If you have a Bitcoin multisig that can be fully spent using compromised seeds (for example, a 2-of-3 multisig where two Coldcard seeds are vulnerable), you are in a critical situation. The good news is that if the multisig uses P2WSH or P2SH-P2WSH, the spending script is not revealed on-chain until the first spend. This provides some protection because an attacker with only the compromised keys may still not have the script required to construct a valid transaction. However, the script was never designed to be secret. From a cryptographic perspective, it is public information. In practice, copies may already exist in your wallet provider's database, backups, logs, or other systems. You should therefore migrate these funds to a new and secure setup as soon as possible. The catch is that your migration transaction will reveal the spending script in the mempool. If an attacker already has enough compromised keys and the script, they can create a conflicting transaction spending the same UTXO to themselves and try to get it confirmed instead. To reduce this risk, avoid broadcasting the migration transaction through the public mempool. Use a trusted private transaction relay that can submit the transaction directly to miners. MARA's Slipstream is one example.