Filistin Büyükelçisi: ''Rumlar ile tarihi bağlarımız var. Özgürlük için ortak vizyona sahibiz...'' 📍Filistin'in güney Kıbrıs Büyükelçisi Abdullah Attari, (Rumların) Kıbrıs’ın Filistin halkıyla tarihi bağları olduğunu kaydetti, ''iki halk, özgürlük için ortak bir vizyon bağlarıyla birbirine bağlıdır'' dedi. Attari, ‘’Filistin Devlet Başkanı Mahmud Abbas’ın ay sonunda güney Kıbrıs’a resmi bir ziyaret yapacağını’’ açıkladı. Attari, ‘’Abbas'ın ziyareti, Filistin ve Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti arasındaki tarihi ilişkileri daha da güçlendirmek için önemli bir fırsattır. İki halk, dostluk, dayanışma ve adalet ve özgürlük için ortak bir vizyon bağlarıyla birbirine bağlıdır’’ dedi. Büyükelçi Attari, Kıbrıs sorununda da uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde bir çözümün olması gerektiğine işaret etti.

Το ότι δεν έχει ζητηθεί η άδεια από την Τουρκία για τις εργασίες που θα γίνουν σχετικά με τη διασύνδεση Ελλάδας Κύπρου τους έχει τρελάνει. Ουσιαστικά δεν αντιδρούν στο έργο αυτό που θέλουν είναι να δώσουν εκείνοι την άδεια.

"İSTİHBARAT SADECE GÜVENLİK DEĞİLDİR"E BİR ÖRNEK: GAMER 🖇️ İSTANBUL YAĞMURU ÖNCESİ ÖNLEYİCİ İSTİHBARAT NEDEN GEREKLİYDİ? İstihbarat kavramının kamuoyunda terörle mücadele, casusluk, askerî tehditler ve ulusal güvenlikle ilişkilendirilmesi, bu alanın gerçek kapsamını daraltıyor. Oysa istihbaratın temel işlevlerinden biri, karar vericilerin doğru karar almasını sağlayacak bilgiyi toplamak, birleştirmek, analiz etmek ve zamanında sunmaktır. Bu yaklaşım afet yönetimine doğrudan uygulanabilir. Elbette İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi yağmurların afetlere dönüşmemesi için daha teknik çalışmalar yapmakla görevli. İçişleri Bakanlığı bünyesindeki Güvenlik ve Acil Durumlar Koordinasyon Merkezi (GAMER) ise farklı kurum ve birimlerden gelen bilgilerin bir araya getirilmesi, değerlendirilmesi ve ilgili karar mercilerine aktarılması amacıyla oluşturulmuş bir yapı. Bu yönüyle bir istihbarat analizi teşkilatı olarak konumlanmış durumda. GAMER'in görev ve çalışma esaslarına ilişkin düzenlemeler de olay öncesi, olay sırası ve olay sonrasındaki süreçlerin bütünleşik biçimde planlanmasını, izlenmesini ve koordine edilmesini öngörüyor. Bir kriz meydana geldikten sonra ihbarları toplamak, ekipleri yönlendirmek, kurumlar arasındaki bilgi akışını sağlamak ve müdahale kapasitesini artırmak zaten zorunludur. Ancak bu faaliyetler, önceden alınabilecek tedbirlerin yerini asla tutmaz. Yağış öncesi Gamer, meteorolojik uyarılar, taşkın geçmişi, dere seviyeleri, altyapı kapasitesi ve hassas bölgeler birlikte analiz etmeli. Riskli alt geçitler ve yollar belirlemeli, tahliye ve ulaşım kısıtlaması seçenekleri hazırlanmalıydı. Elbette GAMER, belediyelerin veya altyapı işletmecilerinin teknik görevlerini devralmamalı. İşlevi, bu kurumların verilerini ortak bir risk tablosunda birleştirmek, yetkili karar mercilerinin gerekli önlemleri gecikmeden almasını kolaylaştırmak olmalı. İstihbarat Yalnızca Güvenlik Meselesi Değildir İstanbul'daki yağmur afeti, istihbarat kavramının kapsamını yeniden düşünmek için somut bir örnek sunuyor. Bir ülkenin istihbarat kapasitesi, toplumun hayatını doğrudan etkileyen riskleri önceden belirleme, karar alıcılara zamanında bilgi sunma ve kamu kaynaklarının doğru yerde kullanılmasını sağlama kapasitesi de bu tartışmanın parçasıdır. Bu yaklaşım, meteorolojik olayların da istihbarat teşkilatı tarafından yönetilmesi gerektiği anlamına gelmez. Meteoroloji tahmin yapar, teknik birimler altyapıyı değerlendirir, afet yönetimi kurumları müdahaleyi planlar. İstihbarat perspektifinin katkısı, bu farklı bilgileri birleştirerek henüz gerçekleşmemiş zararların nerede ve nasıl ortaya çıkabileceğini değerlendirmek ve önleyici kararları desteklemektir. @turanbulent

Suriye’de Kritik Operasyon: Mihraç Ural Olarak Bilinen Ali Kayalı Yakalandı Suriye resmi haber ajansı SANA, “Mihraç Ural” adıyla bilinen Ali Kayalı’nın, sınırdan kaçmaya çalıştığı sırada Suriye Genel İstihbarat Teşkilatı tarafından yakalandığını duyurdu. SANA’nın aktardığı bilgilere göre Kayalı, 2013 yılında Suriye’nin Banyas kentinde sivillere yönelik gerçekleştirilen ve çok sayıda kişinin hayatını kaybettiği katliamın başlıca şüphelileri arasında yer alıyor. Suriye istihbaratının düzenlediği operasyonla yakalandığı bildirilen Ali Kayalı’nın gözaltına alınması, ülkede Esad rejimi döneminde işlenen katliamların ve savaş suçlarının hesabının sorulması açısından önemli bir gelişme olarak değerlendiriliyor. #Suriye #MihraçUral #AliKayalı #BanyasKatliamı #Syria

📍Kıbrıslı Rum yazar Panayotis K. Mavros, ülkeyi yabancı askerlerin üssü haline çeviren Rum Başkan Nikos Christodoulides yönetimini ağır sözlerle eleştirdi ve “İsrail'e, Mısır'a güvenme! Türkiye bizi ıstakoza çevirir” dedi. İsrail’in ve Mısır’ın Rumlar için savaşacağına inanmanın hayal olduğuna dikkat çeken Mavros, “Türkiye’nin bir müdahalesi karşısında Rumların silah sistemlerini kullanmaya bile yetişemeyeceğini” vurguladı. Silahlanmayı Türkiye’ye karşı “caydırıcılık geliştirme” şeklinde savunulmasını “saçmalık” olarak değerlendiren Mavros, “Ne yazık ki Kıbrıs, Christodoulides’in boş böbürlenmeleri nedeniyle Orta Doğu’daki savaş alanının bir parçası hâline geldi” diye konuştu. 1 Ekim’deki askeri geçit törenini Christodoulides, Rum Savunma Bakanı Vasilis Palmas ve savaş yanlısı askeri erkanın ''böbürlenerek'' izlediğini anlatan Rum yazar, “Bu görüntü insanda tiksinti yaratıyor. Türkiye bizi toza çevirir” ifadesini kullandı.

The hijab restrictions in Azerbaijani schools and the relentless criticism of the Azerbaijan–Israel alliance by conservative Turks have triggered what can be considered the fourth major crisis in the broader relationship between Anatolian and Azerbaijani Turks since 1918. Once again, Azerbaijan is making it clear that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has no desire for "another big brother." To understand the current tensions, let us briefly revisit the previous crises. 1. The Ottoman Occupation of Tabriz in 1918 In the summer of 1918, before the Ottoman–Azerbaijani forces liberated Baku in September, the Ottoman Army entered Tabriz and occupied parts of Iranian Azerbaijan. Initially, segments of the local population, themselves predominantly ethnic Turks, welcomed the Ottoman troops. However, this enthusiasm quickly faded, and opposition to the Ottoman presence grew. The mistreatment of local people, the occupying authorities' conduct, and the imposition of an unfamiliar administrative culture contributed to growing resentment. The Ottoman system of governance was fundamentally different from the Iranian system, including its legal traditions, taxation practices, and administrative structures. Moreover, local political leaders who refused to cooperate with the Ottomans faced repression. The occupation demonstrated that shared ethnicity and language did not automatically translate into political loyalty or acceptance of foreign rule. The people of Iranian Azerbaijan might have been ethnically Turkish, but they had their own political traditions, social institutions, and historical experiences. They were not simply Anatolian Turks living on the other side of a border. 2. The First Karabakh War and Turkish Involvement in Azerbaijani Domestic Politics During the First Karabakh War, virtually the entire Turkish population in Turkey sympathized with Azerbaijan and supported its struggle. However, from the Azerbaijani perspective, practical assistance fell far short of expectations. In some of the most critical moments, the support that mattered most was barely above zero as of the perception of Azerbaijanis. One particularly bitter episode occurred during the Armenian offensive against Kalbajar in April 1993. Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey requested helicopters from Turkey to evacuate civilians trapped by the fighting. The Turkish government refused to provide them. Turkey supplied Azerbaijan with grain and other forms of economic and humanitarian assistance, but these measures could hardly compensate for the disappointment caused by its refusal to provide urgently needed evacuation helicopters. Of course, Turkey also helped Azerbaijan in important ways, including behind-the-scenes (non officially made) military assistance, training, diplomatic support and the protection of Nakhchivan. Ankara issued concrete warnings to Armenia and demonstrated its willingness to defend the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijani exclave. Some military assistance was also provided discreetly. Nevertheless, many Azerbaijanis felt deeply disappointed by what they perceived as Turkey's unwillingness to provide decisive support when Azerbaijan needed it most. Another major source of resentment was Turkish interference in Azerbaijan's domestic politics.Numerous reports implicated individuals and networks connected to Turkey in attempts to influence Azerbaijani governments, including allegations surrounding the failed 1995 coup against President Heydar Aliyev. Although the involvement of the Turkish state as a whole remains very much disputed, the reported participation of Turkish political, security, and some figures created considerable anger among Azerbaijan's political elites. For a newly independent country emerging from decades of Soviet domination, the prospect of another external power interfering in its political affairs was hardly welcome, even when that power called itself a brother. 3. The Turkish–Armenian Rapprochement The third major crisis emerged during Abdullah Gül's presidency, particularly with the Turkish–Armenian rapprochement of 2008–2009. Ankara pursued normalization with Yerevan without securing Azerbaijan's approval or adequately addressing its concerns regarding the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. The process culminated in the signing of the Zurich Protocols in October 2009. Azerbaijan was not merely ignored. Its objections were repeatedly overshadowed by Ankara's diplomatic priorities, and the normalization initiative generated fierce criticism and disappointment in Baku. The process ultimately failed to deliver normalization, but the damage to mutual confidence was already done. Once again, Azerbaijan was reminded that Turkey's definition of brotherhood did not necessarily include treating Azerbaijan as an equal partner whose interests and security concerns deserved equal consideration. 4. The Current Crisis: Azerbaijan, Israel, and the Limits of Turkish Brotherhood The current controversy surrounding Azerbaijan's relations with Israel is the most visible source of tension. However, the underlying problem goes much deeper than Israel, Gaza, or the hijab restrictions in Azerbaijani schools. It concerns long-standing prejudices, unequal perceptions, cultural arrogance, and the persistent tendency of many Turks to regard Azerbaijan as a subordinate country rather than an equal. First, many Turks still perceive Azerbaijan as a backward post-Soviet state. Even today, Azerbaijan is frequently imagined as a poor, rural country that somehow remains decades behind Turkey. Among conservative Turks, additional prejudices are particularly visible. Some believe that Azerbaijanis lost their religious beliefs under Soviet rule and have made little effort to recover them. Others dismiss Azerbaijanis because of their predominantly Shiite background, assuming that they cannot properly understand religiously sensitive issues such as Gaza. These attitudes reflect a widespread inability to understand that Azerbaijani society has followed a fundamentally different historical, political, and cultural trajectory. Second, the behavior of Turkish visitors has contributed considerably to resentment. Since Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991, many Turkish citizens arriving in the country have been students and businessmen. Unfortunately, far too many have behaved with extraordinary arrogance. Some Turkish businessmen have become notorious for violating agreements, breaking promises, and cheating their Azerbaijani counterparts. Likewise, many Turkish students have looked down on local people, constantly lecturing them about how backward Azerbaijan supposedly is and comparing the country to "Turkey in the 1980s." (And now they talk about "how Turkey liberated Karabagh (!)" and ask for discounts for that, something that I personally witnessed many times in Northern Cyprus by Turkish citizens). The Azerbaijani language has also frequently been subjected to ridicule. Certainly, some Azerbaijani words sound amusing to speakers of Turkish in Turkey, particularly when identical or similar words carry completely different meanings. These linguistic differences can genuinely be funny. However, there is a fundamental difference between enjoying linguistic humor and humiliating another people's language. The problem becomes even more disturbing when cultural arrogance extends into personal relationships. Many Turkish men have visited Azerbaijan specifically looking for brides, behaving as though they could simply enter a market, inspect the available options, and select a wife as casually as buying fruit. Such attitudes are not merely offensive. They reinforce the perception that some Turks regard Azerbaijanis as socially inferior people rather than equals. Third, Turkey frequently behaves like a big brother who believes he has the right to boss Azerbaijan around. Instead of treating Azerbaijan as a twin or an equal brother, many Turks approach it as a younger, smaller sibling who needs constant advice, correction, and supervision. This paternalistic mentality extends directly into politics. Azerbaijan's victory in the Second Karabakh War is a particularly revealing example. Many Azerbaijanis are deeply disturbed by Turkish citizens who claim that Azerbaijan won the war only because of Turkish drones. There is no doubt that Turkish military assistance, training, and defense technology contributed significantly to Azerbaijan's victory and it was really big, made mostly not for a mutual benefit but due to brotherhood and fraternity, nothing expected in return. However, reducing Azerbaijan's success to Turkish drones effectively hijacks that victory and diminishes the sacrifices, capabilities, planning, and achievements of the Azerbaijani armed forces. It transforms cooperation between allies into a narrative in which one supposedly helpless nation owes its success entirely to its more capable big brother. This is precisely the mentality that many Azerbaijanis reject. Fourth, many Turkish citizens fundamentally misunderstand the nature and strategic necessity of Azerbaijan's relations with Israel. Once again, this misunderstanding originates from the assumption that Azerbaijan is a smaller brother whose foreign policy should follow Turkey's ideological, religious, and geopolitical priorities. Azerbaijani society is predominantly ethnic Turkish, and the search for a distinct ethnic identity within the broader Turkic world, particularly prominent in the early 1990s, is no longer a fundamental source of uncertainty. There is no serious doubt about the importance of Turkic identity in contemporary Azerbaijan. However, Azerbaijan's Soviet experience, the secular character of much of its society, and religion's comparatively limited influence on everyday social and political life have produced a foreign-policy outlook that differs significantly from that of Turkey. Azerbaijan does not build its foreign relations primarily around religious solidarity. It operates largely according to realist calculations of national interests, security threats, strategic partnerships, and geopolitical necessities. Its relations with Israel are not simply a matter of ideological preference or indifference toward Gaza. They involve military cooperation, defense technology, intelligence, energy security, and the regional balance of power, particularly in relation to Iran. These strategic considerations cannot be understood by reducing Azerbaijan to a Muslim country that should automatically adopt the political position preferred by conservative Turks. Moreover, Azerbaijan faces different security threats, different geopolitical constraints, and different strategic vulnerabilities. Its domestic political decisions and foreign-policy priorities are shaped by circumstances that are not identical to those confronting Turkey. The Azerbaijani leadership therefore makes decisions based on its own threat perceptions, strategic calculations, and national interests, not on what Turkish society or political groups believe Azerbaijan should do. This distinction is crucial. Ethnic brotherhood does not mean identical national interests. Shared ancestry does not create political subordination. And religious differences do not invalidate national sovereignty. Turkey remains, and will continue to remain, a brotherly country for Azerbaijan. The historical, linguistic, cultural, and strategic foundations of the relationship are too strong to disappear because of disagreements over Israel, religion, or domestic political decisions. However, brotherhood cannot become an excuse for arrogance, interference, humiliation, or the denial of Azerbaijan's political agency. Azerbaijan is no longer an impoverished post-Soviet republic desperately searching for protection and international recognition. It has developed substantial economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities and is increasingly asserting itself as a regional middle power. Turkey needs to recognize this transformation. As long as Turkey continues to approach Azerbaijan as a younger brother who must obey, rather than an equal brother whose sovereignty, capabilities, and independent strategic interests deserve respect, the relationship will never reach its full potential.Azerbaijan does not need another big brother. It needs a brother who understands what equality means.