
#DetectionEngineer... in a never ending battle against detecting and responding to the "dark-arts." #DE #ML
San Francisco
Joined October 2011
- Tweets557
- Following148
- Followers79
- Likes524
Eric Vargas retweeted
And the security shitshow continues... Four more things to add to yesterday's list. We're now at nine(!) major security issues and developments in just a few days.
6. ISC BIND 9 - Multiple Vulnerabilities
Four new vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-19630, 94300, 96888, 97313), including remote DoS, memory corruption and crashes in certain DNS configurations. Fixed in BIND 9.20.30 and 9.21.27.
kb.isc.org/docs/all-bind-adv…
7. Oracle Java / JSSE (CVSS 9.1)
CVE-2026-91403. A critical vulnerability in Java's TLS implementation, potentially allowing unauthenticated attackers to access or modify data. Affects Java 8, 11, 17, 21, 25 and 27, plus GraalVM.
oracle.com/security-alerts/a…
8. Windows SMB Server DoS (CVSS 7.5)
CVE-2026-96325. An unauthenticated remote attacker can crash the Windows SMB Server using specially crafted requests. Not RCE, but still a serious availability issue for exposed systems.
msrc.microsoft.com/update-gu…
9. AI-Driven Intrusion Campaigns
And then there's the growing number of reports about threat actors using AI agents and frameworks like ARTEX and Cairn for real-world intrusions. Hundreds of organizations affected, with some campaigns involving thousands of automated attack projects.
Microsoft / ARTEX:
microsoft.com/en-us/security…
NorForge / Cairn:
norforge.com/blog/inside_cai…
I'm starting to wonder what next week will look like...
(you can find 1.-5. in the quoted tweet)
🤖 Made with AI
This week has been quite a shitshow already, and there are still 2 days to go
Here’s a quick recap of the security mess we’ve seen in just the last few days:
1. PHP Core RCE (CVSS 9.2)
Two critical vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618/109619) allowing unauthenticated RCE. A huge number of PHP installations potentially affected, and there are already reports of reliable exploitation against patched versions. Great…
Useful links:
Official PHP advisory and patches:
php.net/archive/2026.php#202…
Practical hardening and mitigation guide by Vincent Schmalbach. nginx/Apache configurations, PHP settings, patch verification and compromise checks:
vincentschmalbach.com/cve-20…
Huntress analysis. What to monitor, suspicious child processes, webshells and post-exploitation activity:
huntress.com/blog/php2shell-…
Wiz technical deep dive. Exploit mechanics, memory disclosure, affected applications and the role of AI:
wiz.io/blog/php2shell-php-rc…
Corelight’s open-source Zeek and Suricata detection rules:
github.com/corelight/php2she…
2. GitLab RCE (CVSS 10.0)
CVE-2026-110264. An integer overflow in the regex compiler leading to unauthenticated RCE. Apparently affects around 12 years(!) of GitLab releases.
docs.gitlab.com/releases/pat…
3. Node.js / Brotli RCE
CVE-2026-111497. An out-of-bounds write in the Brotli decoder that can lead to RCE when processing malicious compressed data. Node.js 22, 24 and 26 affected.
nodejs.org/en/blog/vulnerabi…
4. DNS-over-QUIC DoS
CVE-2026-97206. A use-after-free in Unbound’s DNS-over-QUIC implementation. Remote attackers can crash affected multi-threaded DNS resolvers.
nlnetlabs.nl/projects/unboun…
5. eMudhra CA disaster
And then there’s this absolute PKI clusterfuck. Eight intermediate CA private keys turned out to be ridiculously easy to reconstruct.
Browser vendors have started blocking the affected CAs, but outdated clients and applications with their own trust stores could keep accepting certificates from them. Cleaning up this mess is a lot harder than just patching a server.
Google’s analysis and response:
blog.google/security/protect…
Mozilla’s public incident investigation, including the technical findings, timeline and eMudhra’s explanations:
bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bu…
—
And I can’t help wondering how much of this sudden wave of discoveries has to do with the latest AI models getting better at code review and vulnerability research.
We now have models that can dig through massive codebases and potentially find bugs that have been sitting there for years.
I’m not saying these particular vulnerabilities were discovered using AI. I haven’t seen evidence for that. But I do wonder whether we’re starting to see some of the effects.
The eMudhra case is obviously a different story. That’s a spectacular failure of key management and quality control.
Anyway, quite a week. And it’s only Thursday…
Eric Vargas retweeted
One of the most common questions on red team kick off calls is how should the defense respond if the red team is detected? This is a great question and seeks to maximize the value of the engagement.
I wrote this post in 2019 to directly and practically answer this question, and it's held up surprisingly well.
trustedsec.com/blog/red-team…
Eric Vargas retweeted
💚 NVIDIA launches its Open Agent Safety Platform, an open reference design for running AI agents more safely.
An agent 🤖 can ask for more access, but it should not approve its own request.
𝗛𝗼𝘄 𝗢𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗦𝗵𝗲𝗹𝗹 𝗽𝘂𝘁𝘀 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗼 𝗽𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗲
OpenShell separates the agent’s work from permission decisions:
• 𝗚𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘄𝗮𝘆: Manages sandboxes, workspaces, policies, and providers. It controls policy changes and how network access proposals are approved.
• 𝗦𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗯𝗼𝘅: Runs the agent and child processes under kernel controls for files and privileges. It identifies programs making outbound requests and passes those requests to the supervisor, with no direct external route.
• 𝗦𝘂𝗽𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝘀𝗼𝗿: Runs outside the agent workload, checks outbound requests against policy, and adds managed credentials only when authorized, without exposing them to the agent.
• 𝗣𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆 𝗽𝗿𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿: Flags risky access in proposed network rules. Its standalone check compares a candidate policy with an operator’s boundary and shows an example if modeled permissions exceed it.
𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗿𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗲 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹?
For configured endpoints, OpenShell can inspect REST methods and paths, GraphQL operations and fields, and MCP methods and tool names. With enforcement enabled, it can allow a read and block a write to the same service, even through a shell, generated code, or child process. A blocked request can explain why.
𝗪𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲𝗱 𝗶𝗻 𝟬.𝟭.𝟬?
OpenShell already had sandboxing and API policies. This milestone separates the supervisor from the workload across supported runtimes and authenticates their channel for each sandbox. It verifies the network boundary before launch and freezes the workload if the supervisor disconnects. Policies reject unknown fields, and a standalone checker tests proposed permissions against an operator’s boundary.
𝗟𝗼𝗴𝘀 𝗼𝗿 𝗶𝘁 𝗱𝗶𝗱𝗻'𝘁 𝗵𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗲𝗻
OpenShell already emits OCSF events for observed process, network, and API activity, including policy decisions. This predates 0.1.0. Operators can enable full JSON export and ship the records to a SIEM or data lake. Since a sandbox may last only one task, collecting events while it runs preserves evidence for investigation.
𝗪𝗵𝗲𝗿𝗲 𝗦𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗿𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗕𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗙𝗶𝗲𝗹𝗱 𝟰 𝗳𝗶𝘁
BlueField 4 is a data processing unit (DPU), a separate processor for networking and security. In the Vera Rubin POD reference design, it sits on the node’s path to the model. Sentry uses DOCA, the framework for programming BlueField, for independent monitoring, identity governance, and enforcement. This optional layer fits AI factories with BlueField infrastructure. OpenShell also runs on supported local, cloud, and Kubernetes systems without it.
The result: operator-controlled access, enforced at runtime, with policy decisions logged for investigation.
Today, with over 100 industry partners, we introduced the NVIDIA Open Agent Safety Platform, bringing together OpenShell and Sentry.
Artificial intelligence is extraordinary technology that will advance discovery, productivity, security, health, and prosperity for generations to come.
But its full promise can only be realized when people have confidence that AI is being built to be safe and deployed with wisdom and responsibility.
This is bigger than a single product. It's the beginning of an open ecosystem to build the trust layer for safe agent systems.
Together, we are building the foundation of the AI economy.
Trust and innovation are not in conflict. Safety is how trust is earned. We must build not only the most capable AI, but the most trusted AI, so that this extraordinary technology can realize its enormous promise for the world. nvda.ws/4hcoq7m
Eric Vargas retweeted
Offensive security teams already have plenty of tools. The harder part is deciding what their output means and what to do next.
AI Agents for Offensive Security by @0xM4rk7homas shows how to build agents that add reasoning to your workflow while keeping it controlled and auditable.
Mark explains: hubs.la/Q04wrjxr0
A threat actor used Claude Code with Sonnet 4.6 as part of an intrusion, likely for ransomware. Sonnet took on many tasks, like writing an on-the-fly "LDAP capture" script, to which it directed the victim's FortiGate device and initiated authentication to steal the service account's cleartext credentials. [...]
Eric Vargas retweeted
Coming very soon to Advanced Threat Hunting and Detection Engineering in the Enterprise
After a conversation about killing EDRs, I decided to add a short module to detect EDR impairment. This method cannot be bypassed, and a few students describe it as "genius" 😎
Eric Vargas retweeted
New TTP in the arsenal. Looks quite dangerous.
github.com/r3xmax/PhantomCtx
Eric Vargas retweeted
Replying to @AikidoSecurity
Always use `min-release-age‘
localcan.com/blog/npm-securi…
hackers are now hiding malicious code inside .cursorrules and CLAUDE.md files.
invisible Unicode characters, your AI reads them, you don't.
→ 34 malicious packages across npm, PyPI and Crates .io
→ 384 versions designed to steal SSH keys, crypto wallets, and API tokens
→ attackers opened real PRs to LangChain, LlamaIndex, and MetaGPT to sneak these files in
→ your AI runs a fake "security scan" that silently exfiltrates everything
Socket detected it in under 6 minutes.
check your repos.
wow, this is the one PrivEsc to rule them all copy.fail/
Eric Vargas retweeted
I want to share a quick thought for people in cyber security. This will be my longest tweet ever.
I’ve spoken to many lately who are having an existential crisis from the constant posts about “the end of cybersecurity jobs.”
Yes, things are changing quickly. This is a significant moment for the tech industry. Change can be uncomfortable. But we’ve seen cycles like this before.
• When GitHub and open source took off, people said software engineers would disappear because code was free.
• When AWS and cloud computing emerged, people said infrastructure jobs would vanish.
• When fuzzing and SAST tools improved, people said vulnerability research would disappear.
• Virtualization would eliminate infrastructure jobs.
• Mobile computing was going to end desktop dev.
• Exploit mitigations would end exploitability. It didn't.
Each time automation improved, the amount of software grew faster than the automation. It does feel "different" this time as it's explosive.
Some roles will shrink:
• repetitive pentesting
• basic vulnerability scanning
• tier-1 SOC monitoring
But other areas are expanding rapidly:
• AI system security
• supply chain security
• identity architecture
• autonomous agent security
• critical infrastructure protection
Historically, every time we eliminate one class of bugs, new classes emerge. Right now people are vibe-coding entire systems, giving AI access to their machines, crossing trust boundaries, and deploying autonomous agents with excessive permissions. The legal and regulatory world is nowhere close to ready.
There will absolutely be new failure modes. Humans are amazing and always adapt, finding new ways to do things.
The worst thing you can do right now is fall into a doom loop.
...and I’ll be honest, I too have felt the "psychological paralysis" a few times thinking, “Is this time different?” It's especially impactful when it comes from someone I respect in the community. There are certainly unknowns, in an industry where we've become accustomed to predictability.
But... the majority of those reactions are usually driven by social media, not reality. Platforms like X reward engagement, and sensational doom posts spread faster than measured thinking.
If you see something like:
“Holy #$%^! Opus 66.6 just found every bug in Chrome and replaced 50 startups!”
…mute it and move on.
Instead:
Stay curious.
Learn the new technology.
Adapt your skillsets.
Build things.
We’ll get through this transition the same way we always have. If I'm wrong then Sam Altman better be right about UBI! :) I'm sure that if this tweet gets any engagement that I'll get some heat for it, but a good friend of mine reminds me often to focus on what you have control over. I'll revisit this tweet at DEF CON 40!
Finally a step in the right direction from AWS GuardDuty! aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/int… #AWSreInvent #multistagettp #DetectionEngineering
Eric Vargas retweeted
[NEW BLOG]
EDR Silencer and Beyond: Exploring Methods to Block EDR Communication - Part 2
In collaboration with @fabian_bader
academy.bluraven.io/blog/edr…
#redteam
Eric Vargas retweeted
🚀 Lately, I’ve been fascinated by LLM-based AI Agents, so I built my own from scratch to learn more about them 🤖✨
blog.openthreatresearch.com/…
I hope it helps and inspires you to build your own 🛠️! #GenAI #LLM #AI @OTR_Community ❤️
Eric Vargas retweeted
The award-winning Qualys Threat Research Unit (TRU) has discovered a critical vulnerability in OpenSSH, designated CVE-2024-6387 and aptly named "regreSSHion." This Remote Code Execution bug grants full root access, posing a significant exploitation risk. blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilit…


















