https://xitter.cf/t.co/fImt9JTwbm

Joined August 2011
Art Manion retweeted
We know what probably happened. From what we see publicly, NightmareEclipse doesn't communicate well, is emotionally immature, and appears to want to extort Microsoft. Almost certainly, this played a part in the conflict between them and Microsoft -- it's probably as much NightmareEclipse's fault as Microsoft's. With that said, everything Florian says is correct. It doesn't excuse Microsoft's failures. They are supposed to be the responsible one, When there is miscommunication or dispute, it's always allowable to drop 0day, regardless whose fault it is. It's Microsoft's job to avoid that, even when they really aren't at fault for the miscommunication. But Microsoft has convinced themselves of the opposite, that "responsible" disclosure means only the responsibilities of the vuln finder. Vuln finders have no responsibility. Dropping 0day is responsible. Responsible companies don't have so many bugs. We let industry subvert the disclosure process. Instead of working to secure their code, vendors have tricked people into believing in the myth of "responsible disclosure", that vendors should be given time to fix and patch their bugs so they are never to blame for the bugs to begin with. That's why you have customers still buying Fortinet appliances even though their bugs continue to be major sources of customers getting hacked. Customers shrug their shoulders: as long as Fortinet has a vulnerability disclosure program and releases patches, they aren't responsible for when hackers keep breaking into their boxes. This is garbage. Vendors are still responsible for preventing bugs in the first place, a responsibility that doesn't go away just because they patch. Regardless of what happened, Microsoft's threats are a gross violation of ethics in the industry.
I don’t know what happened between Microsoft and #NightmareEclipse behind closed doors Maybe Nightmare Eclipse was unreasonable. Maybe Microsoft was. Maybe both. But I think Microsoft badly misjudged this situation. When you’re the largest software vendor on the planet, you don’t get to behave like an angry individual in an internet argument. You have to be the adult in the room. Deleting repositories, talking about criminal investigations and turning the whole thing into a public fight was a mistake. The damage from that goes far beyond this one researcher. What surprised me most is how quickly people started sharing their own MSRC stories afterwards. - Months without responses - “Working as intended” - Bounty disputes - Reports that went nowhere People don’t suddenly start telling those stories for no reason. I think Microsoft broke a lot of porcelain here. And for what exactly? I don’t see much upside.
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Only weeks away, if you can sort out travel or are maybe relatively near Utrecht, a boutique, high-quality vulnerability measurement and prediction festival: first.org/events/colloquia/u…
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Anyone who operates a physical Ivanti ICS device: How do you boot it from known-good media? E.g., an external USB drive, a reasonably secure boot loader, minimal ROM image?
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It's an SBOM-a-versary! Five years ago today, the Federal Register published an announcement that a tiny agency called NTIA was going to host a meeting on "software component transparency." ntia.gov/sites/default/files…. 1/
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“What’s in the SBOM Box?” 🎧 Listen to the full episode with host DJ Schleen and Allan Friedman as they discuss the ramifications of mandating an SBOM standard: dabom.show/allan-friedman/ 📌 #spdx #daBOM @linuxfoundation #sbom #devops #devsecops @CycloneDX_Spec
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VEX minimum requirements are out! CSAF, CycloneDX, OpenVEX, and likely other implementations exist. cisa.gov/resources-tools/res…
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Very excited to be at the launch of @CyberSecCenter’s Hacking Policy Council and the Security Research Legal Defense Fund. @CISAgov @CISACyber lead Eric Goldstein sets out the importance of sec research for our digital world and the need partnerships to support those researchers
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CISA and friends would like that software products are "...built in a way that reasonably protects against malicious cyber actors..." and "...resilient against prevalent exploitation techniques out of the box without additional charge" cisa.gov/resources-tools/res…
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For radical transparency (in software security) I usually go with Brandeis "sunlight as disinfectant" but this is also a great angle. See also "no silent failures"
Replying to @DennisF
love this. i wrote a thing that applies the consequence of this truism to transparency in security models (esp software transparency) cje.io/2020/04/08/to-err-is-…
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Congratulations to the 2022 #HHS CAPE Cybersecurity Professional of the Year 🏆, Jessica Wilkerson of the @US_FDA! #HHSCybersecurity #SecureOneHHS
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VEX is finally coming! If you're skeptical about SBOMs (like I was), I really encourage you to look into it. VEX addresses all my issues with SBOMs and will result in a much more transparent, automated process. Learn more about how it works on our blog. chainguard.dev/unchained/put…
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It's all coming together!
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CISA EAD for Cybersecurity Eric Goldstein shares his thoughts on how organizations can improve vulnerability management & reduce the window adversaries have to exploit networks, to include new Stakeholder Specific Vulnerability Categorization (SSVC) guide: go.dhs.gov/ZA7
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Isn't it great how market-leading very cryptographically secure VPN things are full of web app vuls? Keep on patching.
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Thanks to @0xcharlie and @nudehaberdasher I now have to bypass the Security Gateway Module to work on my car. Really it's FCA protecting the bottom line from customers.
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Multi-party coordinated vulnerability disclosure solved at the protocol layer insights.sei.cmu.edu/blog/vu…
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The CVE-2021-30860 bit of FORCEDENTRY comes from Xpdf (CVE-2022-38171), lots of downstream software implicated, e.g., Poppler (CVE-2022-38784) github.com/zmanion/Vulnerabi…
Replying to @DonnchaC
Key points from the paper: NSO Group customers deployed at least 6 distinct iOS zero-click chains from iOS 10 (July 2017) until iOS 14 in 2021. An Android zero-click in WhatsApp has also been exploited much more extensively than previously understood..
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Critical-yet-basic advice for EAS operators: In addition to "change default passwords" also change or remove old/default/compromised SSH keys. docs.fcc.gov/public/attachme… (2022) kb.cert.org/vuls/id/662676 (2013)
AI really works: Was browisng @infosecjen's timeline and Twitter wants me to watch Archer.
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