2027 is the year because that’s when the rebuild is supposed to show up at scale. Kaz has been clear: everything they’re doing now is so 2027 looks like a completely different company. At the Silvia event last week he doubled down - exiting 2026 and the next 12 months is the real test of whether they did their job.They’re not waiting for macro to get better. The goal is adjusted net income positive on a 12-month go-forward basis by the end of 2026. Hit that, and 2027 becomes the year volume and operating leverage show up in the numbers. Analyst models already roughly double revenue year-over-year on that setup. Kaz has repeatedly said they don’t need rates to fall or the market to recover. Their floor assumes the hard macro continues. Better conditions would be upside, not the base case. That’s been consistent. Execution risk is real and the housing market is still tough. But the 2027 talk isn’t vague hope that the Fed suddenly helps. It’s the window the company itself marked as the proof point for the operating model they’ve been rebuilding through a bad macro. Bottom line: If they keep fixed/cash opex relatively controlled, continue improving unit economics (contribution margin, resale velocity, ops cost per home), and volume ramps toward the ~6,000 homes/quarter run-rate they’ve talked about for ANI breakeven, the operating leverage can get very strong.

After chatting with @nejatian it helped me hear the signal and connect the dots. 🚨🚨 The @Opendoor Four 🚨🚨 EBITDA - earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. The standard “how much cash does the machine make” number. Adjusted EBITDA - EBITDA after add-backs like stock comp and restructuring. This counts his stock comp as if he’s making a 150 million, which isn’t real cash, and it adds back the interest on the property-level debt carrying the inventory - the actual cost of holding homes. Adjusted net income (ANI) — EBITDA minus the financing cost. This is the number Kaz manages to. He said it plainly: adjusted EBITDA isn’t the best metric for this business, because the interest on borrowed inventory is a real cash cost, not overhead. A company can be EBITDA-positive and still burn cash. Contribution margin — the spread on each home after purchase, renovation, holding, and selling costs. Opendoor’s is thin — roughly three to three and a half percent — but it’s the engine. OpEx per acquisition has fallen from $8,400 to $3,000. I REPEAT Opex (operating expenses) has FALLEN from $8,400 to $3,000. The thesis: this was never a rates story. It was a liquidity story. It wasn’t the level - it was the speed. Rates moved almost 200 basis points in seven months, the fastest since the early 90s outside of 2022. That speed killed liquidity. Sellers locked into 3% percent mortgages wouldn’t move. Buyers couldn’t commit. The market froze because nobody could clear. A market maker doesn’t win by being right about direction. It wins by being right about time. @nejatian pivot is exactly that - the key input used to be the home price forecast. Now it’s how fast they can sell the home they’re buying. Aged inventory over a 120 days collapsed from over 50% when he joined to about 10% now. The funnel is the liquidity engine. Direct-to-consumer converts 6x better than the agent channel. Chloe converts leads at 3x the January rate at 1/3 the cost. The October 2025 cohort is over 80% sold through. The 4.99% mortgage is the bridge @Opendoor absorbs the buy-down cost to keep families moving when fixed rates sit above 7%. But conversion isn’t the score. ANI is. Kaz’s goal: adjusted net income positive on a 12-month go-forward basis exiting 2026, sustained through 2027. Cash after every real cost, including the property-level debt. My 🎬: When liquidity returns and the lock-in effect breaks, the model compounds with the market instead of against it. Keep an eye on OpEx as volume scales. Homeownership is the mission. Kaz and the team are the ones carrying it. Really Long $OPEN