I may be reading too much into this statement, and I certainly hope I am wrong. But it is hard not to interpret it as suggesting that Netanyahu promised Trump another joint military operation against Iran in exchange for his political support. In other words, Netanyahu may have effectively committed Israel to another war with Iran to secure his political future, regardless of the potential consequences. If that is indeed the case, it would be an extraordinary and troubling revelation. Israel cannot afford another war with Iran driven by political calculations rather than a genuine national security necessity. #IranWar‌

No Palestinian Progress, No Saudi-Israeli Normalization If President Trump wants to advance normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia after the Israeli elections, he will have to put significant pressure on the next Israeli government to make meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue. With all due respect to whatever assistance Israel may or may not provide Saudi Arabia in its confrontation with the Houthis, the Palestinian issue cannot simply be brushed aside. It remains a fundamental political and strategic consideration for Riyadh, particularly given the importance of Saudi public opinion. Saudi Arabia’s response to the recent Emirati fly dubai incident only underscored just how far we remain from normalization. If Trump is serious about achieving a historic breakthrough between Jerusalem and Riyadh, he will need to push the next Israeli government toward substantial, credible, and irreversible steps in the direction of a two-state solution, including meaningful implementation of the political vision outlined in his own Peace to Prosperity plan. This cannot be limited to vague promises, symbolic gestures, or another diplomatic process with no clear destination. Riyadh will need to see tangible changes on the ground and a credible political horizon for the Palestinians. The bottom line is simple: No matter what happens in Yemen, and regardless of the extent of Israeli-Saudi security cooperation, normalization will remain out of reach without meaningful progress on the Palestinian issue. Military cooperation may bring Israel and Saudi Arabia closer strategically, but it cannot substitute for the political decisions necessary to make normalization possible. #normalization #KSA

Israel Must Tread Carefully as Ethiopia and Eritrea Move Closer to War As tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to escalate, Israel must approach the possibility of another war in the Horn of Africa with strategic caution. There should be little doubt about where Israel's strategic sympathies lie. The depth of Israel's historical, strategic, and cultural ties with Ethiopia is simply incomparable to its relationship with Eritrea, which has deteriorated dramatically in recent years. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has fundamentally shifted his approach toward Israel while significantly strengthening his country's relationship with Iran. From Israel's perspective, Ethiopia is clearly the more important strategic partner. But supporting Ethiopia and openly taking its side in a regional war are two very different things. Israel cannot afford to ignore the broader regional implications of a potential conflict, particularly its impact on Egypt. Cairo increasingly views Ethiopia as a strategic rival, not least because of the longstanding dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the broader competition for influence in the Horn of Africa. The more openly Israel aligns itself with Addis Ababa, the more likely it is to reinforce Egyptian suspicions about Israel's regional intentions. This is particularly dangerous at a time when Israeli-Egyptian relations are already experiencing one of their most difficult periods in decades. Moreover, a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea is unlikely to remain a strictly bilateral conflict. Its consequences could extend across the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region, drawing in other regional actors. Egypt and Sudan could align with Eritrea, while forces loyal to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in Sudan, and potentially Somaliland, could find themselves supporting Ethiopia. Such alignments are not inevitable, but they illustrate how quickly a localized confrontation could evolve into a broader regional struggle. For Israel, this creates a complicated strategic dilemma. On the one hand, an Ethiopian victory would better serve Israeli interests, particularly given Addis Ababa's strategic importance and Eritrea's growing ties with Tehran. On the other hand, overt Israeli support for Ethiopia could further undermine relations with Egypt, an essential pillar of Israel's regional security architecture. The bottom line: Israel has a clear strategic preference in a potential Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. But having a preferred outcome does not mean Israel should become publicly involved in achieving it. Jerusalem should preserve and strengthen its strategic partnership with Addis Ababa while avoiding unnecessary public involvement that could deepen tensions with Cairo or entangle Israel in another regional conflict. This is a classic case in which Israel must prioritize strategic wisdom over the temptation to openly demonstrate where it stands. Israel's interests may favor Ethiopia, but its broader regional interests require caution, restraint, and a careful understanding of the consequences for its relationship with Egypt.