My heart goes out to everyone who lost bitcoin in the Coldcard hack. That is a real gut punch, and no one should have to go through it. Seeing a lot of people freaking out and questioning the whole idea of self-custody because of it. One company made a serious mistake on the one job a hardware wallet has: generating solid entropy for the seed. That hurts so many real people. At the same time, it does not mean self-custody is broken, even though it might feel like it today. Self-custody is and will always be the point. You hold the keys. No third party that can freeze, lose, or seize your bitcoin. That is what makes this different from the old system. Also, for many people, a simple single-sig setup does the job well. One seed, written down properly and stored safely. Clear and manageable. Countless people also lose bitcoin through their own mistakes rather than sophisticated attacks. Lost seeds, forgotten passphrases, botched setups. Adding layers of complexity also gives more places to mess up. If your stack grows or your threat model changes, it off course makes sense to step up. Multi-sig, a strong passphrase, extra entropy measures. Match the complexity to the amount and the risk. That is a smart upgrade path, not a rejection of the simpler tools that work better for a large number of people. Be careful not to overcorrect. Do not throw away practical self-custody for setups that are hard to maintain, or even worse, hand the keys to someone else who has already proven they can lose them too. Hold your own keys. Keep the setup as simple as your risk allows. Verify everything.