I want to make something absolutely clear. I stand with @lisaisloud. Secret Labs made the decision to walk away from Secret Network. Instead of letting it fade away, Lisa and many others in the community stepped up to preserve the blockchain, continue its development, and fight for a future that includes making those affected by the hack whole. For that, she’s been met with threats and intimidation. That has no place in this industry. Lisa, you are not standing alone. You have my full support. Publicly and privately. My voice is behind you. My resources are behind you. Your fight is my fight, and your problems are my problems. If you believe Secret Network deserves a future driven by its community, follow @SCRT_Intern. This is the new community account supporting the effort to continue the existing Secret Network blockchain and ensure its future is decided by the people who believe in it. I’ve always liked the phrase, “Big Bank Takes Little Bank.” It’s funny how some people think they have more resources and assume they can steamroll everyone else. That’s an assumption I’d think twice about making. History has a way of reminding people that conviction, unity, and persistence can outweigh assumptions about influence or resources. Communities aren’t built through intimidation. They’re built by people who refuse to back down when it matters most. Stand with @lisaisloud. Follow @SCRT_Intern. Stand with the community. Let’s finish what we started.

Sometimes a demo is simply to remind the world that your competition has no desire to dream -- and no ability to evolve.

Do a kickflip!

JUST IN: Florida Governor Ron DeSantis declares “We will make sure” Tesla's flying Roadster is street legal in Florida.

Starlink connectivity at speeds of up to 160 km/h is being restored. Removing Starshield’s speed limit entirely is now critical for Ukraine’s defense. Thank you, @elonmusk. We hope for your continued support.

*OPENAI EYES ACQUISITION OF CRYPTO SECURITY COMPANY TRAIL OF BITS: THE INFORMATION

holy fucking shit. anthropic thinks we could be just MONTHS away from small ai models being capable of replicating themselves across everyday devices without needing a datacenter. their frontier red team found that a 9b model could get inference running on 8 out of 9 hardware types tested. and larger models are already capable of completing the full replication process in simplified environments. we’re talking about ai agents potentially spreading across smart tvs, cameras, appliances and other connected devices on their own. what the actual fuck.

Intel GPU D-series, code-named Crescent Island - 480 GB LPDDR5X memory - 1.5 TB/s of memory bandwidth - 1.3 petaflops of FP8 - 350 W TDP hardwareluxx.de/index.php/ne…

I don't recommend anyone scramble to move their funds to new wallets today. But we should take the risks to cryptography from AI-accelerated math seriously, and minimize our exposure to not just quantum-vulnerable cryptography, but also potentially AI-vulnerable cryptography. The core new area of risk from this viewpoint is, unfortunately, ML-DSA / FHE / lattices. (and it's also another reason, along with quantum, why ECDSA might fall even faster than expected, hence the "fresh address" recommendation) So far most people have been in the mode of thinking "elliptic curves broken, hashes safe, lattices safe". But there is a good chance that the concrete security of lattices will take serious hits from the next two years of AI math. The basic threat model is: factoring is something that naively takes 2^(n/2) time, but over decades smart people have found and optimized number field sieves, and degraded that to 2^O(n^(1/3)), which is why RSA keys and signatures need to be ~400 bytes (and not 64 bytes). What if there are skeletons in the closet like that, both for elliptic curves and lattices, that we are simply not smart enough to discover - but bots soon will be? This is a major part of the reason why for the past year ethereum's lean roadmap has been going in the "hash-only" direction: no lattices, no ML-DSA, no Falcon, no lattice-based commitments inside ZK proofs, etc. Signatures in lean ethereum are all hash-based, either WOTS or SPHINCS-. For signatures and proofs, we already know how to go hash-only. The bigger challenge is for *public-key encryption* - and this goes far beyond blockchains. Secure communication, anonymizing protocols, lots of things need public-key encryption. And unfortunately there are long-standing mathematical theorems showing why public-key encryption cannot be done with hashes alone. You have to have some kind of trapdoor object that has at least one form of usable "structure" - either group theory (incl. isogenies) or lattices or code-based or potentially in the future even more newfangled and spooky things (local mixing?). But for anything that has structure, you should assume that AI will make at least some progress in breaking that structure. Here, one reasonable inference is that if you want to make something plausibly long-term secure, multiply the key sizes by 10. To me that's a very plausible world and something not at all extreme to predict. If AI will bring us 50 years of math in 2 years, then that 50 years of math may very plausibly include a "naive factoring -> GNFS" level of improvement to our ability to break lattices. In that world, lattices will still exist, but they will have to be significantly bigger to guarantee the same level of safety. And at those new larger sizes, hash-based constructions will beat lattice-based constructions on concrete efficiency in every use case where hash-based constructions are possible at all. Theoretically, of course it's possible that hashes are broken too (eg. P = NP would imply that). But I think P = NP is very unlikely. And intuitively, it's much more likely that a mathematical object has exactly no exploitable structure (like hashes are intended to), than that a mathematical object has exactly ~3 forms of exploitable structure (for elliptic curves: associativity, Schoof, pairings) and not some secret fourth form of structure we have not yet discovered that greatly degrades its security (for elliptic curves, ECDLP and pairing security). Similar for LWE, SVP, RLWE and the zoo of lattice problems. For this reason, we do not yet see any reason to worry and start padding the byte size of hashes (if we start to worry more, we would pad the round count first before doing anything to the byte size). Concrete TLDR, my own personal views: * Hash-based > lattice-based, in those situations where hash-based is possible at all * For anything lattice-based, be much more paranoid on param sizes. Remember that blockchains are only a small portion of the cryptography story; this point goes far beyond blockchains and applies to eg. access to websites, secure messaging, Tor / VPNs ... * For privacy protocols, strongly favor NOT putting encrypted notes onchain. Instead, send them offchain through some third-party mechanism. * If it's not difficult for you, keeping your funds in addresses which have not yet been used to make a transaction is a good idea. If it's easy for you, do it. **But be careful about migrations; I personally have lost more money in botched migrations than I have lost in all hacks combined**. * For multisig wallets, doing confirmations offchain is better than onchain, because this way the signatures of signer wallets do not get exposed to the public, so if ECDSA falls to AI much faster than expected, at least the multisig "gracefully degrades" to a 1-of-1 where the 1 is whoever was gathering the signatures - a much better place to be than "anyone can take the money" firefly.social/post/x/210783…

Give Grok @Bot your toughest problems

BREAKING: LEDGER USERS REPORT $86 MILLION IN STOLEN FUNDS On-chain investigator Specter reports that hundreds of wallets belonging to Ledger users have been drained of more than $86 million across Bitcoin, Ethereum, and TRON. Specter has identified 10 addresses allegedly receiving stolen funds, including one Bitcoin address reportedly receiving more than 211 BTC. Some victims claim their recovery phrases were stored offline and their hardware wallets had not been used to authorize transactions. The cause remains unknown. There is currently no confirmation that Ledger hardware devices or Ledger Live have been compromised. Ledger users should remain vigilant, avoid suspicious links, and never enter their recovery phrases into websites or applications. We are monitoring the situation.