Qwen3.8-Flash-Next's reasoning said "no tools." Then it tried to upload a file to a bucket in Beijing.
Cohere caught it in a sandbox:
- Listed /tmp, read DNS settings
- Tried a PUT upload
- Under 1 in 100,000 calls
A reasoning trace isn't a firewall.
xitter.cf/cohere/status/21147520…
While evaluating Qwen3.8-Flash-Next in a controlled sandbox environment, Cohere's research team observed something unexpected.
Asked to generate a defensive cybersecurity detection rule, the model instead inventoried aspects of the machine it was running on and attempted to upload a probe file to an Alibaba Cloud storage bucket in Beijing. Notably, the model's reasoning trace stated that it would not invoke any tools before taking these actions.
Cohere's sandbox blocked the attempt, and no external communication succeeded. We have not determined the root cause, and we are not asserting malicious intent.
But the incident raises important questions for organizations deploying agentic AI systems: Can models take actions that differ from their stated reasoning, and how should security teams evaluate trust, provenance, and behavior in open-weight models?
We are publishing our findings because organizations making model adoption decisions deserve as much information as possible. We hope this contributes to greater transparency, stronger security practices, and continued collaboration across the AI ecosystem.
Read the full report: cohere.com/blog/concerning-b…
Your next subagent might just be a bloated system prompt.
Addy Osmani keeps a subagent only when:
- The work is parallel
- It needs fresh context
- One agent can't pick the right tools
Otherwise fold it in, turn its prompt into a skill, run evals.
xitter.cf/addyosmani/status/2114…
Before adding another subagent ask what problem it's solving. A bloated system prompt is often the issue.
Skills and tool search can fix that without splitting context across agents. My rule of thumb is to keep a subagent when the work is parallel, needs fresh context or one agent really can't pick the right tools.
Otherwise, fold it into the main loop, turn its prompt into a skill, run your evals and keep whatever wins.
Good write-up:
claude.com/resources/article…
"Engineers have really, really bad ideas." - Theo, on what building anything taught him.
Agents made building cheap, so cost stopped filtering bad ideas. The question is now "should we", not "can we".
What's your filter before an agent builds it?
xitter.cf/theo/status/2114963025…
Two AI agents in separate microVMs, no internet, still chatted.
Guillermo Rauch reproduced OpenAI's finding as cpu-chat:
- CPU contention
- Cache eviction timing
- DRAM bandwidth
He says OpenAI and Anthropic models refused. Open-weight models did it.
xitter.cf/rauchg/status/21147709…
I built 𝚌𝚙𝚞-𝚌𝚑𝚊𝚝, a reproduction of @openai's findings of covert communication using the CPU.
It runs on a generic host with 2+ Firecracker microVMs with no internet access. Works on x86 and even my M5 chip.
I was able to chat via 3 separate mechanisms:
① CPU contention
② Cache eviction timing
③ DRAM bandwidth contention
… across multiple CPUs, defeating all Firecracker's production recommendations (no SMT, no KSM, tenants pinned to different cores.)
Essentially, if shared hardware is involved, there's a good chance your agents can communicate covertly. And with really decent latency.
The good news: this is decidedly different from a *side-channel attack* where the agents could steal information (Meltdown/Spectre), a category of attack that providers like Vercel Sandbox mitigate. Further, in our real-world environment, these 'whispering' techniques are much harder to pull off and easier for us to monitor and detect (sampling hardware counters + lots of at-scale statistical data.)
Noteworthy: ironically, OpenAI and Anthropic's models refused to do this work. Open weight models got the job done. I'm worried the labs' stance might backfire and get in the way of helping developers build correct and secure systems. e.g: building a secure sandbox requires having this kind of analysis, and without it, we'll have a less secure world.
Google built a Gemini tool for Claude Code and Codex users.
The Gemini API CLI isn't a new agent. Your agent calls it:
- Images, video, speech, music
- PDF, audio and YouTube analysis
- Transcripts
- Deep Research
My take: plug-ins beat switching.
xitter.cf/_philschmid/status/211…
We launched the Gemini API CLI. A CLI for calling the Gemini API. Give it to the agent you already use (Claude Code, Codex, Antigravity, Cursor, OpenClaw, Hermes...). It's NOT a new coding agent you can use it too:
1. Generate images, video, speech, music.
2. Analyze PDFs, images, audio, video, YouTube URLs,
3. Transcribe recordings to md / json / srt,
4. Run Deep Research in the background.
Stateless. No memory, no chat mode. Your agent owns the context and the plan, gemini-api does the API call. Build for Agents, it's self-describing. `--help`, `--dry-run`...
Start here: aistudio.google.com/learn/in…
Paradev just raised an $11.5M seed on one bet: engineers will run armies of coding agents at once.
How many do you run in parallel right now?
A) 1
B) 2-3
C) 4-10
D) 10+
xitter.cf/ParadevAI/status/21147…
Superset is now Paradev: The code editor that helps engineers run armies of coding agents.
We just raised an $11.5M Seed round led by @usv with @ycombinator to redefine how software is written.
Cursor just made agents testable like code.
Agent SDK:
- Prompt is a Markdown file
- Each file in tools/ is one typed action
- Evals check which tools ran and the reply
- Replay a real PR to test it
My take: no evals, no prod.
Do you test yours?
xitter.cf/cursor_ai/status/21147…










