📌 New piece out with @aljumhuriya_eng on the IMF's mission to Damascus READ: aljumhuriya.net/en/2026/08/2… I wrote it to answer those who said I came across as an overly optimistic neoliberal capitalist who doesn't see that the Syrian economy is struggling. Phew! So, in brief: I still argue that the Fund's assessment is largely right. Activity is rebounding, the new currency has held, fiscal performance has improved, and double-digit growth is projected for 2026. What a mission statement built around aggregate figures can't capture is who is paying for that stabilization. I identify at least three trade-offs, all regressive by nature: • Fiscal discipline is being implemented now, but the development spending and expanded safety net meant to offset it depend on donor decisions that haven't been made. Pain first, relief pending. • Much of the growth is a cyclical rebound from an exceptionally low base, not a gain in productivity. Industrialists have spent much of the transition in open conflict with Damascus. • Currency stability has rested less on monetary policy than on the Central Bank withholding liquidity from banks. That squeeze produces winners and losers: depositors selling savings at a discount for cash, borrowers with dollar access still lending, exchange houses and e-wallet providers gaining ground on a banking sector starved by policy. A half-full glass can look full if we don't look at the empty part! That's why I subtitled the article "Lots of Good, a Little Bad — But Where Is the Ugly?"