STOP CHAT CONTROL 2.0. - What you should know: Tomorrow, 29 September, behind closed doors at the Council, the most draconian version of Chat Control 2.0 goes on the table. It is no longer only an intermediary reading all your private messages and cloud storage. It is a licence to search them for months, without suspicion against any individual. The leaked Presidency note to delegations (11956/26, 10 September) proposes "authorisation of search plans for a period of time rather than on a case-by-case basis" for private chats and emails. In plain terms: your messages, contacts, photos and cloud will be scanned under a state-issued licence for months, with no suspicion against you. The same note admits that under this regime "a high volume of reports generated do not lead to any operational outcome." The Council's Legal Service already warned this is general and indiscriminate surveillance, illegal under EU law. The @Europarl_EN mandate says the opposite: judicial authorisation, targeted to specific persons, no scanning licences. Tomorrow the pressure is on Parliament to fold. You remember the tricks used to push Chat Control 1.0 through and how @EPPGroup with @RobertaMetsola helped to push for it. So fasten your seat belt for what is coming tomorrow, and call or write to your MEP and your government now to reject Chat Control 2.0. as a whole! Remind them what this does to the privacy of every one of us. Under a search plan, every chat, photo or contact the scanner flags is stored by the provider and sent to a new EU agency, the EU Centre, which keeps it and passes it to police. Any state authority can then demand it, with a deadline and a fine for delay, and nobody has to check who is really behind the request, in case it is hacked or weaponised. That is exactly what happened at Revolut, and what keeps happening through abusive requests from authoritarian states, as we have reported for 13 years. In the Revolut case the hackers got access to a real state mailbox. Their requests came from an authentic certified email (PEC) account of an Italian Prefecture on the Interior Ministry's domain, with Postal Police protocol numbers, as European Investigation Orders in the name of the Milan prosecutor, for about five months. About 680 customers lost passports, selfies, home addresses, IBANs and full transaction histories. The files are being sold; hundreds of victims now fear kidnapping. No remedies exist as of now to protect against such attacks. Let's stop it before it is too late. Please repost.