Sir. Miny Sibeko (@Khupha_S) header
Sir. Miny Sibeko (@Khupha_S) profile picture

Apple's Heisenberg | Descansa en paz Mi Reina | @Masandawana 👆🏽 | Self Knighted | Fighter | Citizen of the United States of Africa | Husband | Father!

Ekurhuleni, South Africa
Joined October 2010
“Ain’t no woman alive that can take my mama’s place” RIP Dizo! ❤️❤️❤️
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So! No media house has went to challenge @helenzille on her anti constitution stance??? 🤷🏽‍♂️ “no country builds houses for their citizens”. @Julius_S_Malema was right. For this argument, put aside her age: what about the right to dignity?? Come on guys!!!
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Why are children and lackeys of zionists being forced down our throats??? WE DO NOT WANT THE DA. THEY MUST PAY FOR BURNING OUR FLAG. THIS IS NOT WHERE YOU GET AWAY WITH MURDERING CHILDREN AND WOMEN! Here you behave or JUMP!!
Mashaba, Zuma and Malema: a marriage made in hypocrisy Back in 2024, Herman Mashaba explained why he got into politics: “I promised my friends and family,” he said, “that if South Africans re-elected Jacob Zuma as president, I would become a member of the opposition to turn around the country’s decline.” So it odd to see ASA advertise this week, “A first multi-lateral engagement with ActionSA, ANC, EFF and MK with a focus on how stability and services can be achieved for all.” To see ASA next to the ANC - an organisation Mashaba has described as the devil itself - is one thing. Mashaba’s hypocrisy on this front is now is so well documented as to be taken as read. But quite another level of duplicity to see MK and the EFF in the room. MK is of course former President Jacob Zuma’s personal revenge project. And former ANCYL leader Julius Malema’s EFF represents an earlier iteration of revenge. Mashaba has said of the three, “The ANC, EFF and the MK – those are the parties, for us as ActionSA, we will never work with.” His reasoning being, “It can't be the EFF. It can't be Zuma's MK's. These are all the brainchild of the ANC, all corrupt.” And yet here we are. Hypocrisy doesn’t really affect Mashaba, he seems to bathe in the stuff. But he did say, repeatedly on the campaign trail, that ASA had three non-negotiables, one of which was a “zero tolerance” attitude to corruption. And what do we have outside of the word of a party? It is hard to argue that Zuma has a “zero-tolerance” attitude to corruption. Indeed, the man himself is about to face a long-delayed trial on his own alleged role in corrupting the entire state. But don’t take my word for it. Mashaba said in 2017, “The past eight years of ANC rule under Jacob Zuma have, simply put, been characterised by fraud, corruption and a depravity of governance.” In 2023 he said Zuma “oversaw the biggest destruction of state entities during his presidency” “With Jacob Zuma,” he said in 2019, “we know he steals people's money and he does not hide it.” As a result, when Zuma was convicted in 2021, Mashaba said, “Finally, Zuma will find himself where he belongs - behind bars.” Turns out, that is not where Zuma belongs, he belongs in the metros, overseeing his rotating circle of deployees, managing public money. Not just Zuma, but his family, whom he was quick to point out in 2022 was no less compromised: “He is found to have abused his office for the benefit of himself, his son and the Guptas, and that Mr Zuma and Duduzane entered into contracts with state organs in an irregular manner.” There are many other such quotes from Mashaba. His public career was built on a monument of scathing criticism about Zuma. But the worm turns. “The ANC, EFF, MK out of the question,” Mashaba said in 2024. Now we face the bizarre prospect of Mashaba himself, after going into politics itself no less, to rid SA of the curse of the ANC and its wild progeny, happily and proudly in the process of facilitating their return. Mashaba has become the very thing he started in politics to eradicate: a willing facilitator for the corrupt or, as he put it, “constitutional delinquents”, “who have looted our country with impunity” and who are “characterised by fraud, corruption and a depravity of governance.” Today, under the banner of a “zero-tolerance” attitude to corruption, he is working to carefully manage their return, to give them access to public money, tenders and patronage networks. You have to give to Mashaba, those moderate forces in SA, even in the ANC itself, from the GNU to KZN, have compromised so much to keep MK’s hands out of the till. And MK and the EFF have done so much to try and get their hands on it. Turns out, all they needed was Mashaba. He is set to achieve everything Zuma and Malema ever wanted: access to state resources and a return to the glorious decade following 2009. Truly we live in wonderland. But don’t ever think the protagonist is Ramaphosa, Zuma or Malema. Mashaba is Alice:
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The coalition that will break South Africa is the one funded by the children killers! Aks them to go join their cousins, ifp, pa, acdp.... go form your own coalitions! WE DO NOT WANT DA IN THS PART OF THE COUNTRY!!! Bloody racists
Sjoe! They Won the Coalition🇿🇦 They May Lose the Country! ~ The Coalition That Could Break South Africa💥Cape Independence and KwaZulu-Natal Balkanisation! ~ 💣 One Coalition Deal, Two Provinces, and the Beginning of a Very Different South Africa! Sjoe. Johannesburg has just demonstrated what finishing first is worth under pure proportional representation. The Democratic Alliance took roughly 34.8 percent of the vote and 91 seats on a 270-seat council. A majority requires 136. ActionSA, led by Herman Mashaba, secured 16–17 percent and 42–43 seats. Within days the ANC, ActionSA, the EFF and the MK Party were constructing majorities that would leave the largest party outside the mayoralty and the executive (Eyewitness News, 18 November 2026; BusinessTech, 18 November 2026). The party that arrived first in the economic capital can be locked out by parties that arrived later. Arithmetic has overridden mandate. That exclusion is the high-salience event that has most likely pushed the Western Cape across the threshold at which independence becomes the lower-risk option, and that has placed KwaZulu-Natal Balkanization firmly on the radar. No post-election poll has yet confirmed a majority for either outcome. The cumulative evidence—seat totals, contemporaneous coalition reporting, multi-year polling ranges, and documented fiscal flows—nonetheless indicates that Mashaba’s conversion of a mid-sized seat total into decisive veto power has updated the risk assessment for both provinces at once. Cape independence is now the more probable path inside the current cycle. KwaZulu-Natal autonomy follows as the logical subsequent pressure once the centre’s inability to protect plurality winners is established as operating fact. 1. The Arithmetic That Nullifies South Africa’s pure proportional representation system multiplies parties rather than concentrating them. Under the Municipal Structures Act the executive mayor is elected by a majority of councillors, not awarded to the largest party. Johannesburg’s numbers therefore permit exclusion: DA 91, ANC 63, ActionSA 43, MK 15, EFF 17. Combinations that exclude the DA reach or exceed 136. Mashaba’s party, holding less than half the DA’s seats, becomes the indispensable partner. This is the institutionalisation of kingmaker leverage. Historical surveys between 2020 and 2026 placed support for the idea of Western Cape independence in the 30–50 percent range of the provincial population; one pre-election poll recorded approximately 34 percent among voters living in the province itself (Cape Independence Advocacy Group, 2026; The Common Sense, 2026). An earlier Social Research Foundation poll recorded support near 51 percent inside KwaZulu-Natal for that province breaking away. The Johannesburg exclusion supplies the missing concrete precedent. Single-issue parties received negligible shares, so organised demand remains limited. The threshold claim is a hypothesis grounded in visible exclusion and prior polling ranges. It is the strongest available indicator that the price of plurality has risen. The 1996 Constitution assumed that national and provincial majorities would largely align. Section 235 recognises self-determination within the Republic yet supplies no procedural path to exit. When coalition arithmetic repeatedly prevents the largest party from governing the largest metro, the practical distinction between assigned provincial powers and residual control narrows for regions that already run their own service systems. The 2021 hung-council wave first revealed the pattern. The 2026 Johannesburg talks have elevated it to the operating rule of the economic capital. Sjoe! Ninety-one seats and still waiting in the corridor while 43 decide whether the door opens. The system has discovered that the power to withhold is more valuable than the power to arrive first. Stirring Questions: If the largest party in the economic capital can be excluded from functional leadership, what remaining incentive exists for voters in diverging provinces to treat national coalition outcomes as binding on their own majorities? When that exclusion is paired with already substantial latent support for greater autonomy? These questions together matter because they test whether the 2026 arithmetic has altered the risk calculus faster than gradual demographic or fiscal drift, and whether protective exit has become the rational default for both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. 2. Symmetric Exposure Both provinces already diverge from the coalitions that dominate national arrangements. In the Western Cape the DA retained outright majorities in Cape Town (approximately 56 percent) and in several other municipalities (Rateweb, 2026; IEC results). In KwaZulu-Natal the MK Party emerged as the largest force in 19 of 34 hung councils, including eThekwini with 86 seats. The Johannesburg precedent demonstrates that smaller parties can construct veto majorities against the first-place party. Once that mechanism is normalised, the expected cost of remaining rises symmetrically. Western Cape residents who have repeatedly rejected the parties that form the bulk of national coalitions face the prospect that future multi-party deals could override their local majorities. KwaZulu-Natal residents who have shifted support toward a regionally dominant party face the parallel risk that national coalition logic could still constrain or exclude that party’s preferred outcomes. Protective calculations therefore apply equally: convert temporary local strength into more permanent control before the same exclusionary arithmetic is applied. The provinces differ in party colouring, demography and institutional capacity; symmetry exists at the level of incentive structure, not identical political content. Comparative experience adds precision. In Belgium the repeated construction of national majorities that sidelined the largest Flemish parties accelerated demands for fiscal autonomy. In Canada the perception that federal coalitions were unresponsive to Quebec majorities preceded the 1995 referendum. Neither case maps exactly onto South Africa, yet both show how the normalisation of veto politics raises the relative attractiveness of exit options for regionally concentrated electorates. Mashaba’s success in Johannesburg has performed the same demonstration function for South African provinces. Sjoe! Two provinces, two different parties, one shared discovery: the centre can no longer guarantee that finishing first means governing. The arithmetic does not care about the colour of the jersey. Questions Stirring: Can the same veto logic that operates in Johannesburg be replicated against Western Cape majorities or against MK-led arrangements in KwaZulu-Natal? And what threshold of repeated exclusion would be required before protective demands become majority positions? These questions together are important because they determine whether the 2026 outcome remains a Gauteng-specific negotiation or becomes the template that makes independence or deep autonomy the lower-risk path for both provinces. 3. Salience Without New Polls Multiple surveys established substantial latent preference. The Johannesburg talks supply a high-salience event capable of moving soft or undecided respondents. Once residents in either province update their beliefs to include a non-trivial probability that local preference can be nullified by coalitions assembled elsewhere, the expected cost of the status quo rises relative to the expected cost of testing independence or deep autonomy. Salience can shift preferences faster than slow drift. The absence of a confirmatory post-election poll means the crossing remains unmeasured. The DA’s exclusion is identified as the trigger precisely because it is immediate and observable. Research on demonstration effects indicates that a single, highly visible failure of representation can compress timelines previously assumed to be multi-cycle. The Johannesburg outcome functions as that demonstration. For the Western Cape, Mashaba’s role in ousting the largest party supplies a concrete reason to treat independence as insurance against the same fate. For KwaZulu-Natal the same logic applies with a lag: once the centre’s inability to protect plurality winners is established, regional parties face stronger incentives to lock in local control. An unintended consequence is that kingmaker success in one metro can accelerate exit pressures in distant provinces, regardless of the kingmaker’s own national ambitions. Practical consequences follow for ratepayers: metro paralysis raises the relative value of provinces that can still convert majorities into consistent service delivery. Sjoe! No new poll is required for the calculation to change. Residents simply watched the largest party in the economic capital being told that its 91 seats were insufficient. That is enough to update the ledger. Stirring Qestions: How many additional high-salience exclusions would be required to convert the existing 30–50 percent band into a measured majority? What form would a confirmatory survey need to take to falsify or support the hypothesis? These questions together matter because the claim is explicitly testable; without them the argument remains coherent but unconfirmed, and the distinction between latent preference and organised demand remains decisive. 4. Parallel Pressure The identical coalition arithmetic that can sideline the largest party in Johannesburg can generate concurrent demands in KwaZulu-Natal. Functional separation—local power arrangements, fiscal retention efforts, resistance to selected national policies—need not wait for one province to complete a formal exit before the other advances. Historical processes of fragmentation show that once central enforcement capacity is visibly impaired, multiple regions move on overlapping timelines. Placing the Johannesburg demonstration beside KwaZulu-Natal’s 2026 electoral results and earlier secession polling makes the multi-regional prospect a direct implication of the same mechanism. Legal, economic and security constraints differ sharply between provinces; parallel movement is probable only in the limited sense of simultaneous pressure for greater autonomy, not simultaneous sovereign exit. The practical consequence is that the Western Cape need not succeed first for KwaZulu-Natal to accelerate. Each province supplies the other with evidence that the centre cannot reliably enforce uniform outcomes. Once that evidence is public, the cost of waiting declines for both. Governance analysis notes that when the centre loses the ability to convert electoral outcomes into consistent policy, sub-national actors rationally invest in alternative institutional arrangements, including independent generation capacity and localised revenue retention. Broader societal implications include the hardening of regional identity as residents recalculate the returns to national participation. Sjoe! The centre’s inability to protect the largest party in Johannesburg has become a shared reference point. Two provinces can now move without waiting for the other to finish the journey. Questions Stirring: Can functional separation in one province accelerates or dampens pressure in the other? What institutional responses from the centre would be required to reverse the impairment of uniform enforcement? These questions together are important because they distinguish between sequential and concurrent pathways and therefore shape whether Cape independence and later KwaZulu-Natal autonomy become mutually reinforcing rather than isolated experiments. 5. Conditions Already Present Western Cape provincial majorities already supply the legislative capacity to table a motion invoking self-determination or for the premier to initiate a referendum. Comparable provincial arithmetic exists in parts of KwaZulu-Natal. November 2026 fiscal-flow analyses, including the Econometrix report released with the Cape Independence Advocacy Group, documented substantial and growing net outflows from the Western Cape to the national fiscus; the province has simultaneously expanded independent generation capacity. These conditions lower the practical cost of greater autonomy. When combined with the Johannesburg signal, the previous multi-cycle assumption shortens. Legal pathways remain contested, fiscal models are projections rather than guarantees, and political will inside the dominant provincial parties has not yet been tested by a formal motion. The equal weighting of institutional readiness with the political demonstration shows only that the conditions for testing the question are more favourable than before the 2026 coalition talks. Mashaba’s success in Johannesburg has therefore done more than rearrange Gauteng metros. It has supplied the high-salience event that makes the existing legal and fiscal conditions in the Western Cape actionable inside the current cycle, and that makes parallel pressure in KwaZulu-Natal more probable rather than remote. Economic reasoning indicates that sustained net outflows combined with demonstrated local capacity create a measurable incentive to retain revenue streams once the political risk of remaining has risen. The broader implication is that repeated nullification of plurality winners erodes the expectation that electoral participation will produce corresponding governance, thereby lowering the cost of exploring alternatives. Sjoe! The door was already unlocked. Johannesburg simply showed everyone the key was never required. Stirring Questions: Is there concern whether any provincial majority will actually table such a motion inside the current cycle? What fiscal or service-delivery thresholds would make the cost of inaction exceed the cost of action for those majorities? These questions together matter because they convert structural possibility into observable political choice, and because the answer will determine whether the 2026 exclusion remains a Gauteng story or becomes the moment at which Cape independence, and later KwaZulu-Natal autonomy, moved from hypothesis to active pursuit. Synthesis The sequence is coherent. A documented exclusion in Johannesburg raises symmetric expected costs in two diverging provinces. The salience of that exclusion can update preferences without new polling. The same impairment of central capacity makes parallel pressure probable. Pre-existing legal and fiscal conditions make action inside the current cycle feasible. The collective strength lies in the independence of the sources—IEC seat totals, contemporaneous coalition reporting, multi-year polling ranges, and fiscal-flow analyses—each reinforcing the others like independent witnesses describing the same event. The argument is falsifiable: a post-election survey showing no movement in support, or the failure of any provincial majority to table a motion, would weaken it. The stakes are the continued capacity of the centre to enforce uniform outcomes once plurality winners can be nullified in the economic capital. Mashaba’s positioning of ActionSA as the indispensable partner has made that nullification the operating fact of the moment, and has thereby raised the probability that both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal will treat protective exit as the rational response. The cumulative evidence indicates that the Johannesburg coalition outcome has most likely pushed Cape independence over the threshold and placed KwaZulu-Natal Balkanization on the likely radar. Objections One objection holds that coalition exclusion is normal and temporary, and that Johannesburg will eventually produce a stable government. The arithmetic shows otherwise: combinations that exclude the largest party already exist and have been actively negotiated. A second objection notes that independence parties received negligible votes, so latent polling support is irrelevant. Polling and electoral organisation are distinct; the former measures preference, the latter measures mobilisation. A third objection claims the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal lack the capacity for meaningful autonomy. Existing majorities, documented fiscal outflows and independent generation capacity supply evidence to the contrary, even while legal and political tests remain outstanding. Conclusion The 2026 Johannesburg outcome has measurably altered the risk calculus for both the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. Finishing first no longer guarantees functional leadership. The price of plurality is now visible in the economic capital, and the conditions that would allow diverging provinces to test alternatives are already present. Mashaba’s role in ousting the DA has supplied the demonstration that makes Cape independence the lower-risk option inside the current cycle and that makes parallel pressure in KwaZulu-Natal more probable than sequential. Whether those provinces act remains open; the arithmetic that makes action more rational is not. The cumulative evidence indicates that the threshold has likely been crossed, and that the visible exclusion of a plurality winner in Johannesburg constitutes the clearest available signal that coalition arithmetic has raised the expected cost of remaining inside the unitary state high enough to accelerate demands for greater autonomy or exit in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, with the claim remaining a hypothesis pending confirmatory post-election polling. #SjoeNews 😂 #TheyWonJohannesburgLostSouthAfrica 🇿🇦 #TheGreatSAUnravelling 🧶 #OneCoalitionTwoDivorces 💔 #MashabaButterflyEffect 🦋 #JohannesburgDominoEffect 🎳 #CapeExitStrategy 🧳 #KZNPlotTwist 🤯 #TheUnionHasLeftTheChat 🚪 #DemocracyByCalculator 🧮 #91SeatsAndAConstitutionalCrisis 🪑 #KingmakerGoneWild 👑 #TheGreatPoliticalShuffle 💃 #CoalitionKaraoke 🎤 #OopsWeBrokeTheRepublic 🤡 #TheRepublicOfOops 😱 #CapeOfGoodDivorce 🏖️ #KwaZuluNatalAndChill 😎 #ThePoliticalDivorceCourt ⚖️ #PassTheMovingBoxes 📦 References: BusinessTech. (2026, November 18). ActionSA, ANC, EFF and MK looking ready to sweep Gauteng and leave the DA with nothing. Cape Independence Advocacy Group. (2026, November 16). OP-ED: What now for Cape Independence? [capeindependence.org/post/op…](capeindependence.org/post/op…) Eyewitness News. (2026, November 18). DA refuses to drop Helen Zille as ActionSA edges closer to ANC coalition deal. Rateweb. (2026). Western Cape local election results 2026. The Common Sense. (2026, November 4). LGE 2026: Latest polling. Social Research Foundation polling cited in The Common Sense. (2026). Attitudes to secession in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. IEC results as reported in multiple outlets, November 2026.
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Sir. Miny Sibeko retweeted
Right now, I need Your miracle, Lord. It has been a long time since I had a spark.
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You are driving! Put that phone AWAY!!! @ParliamentofRSA something needs to be done about this phenomenon!!
A cleaner dashboard and a better viewing angle can make your everyday drives feel more convenient.

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Sir. Miny Sibeko retweeted
This is not the end of you. The best is yet to come. Trust God with changes
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Sir. Miny Sibeko retweeted
The best mayoral candidate for Johannesburg by far would be @drtlaleng in my unhumble view
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Replying to @JusstAlpha
@JusstAlpha Let’s apply that same standard consistently. Why is the DA winning elections when Cat Matlala’s blue lights were reportedly fitted during the DA’s tenure in Ekurhuleni? 🤷🏼‍♀️ Why is ActionSA winning elections when Herman Mashaba employed Sibiya? 🤷🏼‍♀️ If proximity to controversial individuals automatically determines electoral outcomes, then surely that argument must apply across the political spectrum. You cannot invent a standard for the EFF and conveniently suspend it when discussing other political parties. And please, let us stop pretending that voters are not intelligent enough to understand political manipulation. Voters are indeed not stupid. They understand their lived realities, service delivery, unemployment, economic exclusion and the political choices available to them. That is precisely why the EFF must go back to its people, listen and organise even harder. Then there is the unfortunate attempt to resurrect the Tshidi matter. May her beautiful soul continue to rest in peace. But why must the CIC be expected to repeatedly address something he has already addressed more than five times? At what point does a question stop being a genuine request for clarity and become a deliberate attempt to manufacture controversy? You arrive with a question seemingly designed to provoke a particular response. When the CIC refuses to entertain the spectacle, you turn around and position yourself as a victim of the organisation. That is not political interrogation. That is an attempt to dictate the terms under which the EFF must engage with its own leadership. And perhaps this is where some of you are getting it terribly wrong. The EFF can reflect without surrendering its ideology. The EFF can acknowledge electoral disappointment without disowning its leadership. The EFF can correct its organisational weaknesses without abandoning the revolutionary programme.
Trained by the best in the game! Rest Eazy, Tshidi Madia❤️🕊️ @tshidi_lee
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Hillbrow!! Berea!!! Bathathe @HermanMashaba … phez kwabo!!! Ksaaaa!
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So! 2.4 Million 🙌🏽🙌🏽🙌🏽🙆🏽‍♂️
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Grootman @MbalulaFikile , no one is punishing you. Just resolve within yourselves that you will apologize. Just be honest and tell South Africans that you are sorry… then renew! Like be really sorry cause guys you messed up! Apologize!!!
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If you want to kill the EFF, kill me first ✊🏽✊🏽✊🏽 -JM
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Mr President @Julius_S_Malema we are fine where we are! It is a victory for us! South Africans are not ready for the truth. Time will come, I just hope it’s not too late!
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One day and only one day you will all learn to listen to me. Unfortunately, some of our family members in leadership are involved in this project. 🤷🏿‍♂️ Ke ngwana Badimo!
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wow!!
"You don’t speak after the President, this is not Protocol, you must tell him," Cyril Ramaphosa tells Panyaza Lesufi to inform Nkosindiphile Xhakaza that he must not speak after the President. The ANC is a mess! Ayikho lento! 😭😭😭
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Underline: europeans!!!
A white teenager in apartheid Rhodesia claims Black people shouldn’t be allowed to vote because they lack education. The viral clip from 1971 exposes the deep-rooted r*cism pushed by the country’s white-minority government. Black students said their schools were deliberately underfunded to stop them reaching the educational thresholds needed to vote. Ian Smith’s government finally collapsed in the late ‘70s after years of gu*rrilla w*rfare and a crashing economy. In 1980 the country held its first free democratic elections and became Zimbabwe. The clip is from the British documentary Children of Rhodes – what the young say. #Zimbabweans #AfricanHistory #ColonialHistory #AfricanHistory #MajorityRule #IanSmith #Liberation #ZimbabweHistory
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Sir. Miny Sibeko retweeted
This zebra earned his stripes that day.
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The newsrooms have been eagerly waiting for this 🤣🤣🤣
BREAKING NEWS: EXCLUSIVE LEAD! An EFF MP was arrested last night after she allegedly caused a commotion at the SAPS Brooklyn Client Service Centre and assaulted a police officer. Preliminary information from sources suggests she was arrested just after 10 pm last night. The MP was released the same night with a warning and is expected to appear before Hatfield Magistrates' Court on Monday. We have reached out to the EFF for comment. Story is developing. More on @eNCA
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Sir. Miny Sibeko retweeted
Breaking Bad will always be the biggest TV show ever made. That show is a masterpiece.
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