War of Attrition advocate. Political & military analyst | Geopolitics, strategy & security | Breaking down power, conflict & statecraft

Joined March 2025
MagnusMatrix retweeted
The most dangerous assumption within the Russo‑Ukrainian war is that a single technology can replace the wider military system required to achieve victory. Ukraine should not approach the debate between Syrskyi and Fedorov as a choice between conventional warfare and technological innovation. The core rationale is that war is holistic, and no single system, technology or doctrine can independently deliver victory. A healthy tension must therefore exist between both perspectives. Fedorov is correct to emphasise drones, innovation and procurement reform. Drones are highly effective for reconnaissance, precision strikes, area denial and the disruption of enemy logistics. His efforts to reduce corruption and create a more transparent procurement system are also important, as they allow resources to reach operational units more efficiently. However, drones cannot currently replace personnel or combined-arms warfare. Drones are aforce multipliersnot substitutes for combined arms or personnel. Drones can identify, isolate and degrade an enemy position, but soldiers are still required to assault, clear, occupy and defend territory. Military success also cannot be assessed solely through confirmed kills or destroyed equipment. Artillery may not always produce visible evidence of destruction, but it can suppress enemy positions, restrict movement and enable friendly forces to advance. Similarly, electronic warfare, logistics, engineering, air defence and medical evacuation provide critical support despite not always producing easily measurable results. This highlights the danger of gamifying war. If military performance is judged primarily through visible drone strikes or point-based systems, units may prioritise targets that generate measurable results while neglecting essential support capabilities. Metrics should support military judgement, not replace it. Syrskyi’s perspective therefore remains relevant. He understands that personnel and conventional military formations remain necessary to fight, capture and hold ground. However, the major criticism of his approach is that operational results may be achieved at an excessive human cost. Personnel are essential to victory, but they must also be treated as a limited strategic resource. An attritional war does not require constant territorial advances. Ukraine can weaken Russia by imposing personnel and equipment losses, disrupting logistics and preserving its own forces. However, attrition must ultimately support wider political and territorial objectives. Territorial advances should result from successful attrition rather than being pursued regardless of cost. Ukraine may not require Syrskyi personally, but it still requires a military leader capable of representing the conventional realities that Fedorov’s technological vision cannot replace. Technologists should challenge commanders who rely too heavily on manpower-intensive operations, while commanders should challenge technologists who risk confusing measurable drone strikes with strategic victory. The strongest military approach is therefore a synthesis. Drones, artillery, electronic warfare, logistics, intelligence and infantry are most effective when integrated into a unified system.
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MagnusMatrix retweeted
This could well be the most important battle of 2026 of the war in Ukraine, if the momentum from 2025 does not pick up again. Everything seems to indicate that the first phase of the Ukrainian collapse in Kostiantynivka is beginning.
Replying to @Suriyakmaps
Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 1548-1552: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 Situation on Konstantinovskaya front: During the last week, Russian Army has made a series of advances in the city of Kostiantynivka. Intense shelling of Ukrainian army’s rear and supply routes, located in the northern part of the city, is paying off, allowing Russian forces to infiltrate new areas in the southern half of the city, expanding the gray zone and, with it, urban combat. - In the south, Russian forces captured the Tabachna factory and the industrial landfill, as well as most of the Stara Santurynivka district - In the east, Russian forces crossed the Hora district, advancing along Bahmutska Street until they reached the school on Mykhaila Savchuka Street. Russian troops also crossed the Hruzka Forest and managed to enter Teatralna Street, which leads to the central market. - In the west, heavy Russian shelling of high-rise buildings has allowed troops to advance in the Tsentralnyi, Chervóne mistéchko, Prohresyvnyi, and Zinkovy districts, increasing pressure on Ukrainian forces still deployed in the Ukrayinsky Khutir district (which have established a base in the former bus station). Map: [ google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid… ]
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MagnusMatrix retweeted
There is currently a lot of optimism within the Ukrainian community around the slowing, and in some areas reversal, of Russian gains. But I think that optimism needs to be treated carefully. This war remains fundamentally attritional. The key question is not just whether Russia gains less land in one month, but whether Ukraine is trading equipment in a sustainable way. @Willy_OAM: Fully credit to him for the following information: 1. Early 2025: High Russian Losses, Modest Russian Gains Lower Ukrainian Losses From January to April 2025, Russia was taking heavy tank losses for relatively modest territorial gains. Russian tank losses were roughly: Jan 2025: 55 tanks Feb 2025: 72 tanks Mar 2025: 64 tanks Apr 2025: 62 tanks Yet Russian territorial gains were only around 230–340 km² per month, far below the later 2025 peaks. Ukraine’s losses during this same period were lower in comparison. Ukrainian tank losses were mostly around 28–47 tanks per month, while Ukrainian SPG losses were around 14–28 per month. Early 2025 looked like this: Russia: high tank losses + modest gains Ukraine: lower losses while slowing Russian advances. 2. Mid-to-Late 2025: Russian Losses Fall, Russian Gains Rise Ukrainian Losses Increase The major shift happens from around May 2025 onward. Russian tank losses drop sharply: May: around 32 tanks June: around 30 tanks July: around 28 tanks October: around 24 tanks November: around 21 tanks Russian SPG losses also collapse from roughly 10–15 per month earlier in the year to almost 1–5 per month by late 2025. But at the same time, Russian territorial gains increase dramatically: May 2025: around 640 km² June 2025: around 570 km² July 2025: around 530 km² October 2025: around 660 km² November 2025: around 745 km² Russia was no longer losing large numbers of tanks while gaining modest land. Instead, Russia was gaining significantly more territory while losing fewer tanks and SPGs. Meanwhile, Ukrainian losses did not fall in the same way. Ukrainian tank losses remained in the 20–38 range, while Ukrainian SPG losses rose into the high 20s and 30s by late 2025. Trend becomes: Russia: reduced losses + higher territorial gains Ukraine: continued and rising material pressure. This suggests Russia either adapted tactically, relied less on tank-heavy assaults, or shifted more of the fighting burden onto infantry, drones, glide bombs, artillery, and smaller assault groups. 3. Early 2026: Russian Losses Stay Low, Russian Gains Slow But Ukraine Still Takes High Material Losses despite gaining ground By early 2026, Russian losses remain low compared with early 2025. Approximate Russian tank losses: Jan 2026: 12 tanks Feb 2026: 5 tanks Mar 2026: 13 tanks Apr 2026: 9 tanks Russian SPG losses remain extremely low, around 2–3 per month. Russian territorial gains also appear lower than the late-2025 peak: Jan 2026: around 420 km² Feb 2026: in the negative. Mar 2026: around 100 km² Apr 2026: around 260 km² This is where some of the current optimism comes from. Russian gains slowed, and in some areas Ukraine may have reversed ground losses. The material picture is still concerning. Ukrainian SPG losses remain high: Jan 2026: around 18 SPGs Feb 2026: around 35 SPGs Mar 2026: around 50 SPGs Apr 2026: around 22 SPGs So even when Russian territorial gains slow, Ukraine is still taking serious artillery and SPG losses. A slowdown in Russian gains is positive, but it does not automatically mean the attritional balance has changed. If Ukraine is reversing some ground but losing high-value systems at an elevated rate. This raises serious concerns because Ukraine cannot afford sustained losses of critical systems such as SPGs. These systems are central to Ukraine’s ability to provide mobile fire support, engage drone-identified targets, suppress Russian positions, and support mechanised assaults. Losing them at an elevated rate weakens Ukraine’s combined drone-artillery-manoeuvre capability. In a war of attrition, the question is not simply who gained or lost land this month. The real question is who can sustain the exchange ratio over time. For Ukraine, being smaller force in this war, that remains the central problem. Ukraine gaining ground is excellent news. My greatest concern, however, is whether they can sustain it over time, especially if continued SPG and armour losses leave them with fewer critical systems to defend against future Russian assaults.
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Today, Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov made some of the most ridiculous claims I've ever seen in this war. According to him, 85% of Lyman is under Russian control, and Russian forces have captured all of Borova, half of Shyikivka, and are fighting for Druzhelyubivka and Cherneshchyna. The reality is: Russian forces control only a few positions on the outskirts of Lyman and are infiltrating some of the suburbs. The VAST MAJORITY of fighting is still ongoing for positions OUTSIDE Lyman. Russian forces are over 3 km from the outskirts of Borova, let alone fully controlling it. They are also over 4 km from Shyikivka, over 4 km from Cherneshchyna, and over 1.1 km from the outskirts of Druzhelyubivka. Claims of full Russian control over the remnants of Luhansk Oblast are also false. I've mapped what his claims of the frontline configuration would theoretically look like below. I've said it before and I will say it again: NEVER trust wartime government reports, whether they are Russian or Ukrainian.
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MagnusMatrix retweeted
Russia is once again utilising its superior manpower and artillery advantage to place the Ukrainian city of Kostiantynivka in a position of partial encirclement by applying pressure on the flanks of the city. If Russia is able to capture the settlement of Stinky to the north-east and the settlement of Dovha Balka, the city will be placed into a position of increasingly untenable logistics. Furthermore, as reported by @Playfra0 full credit to him for the following information: The city is becoming increasingly infiltrated by Russian forces, thereby weakening Ukraine’s ability to hold the city. Northern sector: Along the creek toward Illinivka, then north through the lake and forest terrain, or east through Chervone Mistechko toward the central districts. Southern vector: Through Berestok toward eastern Illinivka and the Berestovyi District. Eastern vector: Through the large forest east of the city, using destroyed dachas, dugouts, and basements before entering Hora, Novodmytrivka, Molocharka, or the 92nd Quarter. My own personal analysis is that the city will not fall until Russia has successfully placed it under a form of semi-encirclement. If we see Russian TOS systems being utilised on the flanks, this would likely indicate that an imminent attempt to force the fall of the city is being prepared by Russian forces. The likely objective would be to maximise Ukrainian casualties while reducing Russian losses, by attempting to attrit Ukrainian forces and make their continued defence of Kostiantynivka increasingly unsustainable.
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MagnusMatrix retweeted
An attack on the May 9 Victory Day parade is exactly what Putin wants: The idea that Ukraine should attempt to strike the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow is both strategically reckless, but politically disastrous. While such an attack may create dramatic Western headlines, it would almost certainly provide Vladimir Putin with exactly what he wants: a powerful symbolic event that can be used to rally Russian society, justify escalation, and portray Ukraine as attacking not only the Russian state, but the memory of the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. #VictoryDay #Russia #NAFO #Ukraine #Soviet
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MagnusMatrix retweeted
The map and information provided by @actfast are incorrect. The situation at Yampil is not evidence of a successful Ukrainian offensive in which Ukrainian troops have “breached the first Russian line” and are now consolidating their gains. Rather, the tactical picture highlights the opposite: Ukrainian forces appear to be operating under conditions consistent with either vertical encirclement or a physical encirclement.
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This has been sent out to everyone I have reached out to. (I have had to rewrite some of it due to X flagging spam) However, this is the core of the document. If you are an analyst, please feel free to send me your responses.
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The questions for the Pokrovsk Analysis Thread have now been released. This project will collect insights from analysts, mappers, and military observers to highlight diverse perspectives on the Battle of Pokrovsk. If you’d like to participate, DM me. Your perspectives matter.
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Pokrovsk is merely the visible result of that collapse. A symbol of an army and political apparatus trapped in an unwinnable war of exhaustion.
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From an attritional warfare perspective was the Battle of Pokrovsk, a victory for Russia or for Ukraine?
23%Major Russian victory
15%Minor Russian victory
8%Major Ukrainian victory
55%Minor Ukrianain victory
62 votes • Final results
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This is a perfect example of Western misunderstanding of attritional warfare. 50 Tomahawks isn’t strategy it’s PR. Attrition needs mass, sustainment, and repeatability. A few dozen missiles raise costs but don’t change outcomes. Ukraine needs volume, not wonder weapons.
With a few launchers, that would be enough to effectively strike one to three important targets, including the Yelabuga drone factory, while Ukraine’s own cruise‑missile production scales up. Let’s hope it happens
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In the Pokrovsk direction, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have advanced, with Russian forces making important progress inside Pokrovsk City. Russian assault groups were able to secure the eastern part of the Kalynivka District, where they used the low-rise residential area to enter the Lazurnyi District of Pokrovsk. They were able to capture most of the high-rise buildings here, and infiltrated further into the Pivdennyi, Shakhtarskyi, and Soniachnyi Districts, where a large grey-zone has formed. Most of the fighting is centred on the Shakhtarskyi District, where the Russians are attempting to advance beyond the E-50 Highway. To the west, Russian forces broke through Ukrainian positions west of Pokrovsk, and captured three parallel treelines leading up the railway line. Meanwhile, in the western suburbs of Pokrovsk, their zone of control shrunk after they failed to consolidate in the Durniak District, however, infiltration attempts continue in the Durniak and Pervomaika Districts, where Ukrainian forces are increasingly using FPV drones to contain their advance. On the other hand, Russian forces withdrew from the Market District of Pokrovsk, allowing for the Ukrainians to regain control over the eastern market and surrounding residential areas. + ~3.89 km² in favour of Russia. + ~0.39 km² in favour of Ukraine.
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Russian forces have captured the village of Fedorivka, southern flank of Siversk, Donetsk Oblast. Pre-war population: ~410. Total land area: ~0.94 km².
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MagnusMatrix retweeted
-- GEROMAN -- time will tell - 👀 --
@GeromanAT6 Oct 2025
that means the whole pocket is under complete fire and drone control.
Replying to @GeromanAT
The Kupyansk pocket vs. a circle with a diameter of 20 km:
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Over the past two months, Russian forces have made consistent progress towards the town of Pokrovske in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, largely matching my prediction in this analysis from 1 month ago. They have advanced around 21 km from Vilne Pole to Verbove, putting them just 13.4 km from the crucial logistical hub of Pokrovske. As I said last month, the goal of this offensive is likely to eventually bypass the stronghold city of Hulyaipole (Zaporizhzhia Oblast), taking it into a pocket.
Analysis on the Pokrovske-Prosyana direction: Since the fall of Vuhledar, Russian forces have been carrying out a concerted effort to collapse and capture the rest of Ukrainian-controlled south Donetsk Oblast. Now with that goal almost completed, the next goal for Russia in this direction is likely to seize two important settlements in Zaporizhzhia Oblast and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: The city of Hulyaipole, and the town of Pokrovske. Both Hulyaipole and Pokrovske are key logistical hubs for Ukrainian forces defending the line from Andriivka-Kletsove in Donetsk Oblast, to the eastern flank of Orikhiv in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. However, Hulyaipole is the strongest of the two, and lies right next to the line of contact in an area that has seen little movement for over three years. Ukrainian forces have used this time to convert this city into a fortress that Russia would undoubtably take substantial losses if trying to storm head on. So naturally, Russia will likely carry out their usual strategy with cities like this: simply bypassing them and attacking from the less-fortified rear. After the fall of Vuhledar in September 2024, the frontline entered a stage of collapse, as the Ukrainians didn't carry out a coordinated withdrawal and fallback from the city. This allowed for the Russians to simply keep advancing further and further, with their only difficult points being specific settlements with higher concentrations of Ukrainian manpower. This continued until they reached the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka, which after a second series of attacks (including coordinated efforts from the west), also fell quite quickly relative to its significance. The fall of Velyka Novosilka marked a new era for the remnants of the south Donetsk front. It allowed for a refocusing of efforts west of the city after the remaining pockets of Ukrainian resistance south of the Vovcha River and east of the Mokri Yaly River were cleared. The fall of Velyka Novosilka led to the subsequent fall of Komar, and the establishment of a three-settlement line of key logistical hubs now used by Russia to attack even further west to achieve their new goals. I have split this into three areas: 1, 2, and 3: Area 1 is largely supplied by Komar, with its southern boundary forming the operational border between the Russian 36th and 6th Combined Arms Armies. Area 1 covers the remnants of the Ukrainian positions east of the Vovcha River, as well as south of Novopavlivka. Area 2 is largely supplied by Velyka Novosilka, and covers the zone from the bend in the Vovcha River to the Yanchur River, and includes the Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia-Dnipropetrovsk tri-border point. Area 3 is largely supplied by Staromylnivka, and covers the East-Zaporihzhzhia front, including Hulyaipole. It is the strongest and most stable section of this front. But let's break this down further before looking at possible future movements. Area 1 was previously the "easiest" section of this front for Russia. After they had properly established themselves west of the Mokri Yaly River, they were able to advance to the eastern bank of the Vovcha River. However, Komar's proximity to the frontline, and its position in what was at the time a more evident salient, made it difficult to transfer supplies through due to the presence of Ukrainian FPV drones. Ukrainian forces likely took advantage of this and exploited a lack of Russian consolidation in and around Andriivka-Klevtsove, Zelenyi Hai, and Olekandrohrad, to conduct a series of counterattacks towards the Mokri Yaly River. However, the presence of the Vovcha River made supply for the Ukrainians here difficult too, and the attacks eventually resulted in a withdrawal from their forward positions in and around Tolstoi. But to further cement Russia's presence in Area 1, Russian assault operations were carried out to the bend in the Vovcha River in order to further isolate Ukrainian positions east of the river, which brings us to Area 2. Area 2 is where the bulk of Russian offensive actions are taking place. They have been constantly fattening their zone of control west of the Mokri Yaly River, and are now over 20km west of it. Here, they have been exploiting a lack of Ukrainian manpower to move through fields and treelines relatively quickly and "smoothly", bypassing key villages which hold the main Ukrainian presences, taking them into dangerous salients, and forcing them to withdraw (Komyshuvakha is a prime example of this). Ukraine simply can't cover every section of Area 2 with soldiers, so instead chooses to concentrate most of them in settlements, utilising their cover for forward deployment points to exert their control outwards to the fields. Naturally, this gives Russian drone operators easier targets to hit, as the positions of Ukrainians are more predictable. With these quicker Russian advances, Ukrainian drone operators in villages previously several kilometres behind the line of contact are often caught off guard and have to quickly (and likely chaotically) withdraw further west, set up their new UAV control points, and go through the process of re-establishing themselves effectively. This takes time, is very dangerous when closer to the line of contact, and the lag between the withdrawal and completion of new positions results in less Ukrainian FPV drone coverage, which Russia exploits for less losses when advancing here. Area 3 sees little frontline activity. Skirmishes and occasional ground attacks occur, but it's mostly limited to mutual artillery shelling and FPV drone strikes on well-dug-in positions. But I believe there is a reason for this, and that is because the Russians don't need to advance here right now... With the Ukrainian presence west of the Vovcha River in Area 1 now isolated and likely coming to an end, and Russian forces enjoying steady advances westwards in Area 2, it appears that Russia is trying to reach the town of Pokrovske and subsequently the rear of Hulyaipole. A significant portion of movement in and out of Hulyaipole goes through Pokrovske, so if the Russians can capture Velykomykhailivka (another important Ukrainian logistical hub), then get close to, and capture Pokrovske, it will put them in a much stronger position to storm Hulyaipole from three directions. Currently Russian forces are advancing downhill to the rest of Hulyaipole - reminiscent of the operations to reach the rear of Vuhledar. If they cross the Yanchur River and establish a solid bridgehead west of it, the city will be in danger of being taken into a pocket. Area 3 won't have to be activated unless it becomes the "bottom of the salient", where supply for Ukraine is the most difficult due to its distance from the outside of the salient, similar to the current situation in Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad. But there is one other thing to consider with a prolonged operation like this: It may depend on the situation on other fronts - namely Novopavlivka to the northeast. Depending on how strong Ukraine is in the Pokrovske area when the town falls, Russia may have to have collapsed the Novopavlivka salient, and advance north of the Vovcha River to the north of Pokrovske, but that could be difficult due to the placement of Mezhova. This is why it would be impossible to put a timeline on an operation like this, as all sections of the frontline influence each other. Legend for the map: Orange lines: Important roads Green lines: Area boundaries Yellow circles: Important logistical hubs Red arrows: Possible approximate future Russian attack vectors Light blue lines: Significant rivers
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