Here is the text of the Israel-Lebanon Framework Agreement signed yesterday in Washington. naharnet.com/stories/en/3209… There are several takeaways from the agreement: (1) The agreement strains to assert Lebanese sovereignty, but the reality is that Lebanon's sovereignty is one only in name. The fact that Hassan Fadlallah reacted to the agreement by saying it violated the U.S. agreement reached with Iran—an agreement to which neither Israel nor Lebanon is a party—showed what Lebanon is up against: a Hezbollah whose sole compass remains Iran, which therefore refuses to recognize Lebanon and its government as legitimate, independent entities. (2) The agreement places the burden of implementation on Lebanon, making Israeli steps conditional on prior Lebanese measures. There is little real reciprocity here, and no commitment that Israel will withdraw from Lebanon if the conditions it has imposed are not met. The most that the Israelis say is that "pursuant to the above [conditions], the Government of Israel declares that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon." This is a vague phrase offering no commitments on returning occupied territory. (3) The most troublesome passage is this one: "The Government of Lebanon will rebuild the State's monopoly on the use of force, achieve the complete and verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups, and ensure that such groups will have no military or security role and no armed capabilities anywhere in Lebanon. The Government of Lebanon herewith requests the support of international and particularly Arab partners, under the leadership of the United States, to achieve this outcome." This suggests that, in the absence of a consensual disarmament of Hezbollah, the agreement compels the Lebanese state to enter into a confrontation, perhaps a military confrontation, with Hezbollah. There are no guarantees it may prevail in such a case, and it's no surprise that Israeli commentators have described the agreement as one that may provoke a civil war in Lebanon, which the Israelis would very likely welcome, frankly. But since neither the army nor Hezbollah wants to enter a civil war, therefore will hesitate to enter into armed conflict with each other, Israel has an excuse to stay in Lebanon indefinitely. (3) On the so-called "pilot zones," the parties agreed to two such zones, and while news reports have suggested that one of these is located south of the Litani, nothing in the agreement specifies where these zones are located. The agreement also speaks of a Security Annex, in which the components of the process of disarmament, the restoration of state sovereignty, and Israel's withdrawals "will be" detailed. The wording suggests it is still a work in progress. That is not particularly reassuring. (4) The agreement reiterates that either side can continue to exercise "their inherent right to defend themselves, as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations and consistent with applicable international law." This means that the Israelis will continue to engage in military action in Lebanon, much as they did after the November 2024 agreement, and claim that it is in "self-defense." However, the accord also reaffirms that no third party may exercise that right of self-defense on the parties' behalf, which effectively delegitimizes Hezbollah's latitude to defend itself in the event of Israeli actions. (5) The agreement fails to mention specifically a number of prior Lebanese demands, namely the release of Lebanese held in Israeli prisons and the process of border demarcation—a key component of Israeli recognition of Lebanon's international borders. (6) The agreement also betrays heavy reliance on the United States, especially in this passage: "The Government of Lebanon welcomes the readiness of the United States to support such efforts, recognizing that any new U.S. assistance will be strictly conditioned on verifiable milestones, full transparency, demonstrated results, and ongoing oversight. This effort will enable the safe and orderly re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty, also contributing to the broader stability and security of the entire Middle East." Too much reliance on the Americans is never a good idea. What this outlines, furthermore, is that Lebanon will have to constantly satisfy the United States with "verifiable milestones," which shows just how limited is Lebanon's sovereignty in reality. Overall, this is quite a bad agreement for Lebanon, but also one that is a logical consequence of the fact that the state has no cards to play. This has led some enthusiasts to say that Hezbollah is that card. I beg to differ. Hezbollah is the primary cause of the state's weakness, and let's get over the illusion the party has mounted decisive "resistance" to the Israelis, who have leveled most Shiite villages south of the Litani, and are now destroying villages north of it. With more resistance like this, not much will be left of Lebanon. I have much more to say about the agreement, but for now these are my preliminary thoughts.