending it before 4 November is the worst timing, because the ANC would be the one defending market turmoil during a campaign. For the country, a replacement coalition built on MK and/or the EFF raises real policy risk around property rights, the central bank, fiscal discipline and the Ramaphosa question. It also changes the character of the arrangement from a centrist grand coalition into a left-populist one. On the other hand, the DA’s critics argue the GNU has blurred accountability and that a cleaner government-versus-opposition structure could sharpen democratic competition. That is a legitimate argument, but it is not what’s happening here. This is tactical, not principled, even though of course we see it spun as exactly that. The DA’s best move In conflict terms, the DA holds more leverage than the rhetoric suggests, but only if it avoids the one move that surrenders it: walking out first. My advice is to stay through 4 November, but not passively. Make the ANC own any rupture. The party that breaks a coalition inherits the blame for instability. If the ANC wants the DA out, force it to say so formally, in writing, through the statement of intent’s own dispute processes. Right now the threat costs Mbalula nothing. A formal request makes it cost something. Don’t relitigate the court case. The DA said it respects the ruling but is concerned about the precedent for IEC compliance. That is the right register. A rules-based, institutional argument is a stronger brand than a grievance, and it keeps the moral high ground with its own voters. Separate the party from the principal. Direct the engagement at Ramaphosa, not Mbalula. A call between the two leaders defuses a secretary-general’s statement far better than a public exchange does. Keep the exit option visible but unused. The credible threat to leave is worth more than leaving. Walking out just before an election looks opportunistic, and it throws away ministries and the influence over delivery that the DA wants to campaign on in 2029. Reassess after 4 November on actual results and on how the ANC behaves, not on its threats. We should remember that the number of votes the DA and ANC end up with post-election plays its own role in answering these current questions. The case for leaving earlier is the risk of being treated as a permanent junior partner while the ANC takes the credit. But that argument is stronger after the elections, when the DA can leave on its own terms, with its municipal results as a mandate. What I’d watch in the next 19 days Whether the ANC’s NEC or NWC formalizes anything, or whether this stays at the level of a secretary-general’s remark. Whether Ramaphosa distances himself from Mbalula. Whether MK or the EFF publicly price their entry, especially around Ramaphosa. And whether the IEC compliance questions the DA raised produce further litigation, which would keep this fight alive through election day. So, as posturing it is its own limited drama, if it tips over past that, it is obviously a complex question with many possible outcomes. Worth watching (Originally posted on my LinkedIn page)

Nearly three in four older South Africans receive an old age grant. Researchers say the grant has helped reduce poverty among older people, but it is being stretched by rising living costs and growing care needs. theoutlier.co.za