Christos Tsopokis retweeted
Tom Barrack, US amb in Turkey and envoy for Syria etc has almost single-handedly, redirected U.S. policy in Turkey’s favor-- and that is Erdogan's Turkey that flirts with Islamic extremism every day. He lobbies non-stop for selling weapons to Turkey which was last loyal to the US in 1953.
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
Unlike France, Italy, the UK or Spain, whose nat debts exceed 100% of GDP, Israel's is 68.5% -after a v expensive war (US aid covers 15-20% of defense spending) WHY ? Israeli women have children so new workers outnumber new old age pensioners
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
Security is maintained through the combination of
- people
- technology
- procedures
Fixation on bugs as the sole element of security (offensive and defensive) is a category error. A profound misunderstanding of how systems work, and how they fail.
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
I'd encourage everyone to read the Danish military intelligence assessment in full, and not rely on excitable social media upsums.
Here is the top line: "The Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) assesses that Russia will intensify its hybrid war by carrying out more frequent attacks against the West and NATO, with greater consequences for the targeted countries than in the past. This could include destructive cyber attacks that cripple critical societal functions as well as sabotage attacks that carry a high risk of casualties."
In other words, Russia will continue doing what it's already doing (terrorist attacks against hard and soft targets, cyberoperations), only more so. This is an uncontroversial assessment across Western intelligence services, so far as I've been able to determine.
DDIS continues: "At the same time, there is a low but growing risk that Russia will launch a limited military attack against one or several NATO countries bordering Russia....Such a limited military attack could take the form of isolated strikes with long‑range weapons on infrastructure that is vital to the support to Ukraine. In this situation, Russia might then claim that the weapons only struck NATO territory because they were jammed by Ukraine. It could also be a so-called false flag operation, where Russia uses Ukrainian‑made drones to attack a NATO country."
The scenario envisaged here (a low but growing risk) is a plausibly deniable conventional attack by Russia. The objective would be twofold. First, to sow panic and confusion in the targeted country or countries, and encourage skepticism of the official government version of what just happened. "Maybe it was the Ukrainians." "Maybe it was an accident." "Maybe no attack took place and the deep state is trying to foment World War III."
Thirty seconds on this hellsite should be enough to convince you that counterfactual narratives would be easy enough to amplify, especially in countries with elections forthcoming. A "limited military attack" psychologically would just be a heightened form of "hybrid" war because it's designed to overwhelm and demoralize the population and make its think that supporting Ukraine just isn't worth it since those not at war are now liable to become collateral damage.
The second objective of such an attack would be to gauge NATO's response to it -- and this is key bit, because, as DDIS also states:
"Russia will likely carry out military attacks only if it assesses that such attacks will not result in a war by triggering a collective NATO military response. However, Russia is likely uncertain about what could trigger such a war. Consequently, there is a risk that Russia assesses that the NATO countries will not respond collectively, especially if Russia assesses that the United States cannot or will not support the European NATO countries in a potential war against Russia." (Italics added.)
You wouldn't be wrong to detect a hint of political messaging here. (All intel services deny they do any such thing but they all do.) This is Denmark, a country that just stared down a possible U.S. invasion and annexation of Greenland, which would have meant the disintegration of NATO.
Trump has spent his entire second term (and much of his first term) doubting the Inviolability of Article V. His Pentagon has given NATO allies questionnaires to fill out to prove their worthiness as allies, while it undergoes a force posture review with ominous media leaks about what Bridge Colby and his minion might do (25,000 U.S. troops withdrawn, a scuppered U.S. base in Poland, etc.)
Now comes a frenzy of intelligence reporting across Europe about a possible Russian attack on NATO, all kickstarted by a CIA briefing delivered to the Poles, Scandinavians and Balts months ago with a warning that they're probably on their own if and when such an attack happens.
Never let a good crisis go to waste... Russia isn't sure what would trigger a war with NATO, so how might NATO make it sure? A "limited military attack" can be deterred if Washington telegraphs its intent to enforce Article V in word and deed by stating clearly and repeatedly what would constitute a casus belli in 2026 and, of course, by keeping U.S. troops in Europe.
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
NEW: 🇵🇱 A fire broke out at a Starlink ground station in Poland, in Wola Krobowska, Mazovia, with firefighters reportedly treating it as arson.
The fire damaged the station’s power supply infrastructure, while a power generator was also damaged. Police took over the scene, with Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) and Central Police Bureau of Investigation (CBŚP) also notified.
The station is operated by Exatel, Poland’s state-owned telecommunications company. The infrastructure at the site is used to transmit internet traffic across Poland and to Ukraine, and it also supports SpaceX systems providing connectivity through Starlink terminals.
Deputy Prime Minister and Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski said there are indications that this could be another element of hybrid warfare and a deliberate attempt to disrupt an important internet hub.
He stressed that it is too early to say who was responsible, but said the incident fits a broader pattern of sabotage threats against critical infrastructure.
The fire was extinguished and services are investigating the circumstances
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
Expected utility theory (EUT) is commonly interpreted as people optimizing the expected value of their utility. Utility, in this setting is subjective.
Ergodicity economics (EE) argues that people have little reason to do so because what happens to their utility in expectation is not generally what happens to their utility as time passes.
EE interprets EUT as people optimizing wealth in the long run. That constrains `utility functions' to be identical to ergodicity transformations. No longer subjective but given by circumstances or context, namely by the dynamics.
An entirely different model of human rationality and therefore human behavior emerges.
You can read about it in Chapter 6 of our textbook. Or, as of this morning, you can download a self-contained article, to be publish in November in the Philosophical Transactions.
Here it is:
arxiv.org/pdf/1801.03680
Valid points; there is a combined effect of FPVs to artillery itself, namely the radical increase of precise hits due to the continuous feedback they provide to C2 systems. The lifespan of weapons is determined by their spare expansive capacity. See Strategy book by @ELuttwak
FPV drones owning the battlefield.... the end of an era,
FPV drones owning the battlefield was always going to be a short-term situation. The reason is straightforward: armored vehicles moving forward now carry enough electrical power and mounting space to field automated, optically guided kinetic anti-drone systems directly on the vehicle. These systems can be cued by early warning, so vehicles and their automated defenses know where incoming FPV drones are before they arrive. The drones themselves can be tracked optically and acoustically, picked up by the sound of their engines and motors, and with enough of these systems fielded, Third Corps has effectively mastered how to clear the sky of FPV drones in the area it's operating in, specifically the ground north of Lyman.
The reason so few FPV drones are being encountered in that area comes down to a deliberate, layered air defense concept. A .50 caliber machine gun has an effective range of roughly a thousand meters, which means each air defense gun protects a radius of about two thousand meters around itself. These systems can be vehicle-mounted, trailer-mounted, or pallet-mounted, simply dropped off at the front and daisy-chained together. With four, six, or twelve of them working in concert, they move forward one piece at a time, like pieces on a chessboard, always keeping overlapping fire and mutual support between systems. Combined with electronic warfare vehicles and other anti-drone systems moving forward alongside them, this is exactly what has let Third Corps advance into a large area while encountering relatively few FPV drones, whether radio-guided or fiber-optic guided.
We always knew this was coming. When large formations move forward with heavy vehicle density, combining kinetic anti-drone systems with electronic warfare sweeps the FPVs from the sky, and that's exactly what's being seen now. We saw an earlier version of this at the Battle of Kursk, where wide-spectrum jamming alone worked well for the first couple of days, until fiber-optic drones showed up and jamming alone stopped being enough. What's happening now is the second phase of that same evolution: jammers combined with kinetic air defense actually sweeping the skies clear of FPVs, rather than jamming alone trying to hold the line.
FPV drones will always have a place on the battlefield going forward, but they've always been fragile, and as long as they can be seen, they can be dealt with. What's re-emerging now, as a direct result of clearing the skies, is conventional tube artillery, finally able to do what it does best at long range again, without nearly as much fear of the FPV threat hanging over it.
Μια πολύ ωραία συνέντευξή με εξαιρετικές προτάσεις για την παιδεία. Είναι να απορεί κανείς γιατί αυτά δεν έχουν υπάρξει ο κεντρικός άξονας πολιτικής εθνικής παιδείας κάποιου κόμματος τόσα χρόνια.
Πήγα στην Θεσσαλονίκη για να συζητήσω με τον εξαιρετικό νεαρό δάσκαλο και podcaster Ιορδάνη Πετρίδη για το έθνος, την γλώσσα, την θρησκεία και την παιδεία. Ιδού το podcast.
youtube.com/watch?v=yWr-EXnf…
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
a che uopo le costose forze armate Europee se non sono usate per assicurare i flussi di idrocarburi all-Europa via il Golfo Persico e Mar Rosso, adesso sotto minaccia non solo dai fanatici Sciiti del Iran ma anche dai primitivi Houthis del Yemen.
0-click exploit chain targeting Pixel 9, from RCE in mediacodec to kernel LPE (@natashenka and @__sethJenkins)
Part 1: projectzero.google/2026/01/p…
Part 2: projectzero.google/2026/01/p…
Part 3: projectzero.google/2026/01/p…
#infosec
.@trailofbits released 3 skills to help write patches:
`post-patch-validation` helps agents test that fixes are correct
xitter.cf/trailofbits/status/209…
.@1Password's FLAWED report says AI models produce a clean security fix only 26% of the time.
Defenders shouldn't take that number seriously.
• The six vulnerabilities were handpicked because their fixes were complex. Clean-fix rates ran from 3% to 60% depending on the bug, and the report averaged them together.
• Agents set up to fail were counted in the headline figure. Two of 1Password's prompts instructed the agent to apply the wrong fix. Those trials make up 22% of the data. One evaluation mode prevented the agent from compiling or running any code, and it accounts for 36% of the data.
• The report ran two models, GPT-5.5 at medium effort and Opus 4.8 at high. Neither was tested at its highest available setting, so the report says nothing about how more effort or stronger models change the results.
• Several instruction and grading errors further undercut the headline, and are elaborated upon in the attached blog.
We've spent four months submitting hundreds of AI-authored patches to widely adopted open-source projects as part of Patch the Planet.
Our experience didn't match 1Password's report, so we did a full analysis across 186 AI-authored pull requests and 33,500 subsequent commits, benchmarked against 2,265 human-authored patches we graded across years of security engagements. blog.trailofbits.com/2026/09…
Για τοιχοκόλληση! Άψογος @Balakpan
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
So two good things:
1) LLMs threaten the performative aspect of mathematics as a competitive spectator sport limited to a narrow group of savantic misfits.
2) LLMs help spread mathematical knowledge by favoring mathematically adept nonnerdy nonsavantic users.
an excellent drone produced in hundreds is interesting, but it's a good drone produced in hundreds of thousands that changes the course of the war
🇺🇸 В колонке для The Washington Post бывший глава Google Эрик Шмидт, неоднократно бывавший в Украине и участвовавший в работе над военными технологиями, пишет, что после последней поездки впервые с начала полномасштабного вторжения уехал настолько встревоженным. По его оценке, Россия научилась воевать значительно эффективнее и постепенно переходит к стратегии тотальной войны, соединяя превосходство в людях и промышленном производстве с быстрым технологическим развитием.
Главным преимуществом Украины долгое время была скорость инноваций: небольшие команды военных, инженеров и оборонных компаний могли за считаные недели разработать новую систему, испытать ее на фронте и усовершенствовать. Российская военная бюрократия за этим не успевала. Теперь, предупреждает Шмидт, это преимущество быстро исчезает. Россия не только массово производит оружие, но и сама научилась быстро адаптироваться: на украинские дроны-перехватчики она ответила более быстрыми реактивными "Шахедами", а теперь создает и собственную спутниковую группировку, способную конкурировать со Starlink.
Поле боя при этом изменилось до неузнаваемости. Командиры находятся глубоко под землей, тысячи беспилотников ведут разведку, доставляют грузы и атакуют людей и технику. По данным, которые приводит Шмидт, около 80% украинских потерь происходит при перемещении военнослужащих между позициями.
Но главной проблемой Украины становится уже не способность изобретать новое оружие, а возможность производить его в достаточном количестве. Один украинский командир рассказал Шмидту, что его подразделение перестало искать новые российские цели: обнаруженных уже больше, чем имеющихся дронов для их поражения. Как пишет Шмидт, отличный беспилотник, произведенный сотнями, — это интересно, но ход войны меняет хороший беспилотник, выпускаемый сотнями тысяч.
Россия тем временем наращивает промышленные мощности для тотальной войны. Украина самостоятельно конкурировать с такими масштабами производства не может. Особенно опасной Шмидт считает предстоящую зиму: Россия уже использует нехватку у Украины средств защиты от баллистических ракет, нанося удары по электростанциям и подстанциям.
Главный вывод Шмидта: Украине недостаточно отдельных партий западного оружия. Запад должен фактически включить украинский ВПК в собственную оборонную промышленность — совместно производить оружие, вкладываться в украинские предприятия и массово поставлять перехватчики, боеприпасы и дальнобойные системы.
"Восхищение украинской стойкостью — не стратегия", — заключает Шмидт. За четыре года Украина выиграла для Запада время "кровью своих солдат и изобретательностью своих инженеров". Одного мужества недостаточно, чтобы защищать города и выиграть войну: Запад должен превратить это время в промышленное превосходство.
Bypassing Android Hardware Attestation by Eric Le Guevel (@quarkslab)
blog.quarkslab.com/bypassing…
#infosec
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
Όταν ανακοίνωσε το Σάββατο τον νόμο για το 15% φόρο στα ακίνητα για αγοραστές εκτός ΕΕ ο Κ Μητσοτάκης δέν διεχώρισε τα φυσικά πρόσωπα από τις εταιρείες .Σήμερα η κυβέρνηση διαχωρίζει τα φυσικά πρόσωπα λέγοντας ότι θα φορολογήσει μόνο αυτά όταν η μεγάλη πλειοψηφία των αγοραστών
Christos Tsopokis retweeted
Η Δυτική Μακεδονία είναι η πρωταθλήτρια της έμψυχης αποψίλωσης, καθώς ανάμεσα στις δύο απογραφές έχασε το 10,3%. Ακολουθεί σε συρρίκνωση η Ανατολική Μακεδονία και η Θράκη, με μείωση πληθυσμού κατά 7,6%.-
Στοιχεία για τη δημογραφική κατάρρευση ανά περιοχή share.google/vEbfrdKvoSBckgj…
































