Bull Stock Picks

$INBX: 106 worked. 109 may be worth far more than the market is giving it credit for. And 2027 could determine whether this becomes a much larger oncology franchise. My full post-data thesis below.

$INBX — I think this selloff is a major overreaction. $GMAB’s 0.50 overall survival HR is an excellent result. My thesis is that its strongest benefit will be in HPV−. Genmab has yet to publicly demonstrate an HPV+ efficacy profile matching the exceptional early results from INBRX-106. My bet is that 106 ultimately sets the higher benchmark in HPV+. The biology matters. $GMAB petosemtamab, Bicara’s ficerafusp and J&J’s amivantamab all target EGFR, although their second mechanisms differ. Related EGFR-based combinations have already shown a striking pattern: Bicara + Keytruda: 54% ORR in HPV− versus 27% in HPV+. J&J + Keytruda/carbo: 77% ORR outside HPV-associated oropharyngeal cancer versus 29% in HPV-associated disease. Now look at INBRX-106 + Keytruda in HPV+: 80% confirmed ORR versus 33% with Keytruda. 30% complete responses versus 0. 90% six-month PFS versus 33%. That is an early randomized signal: 10 combination patients versus nine controls, all CPS≥20. The company’s early data, highlighted in Stifel’s analysis, provide early evidence that 106 may work regardless of CPS. That supports a potentially broader opportunity beyond high-CPS patients. The HPV+ expansion includes patients with CPS 1 or greater. 106 stimulates OX40 on T cells, with a biological rationale for amplifying immune responses against HPV viral antigens. That gives us a compelling scientific reason to take its HPV+ signal seriously. These are small cohorts so larger confirmation remains essential. But the biology and early clinical results are why I believe 106 can deliver exceptional results in HPV+. I expect the fiercest competition among these EGFR-based drugs to be in HPV−, where $GMAB now has powerful Phase 3 evidence. In HPV+, my bet is that 106 separates itself and becomes the preferred treatment. Management says the HPV+ expansion is already enrolling, with data targeted for mid-2027. Then look beyond HNSCC. OX40 costimulation provides a compelling rationale for testing 106 in other immunogenic cancers, including NSCLC—a substantial additional opportunity. The ongoing perioperative lung study is a major test of that broader potential. If it delivers compelling results, the implications for 106’s clinical and strategic value could extend far beyond HPV+ head and neck cancer. Meanwhile, INBX’s entire market value sits well below my estimated gross value for 109 alone. I see substantial upside from 109 before assigning value to 106’s potential. Two substantial opportunities. A share price I believe materially undervalues them. I remain extremely bullish.

$INBX — November 19’s Ewing sarcoma update at CTOS could be an important catalyst for 109. Previously disclosed results for ozekibart plus irinotecan/temozolomide showed: • 64.5% objective response rate: 20 of 31 evaluable patients • 87.1% disease control rate The next question is durability. I expect the updated results to show sustained responses, encouraging progression-free survival, continued clinical activity, and manageable safety. If confirmed, those data could strengthen the case for a meaningful Ewing sarcoma franchise. Management estimates more than $500 million in worldwide sales potential for Ewing sarcoma alone. That projection does not include potential perioperative use. Based on my research, I believe some sarcoma specialists may consider using 109 perioperatively in selected Ewing sarcoma patients before surgery. The tumor-shrinking activity observed in the combination study could potentially make surgery more feasible and improve the likelihood of achieving a successful outcome. Perioperative use in chondrosarcoma could also become meaningful, in my view. Any perioperative use in Ewing sarcoma or chondrosarcoma would depend on physician judgment, clinical evidence, regulatory considerations, and reimbursement. It is a potential opportunity—not an established indication or guaranteed outcome. The company expects to receive FDA approval data in April, but given the broad support and strength of the clinical results, I believe approval could come earlier. Following CTOS, I expect management to pursue an accelerated approval pathway for 109 in Ewing sarcoma, while also seeking publication of the data and potential inclusion in NCCN guidelines. Those steps could help expand awareness and adoption, although neither is guaranteed. This is why I’m bullish on the significance of the November 19 update: stronger durability and safety data could increase physician interest and lead investors to assign greater value to 109’s broader Ewing sarcoma opportunity. Ewing sarcoma deserves attention as a meaningful part of the 109 thesis. At current levels, I believe the shares trade below my valuation of 109 in sarcoma alone, including Ewing sarcoma and chondrosarcoma. That valuation excludes potential use in colorectal cancer and the entire 106 franchise. Initial CRC results for 109 have been encouraging, and if the current 30-patient second- and third-line CRC cohort continues to produce strong results, I believe 109 could be worth $250–$300 per share on its own, before assigning any value to 106. 106 could become a franchise drug by significantly enhancing T-cell activation across PD-1 checkpoint inhibitor–treated tumors. $INBX remains one of the best risk-reward bio investments I have seen. Long $INBX $XBI @CureSarcoma @sarcoma_chondro @sarcomacancerca @sarcoma_chondro

$INBX - what else does the market need to see. This is a 5-10x from here. Get in while the price is cheap. The CEO is telling you to!

$INBX: My $750M core sarcoma peak-sales scenario for 109 implies ~$133–$152 per fully diluted share in gross asset value at 3.5–4× peak sales. Potential perioperative expansion could bring that to ~$178–$203—before CRC, other 109 indications, or anything for 106. My illustrative global annual peak-net-sales scenario: • Advanced conventional chondro: $450M • Relapsed/refractory Ewing: $300M • Core sarcoma total: $750M Potential perioperative upside: • Chondro: +$200M • Ewing: +$50M • Expanded sarcoma total: $1B Why consider perioperative use? Published incidence estimates imply roughly 1,000–1,700 new U.S. chondrosarcoma cases annually. Approximately 90% of patients in a 5,329-patient NCDB study underwent surgery. Applying that historical rate suggests roughly 900–1,500 surgical patients annually, across grades and subtypes. This is an extrapolation, not a measured current count. For Ewing sarcoma, MSK cites approximately 350 new U.S. cases annually. In a Children’s Oncology Group study of localized disease, 730 of 956 patients received surgery, with or without radiation. These are broader patient populations; only a subset would be appropriate for 109. Management has described conversations with orthopedic oncologists who perform difficult, sometimes highly aggressive chondrosarcoma resections because treatment alternatives are limited. That creates a compelling rationale to investigate 109 before surgery: if treatment can reduce tumor burden, it could improve surgical options or reduce the extent of resection in selected patients. Better surgical outcomes still need to be demonstrated. The pricing math shows why relatively small patient numbers could matter. Management discussed an $800K–$1M annual orphan-oncology pricing benchmark. Using $900K gross and my assumed 25% discount: • $675K annual net revenue per patient • $169K–$338K for 3–6 months • $17M–$34M per 100 patients treated for 3–6 months Actual 109 pricing remains unannounced. International net pricing would likely be lower. The $250M perioperative scenario equates to approximately 740 six-month courses at the assumed U.S. net price. A global patient mix with lower pricing would require more courses. This remains an expansion scenario dependent on evidence, reimbursement, and adoption. Manufacturing economics could also be attractive. My understanding is that 109 is inexpensive to manufacture, supporting high gross-margin potential. Inhibrx’s SEC filings describe manufacturing at high yields using established processes. An oncology buyer could potentially commercialize 109 through its existing infrastructure. Applying an assumed 3.5–4× peak-sales acquisition multiple: • $750M core case → $2.63B–$3B (~$133–$152 per FD share) • $1B expanded case → $3.5B–$4B (~$178–$203 per FD share) Based on 19.7M FD shares. These are conditional gross asset-value equivalents before cash/debt adjustments, taxes, future funding, and dilution—not present-day price targets. This is why I remain strongly bullish and see $INBX as one of the lowest risk / reward investments today. Under these assumptions, sarcoma alone could account for substantial value above the current share prices—and this analysis assigns nothing to CRC, other 109 indications, or 106. Those address much larger opportunities. If the next clinical readouts validate their potential, I believe INBX could deliver 7-10x upside as both the earnings opportunity and strategic value become clearer. Insider purchases by CEO Mark Lappe and board member Jon Kayyem strengthen my conviction through their additional personal investment. My thesis is that the market is still underestimating how much value successful development across these programs could create. NFA — Long $INBX