Today I’m launching the Center for Technology & Statecraft (CTS), an initiative inspired by the lessons I learned first as a policy researcher and later in the White House. I'm an optimist about technology. Institutions adapt to disruptions — whether the industrial revolution, computing, the internet — through competition, self-correction, and iteration, and we mostly figure it out in the long run. But we've never had to adapt to a technology that is both this transformative and developing this fast. AI capabilities continue to scale rapidly with no sign of slowing, and it's a full-time job just to keep up with model releases. I worry policy will stay reactive right up until we face immense disruptions — including basic challenges to human agency and relevance in a world of powerful AI. Even still, I believe policy can steer this transition, but only with foresight and the right information. CTS aims to provide just that. Our two initial policy focus areas: 1) How policy can shape virtual and physical automation over the next decade as we reimagine the social contract in light of advanced AI. 2) How to manage long-term strategic US-China AI competition while ensuring stability. These focus areas will build on a deep model of the AI value chain, from chipmaking tools, to the compute, algorithms, and data that make AI, to the tokens, agents and robots that affect the world. For more on our worldview and research philosophy, read techstatecraft.org/launch. I’ve seen firsthand how technical, forward-looking research can inform policy if it’s ready for the policy window. After a decade as an IP and tech lawyer, I joined a think tank, CSET, in 2019 to study AI chips, their supply chains, and AI policy. This was three years before ChatGPT, so these weren't seen as urgent topics at the time. Soon after, AI quickly became an increasingly salient policy issue. From 2021–2025 I served in the White House NSC and the Commerce Department and put new policy ideas into practice (alongside many brilliant colleagues). One goal of CTS is to scale this kind of experience to a whole team: @KonstantinPilz @nchlsbrwn @amelia__michael @mary_clare_m already bring a wealth of technical and policy expertise and we’ll continue to grow to tackle an ambitious research agenda. We're thrilled to be supported by and affiliated with @IFP, and grateful to the advisors and colleagues who helped get CTS off the ground, including @ohlennart, @fiiiiiist, @AlecStapp, and @calebwatney. Our first major reports will launch soon. You can follow us at @techstatecraft.

While AI chip exports get more attention, whether China can continue to import ASML’s DUV immersion (DUVi) lithography machines will be the decisive factor in US-China AI competition over the next decade. @techstatecraft has published a 30,000-word report that models how continued DUVi exports may let Huawei and other Chinese chipmakers scale AI chip production to compete with leading US AI chipmakers like NVIDIA. Our core findings: (1) 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝘀 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝗺𝗮𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗲𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗲 𝗔𝗜 𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗽𝘀, 𝗯𝘂𝘁 𝗶𝘀 𝘂𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗸𝗲𝗹𝘆 𝘁𝗼 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗰𝗶𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘇𝗲 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗼𝘄𝗻 𝗮𝘁 𝘀𝗰𝗮𝗹𝗲 𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗹 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗺𝗶𝗱-2030𝘀. This gives the United States and its allies, the sole producers, extraordinary leverage over China’s AI ambitions. (2) 𝗬𝗲𝘁 𝘁𝗼𝗱𝗮𝘆 𝗔𝗺𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗰𝗮 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗶𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗴𝗶𝘃𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗮𝘄𝗮𝘆 𝘁𝗵𝗮𝘁 𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗴𝗲 𝗯𝘆 𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗺𝗶𝘁𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝘁𝗼 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝘀𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝗽𝗮𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗼𝗳 𝗺𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗛𝘂𝗮𝘄𝗲𝗶'𝘀 𝗔𝗜 𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗽𝘀. China has aggressively capitalized on this opening, amassing a large, growing stockpile of these systems as of 2026. If Chinese DUVi imports continue, China could accumulate enough lithography capacity over the next five to ten years to narrow or even erase the currently sizable US-allied advantage in AI chipmaking. (3) 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗨𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗲𝗱 𝗦𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 𝗰𝗮𝗻 𝗽𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗵𝗶𝘀 𝗼𝘂𝘁𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗲 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗮 𝘀𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲: 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗰𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁, 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝗶𝗮𝗹 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝘀 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗮 𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮-𝘄𝗶𝗱𝗲 𝗯𝗮𝗻 𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗹𝗹 𝗗𝗨𝗩𝗶 𝗲𝘅𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀, 𝘄𝗶𝘁𝗵 𝗰𝗼𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗰𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝘀 𝗼𝗻 𝘀𝗽𝗮𝗿𝗲 𝗽𝗮𝗿𝘁𝘀 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗻𝗴. This action would secure the US advanced AI chip production advantage (see Figure)—and resulting AI capability advantage—for at least a decade and ensure that the next wave of advanced fabs is built in the United States and its allied countries, not China. The MATCH Act, now before Congress, would establish China-wide controls on DUVi exports. Passing MATCH is arguably the single strongest step the US government can take to ensure a long-term AI advantage over China. We also develop analysis on: - China's lithography indigenization trajectory - The regulatory structure of US, Dutch, and Japanese export controls on SME - China's DUVi imports and installed base - Yields and throughputs obtainable with China’s installed DUVi systems - US and Chinese AI chip production under a range of scenarios See the full report at techstatecraft.org/duv/.