galiba yazmak sart oldu.rt lenenler ilgimi ceken yazilardir. icerikleriyle mutlaka hemfikir olmam gerekmiyor. bunun anlasilmasi neden zor onu da anlamis degilim

Joined December 2013
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“Öte yandan kendimize sormamız gereken soru ise, AB son 1 yılda, son 10 yılda imzalamadığı kadar anlaşmayı başka kıtalardaki 3. ülkelerle imzalarken, Türkiye gibi yanı başındaki bir ülkeyle ekonomik anlamda kazan kazan üzerine kurulu ilişkisini neden gözden çıkarabiliyor? Uluslararası Enerji Ajansı Başkanı Fatih Birol’un enerji konusunda bir tespiti aklımdan çıkmıyor: “Aktörler artık ucuz olanı değil, güvenilir olanı arıyor.””
🔴 Bu da oldu: Türkiye, Avrupa’ya “Hukuka uy” diyor 📌 Türkiye “Made in Europe” konusunda Avrupa’ya “kurallara, hukuka, anlaşmalara uyma, sadık kalma” hatırlatması yapıyor. İktidarın içeride hukuka bakışı nedeniyle bu mesaj pek ciddiye alınmıyor olsa gerek. Ticaret Bakanı Ömer Bolat’ın Brüksel temaslarından 2 gün sonra Almanya ve Fransa, Türkiye’nin AB’nin otomotiv sektöründen dışlanmasına neden olacak bir anlaşma üzerinde uzlaştı. AB’nin korumacılığı otomotiv sektörüyle sınırlı kalmayacak. "Geliyorum" diyen bu devasa sorun için iktidarın çoktan her düzeyde seferberlik başlatması gerekirdi... ✍️ Barçın Yinanç'ın yazısı... 🔗 t24.com.tr/yazarlar/barcin-y… ➡️ apps.apple.com/tr/app/t24/id… ➡️ play.google.com/store/apps/d…
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Bugün tek bir yazı okumaya vaktiniz varsa; bu yazıyı okuyun👇
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Made in Europe kapsamının içinde olmak Türkiye bakımından niye o kadar önemli ? Ocak 1980'den bu yana uygulanan büyüme modelimizi niye tehdit ediyor ? Anlatmaya çalıştım @guzemyilmaz @cnbceofficial
#MadeInEurope konusunda #Türkiye'nin içinde bulunduğu hassas vaziyeti @sinanulgen1 'den daha iyi kim anlatabilir bilemiyorum. Dört dakikanızı ayırıp izleyin. #AB'yi dış ticaretimizde ikame imkanımız yok. Aksine iddialar retorikten ibaret. #Çin'in ağuşuna koşmak felaketimiz olur.
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Made in Europe ile ilgili Macron-Werz uzlaşması otomotivde Türkiye'yi dışlanan ülkeler kategorisine alıyor. AB üyesi olmayan ülkelerden bir tek İngiltere kapsama dahil ediliyor. Japonya ve G. Kore de bizim gibi gol yemiş. Ama onların Gümrük Birliği yok AB ile.
Otomotivde dıșlandık. Sadece ihracat icin degil, yatirim icin de kotu haber. Diger sektorlerde -cimento, demir celik, kimyasallar- ayni tehlike mevcut.
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Ben Affleck’ten doğru bir gözlem: ABD Özel Kuvvetler mensupları, ekseriyetle film ve dizilerde betimlenen profilde bireyler değiller. Tabi, her kuvvet komutanlığının özel kuvvetler kültürü farklı. Kara Kuvvetleri özel harekat (misal, Delta, yeşil bereliler) genelde aynen Affleck’in anlattığı gibi. Deniz Kuvvetleri (misal, SEAL takımları) da benzer, hatta daha da “rahat & şakacı” olurlar. Hava Kuvvetleri biraz daha ciddi, ama mevzuları farklı. Film ve dizi prototipine en çok uyan özel kuvvetler ise Deniz Piyadeleri’nde. Film-dizilerde pek isimlerini de duymayız aslında (bir istisna: Punisher, Frank Castle). ~10 sene evvel Camp Lejeune’da Raider Regiment’a brifing vermişliğim var. Film ve dizilerde gördüğümüz ~2 metre boyunda ve sıfır mimikli özel kuvvet bireylerini ancak orada bir arada gördüm. Kısaca: Mevzuya biraz aşınayım diyelim. Lakin, mevzu benimle ilgili değil. ABD Birleşik Özel Kuvvetler Komutanlığı (JSOC), yaklaşık 20 sene boyunca ABD askeri-diplomatik tercihlerinin odak noktasıydı, 11 Eylül sonrası. Bir açıdan bakarsak, aşındılar. Diğer bir açıdan bakarsak yerel jeopolitikaların da ana aktörlerinden oldular (Türkiye için en önemli vaka analizi: YPG Sevdası). Demem o ki: ABD’nin 2001-2020 esnasındaki “terörle küresel mücadele” (GWOT) askeri-diplomatik yaklaşımını ABD Özel Kuvvetleri’ne atanan rolü anlamadan pek de anlayamayız. Umarım mevzuyu çalışan genç akademisyenler vardır, çünkü çıkarılacak sayısız olumlu ve olumsuz ders var. Diye düşünüyorum da değil. Mevzu bu.
Ben Affleck says meeting Delta operators taught him the most elite fighters are not the biggest or toughest guys but the relaxed ones who don't get tight and can problem solve in a crisis "There's been less than 900 guys ever in the history of Delta. You meet them and they're not the biggest guys, they're not the toughest guys, they're not trying to fucking be hard, and, you know, they're the most relaxed, at ease." "I found myself just being like, finally I was like, what can I just ask, what do you think makes somebody like qualify for the Delta Force? Like, what's a good Delta operator? It's like, 'You know, problem solving.' Problem solving? The guy goes, 'Yeah, it's probably like your job.'" "I was like, 'No, let me tell you something. No, it isn't. It's really not like my job. I appreciate it. Very big fucking difference.' He's like, 'Yeah, you solve problems.' Again, no one's trying to kill me." "See, that's the thing. But that was the closest insight I got to it, which was, I've always kind of thought this about like a guy's like, like Brady or something. There's guys that just don't get tight, and that they are kind of able to problem solve when the problem is like, well, that helicopter's crashed and we're 200 miles inside Afghanistan and we're outnumbered fucking six to one. How do you think we should get home?"
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Son günlerde Türkiye-Azerbaycan ilişkilerinde gözlenen pürüzler karşısında Güney Kafkasya’nın dört önemli aktörünün bölgenin kalıcı barış, huzur ve istikrarı için oynamaları gerekli rollere dair gözlem ve önerilerimi Ankara Politikalar Merkezi (APM) için yazdım. 👇
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I am a member of the Norwegian Nobel Committee. There are five of us. Five people, appointed by a parliament most of the planet could not find on a map, who decide, once a year, which human being the world has agreed to call good. I know. I know. I think about it on the tram. We meet in a building on Henrik Ibsens gate, a street named after a man who wrote almost exclusively about people discovering they are frauds, which nobody on the committee finds funny except me. There is a room with a long table and the portraits of the dead laureates looking down, Mandela, the Dalai Lama, a great many earnest men in spectacles, and one portrait we do not discuss, which is Kissinger, 1973, awarded while the bombs were still falling, after which two of our predecessors resigned and the satirist Tom Lehrer said political satire was now obsolete. We keep him on the wall. A reminder. Every family has the uncle. It is October in Oslo, which means the sun gives up around four in the afternoon like a civil servant, and it rains the particular Norwegian rain that isn’t quite falling, just hanging there, judging you. I arrive with wet shoes. I always arrive with wet shoes. There is coffee, because this is Norway and there is always coffee, we drink more of it per person than almost anyone alive, and someone’s wife has sent kanelboller, the cinnamon buns, and we sit, five Norwegians, damp, caffeinated, sugared, and we decide the moral standing of the entire species. Let me tell you how it actually works, because the world imagines a cathedral and it is, I promise you, a book club with a mandate. 287 nominations this year. 208 people, 79 organizations. Anyone can nominate, that’s the secret nobody understands: a professor, a parliamentarian, a former laureate, so the “nominee” list is meaningless, it’s a suggestion box, and every autumn some congressman nominates his own golden retriever and the press writes “SHORTLISTED.” Nobody is shortlisted. There is no short list the public ever sees. There is us, and the coffee, and the rain, and the portraits, and a Norwegian stubbornness that is older than the prize itself. We read reports. The institute’s advisers write them, thick dull documents, and we argue. Our chairman told the BBC once that in the final meeting “there is a high temperature.” High temperature, for a Norwegian, means someone slightly raised an eyebrow and then apologized for it. We don’t do high temperature. We do a long silence, and then Kristin says “well,” and everyone knows exactly what “well” meant, and it’s settled. That’s our shouting. “Well.” You’d have to be raised here to hear the violence in it. Now. This year. I will not say the name, because we never say the name, but you know the name. A certain head of state wanted this prize the way a child wants a thing in a shop window, which is to say loudly, and in public, and with the full belief that wanting it was itself the argument. He said he deserved it. He said he’d ended eight wars, a number that grew most times he said it, like a fish. He had other heads of state phone us. Israel’s prime minister posted it on the internet, “Give him the Nobel.” The leaders of Cambodia and Pakistan announced they’d nominated him, as though announcing it were part of it, as though we tally mentions. A man flew around the globe collecting endorsements for a Norwegian committee the way you’d collect signatures for a petition to the council about a noisy dog. And here, uff da, is the detail I treasure, the one that makes me smile into my coffee. The nomination deadline is the 31st of January. He took office on the 20th. So for all the phone calls, all the posts, all the gilded lobbying, the only nominations that could possibly count for this year’s prize were filed in the first eleven days of his term, before he had, by his own arithmetic, ended a single one of the eight wars. He campaigned all year for a prize whose window had shut while he was still hanging up his coat. We didn’t have to reject him. The calendar did. We just watched. Norwegians are very good at watching. We have long winters. People think we sit there weighing his deeds. We don’t. That’s the thing I can’t make the world understand. We’re not grading his homework. We don’t owe anyone the prize for a ceasefire, however real, however loud the announcement. “He made peace” is not a sentence that ends in a medal, the way he believes it does, the way he believes every good thing ends in his name on it. The will of a dead Swede says the prize goes to whoever did the most for fraternity between nations. A dead Swede, I should add, who made his entire fortune inventing dynamite and selling arms, and spent his last years horrified at his own obituary, which called him a merchant of death, and so bought his way to immortality as a man of peace. The whole prize is one guilty arms dealer’s attempt to launder his name. We are, all of us, administering a dead man’s public relations. I find this clarifying. It keeps me humble. It should keep everyone humble, and it keeps, by my count, no one humble at all. So who did we give it to? An eighty-five-year-old woman. A judge. Born in Durban, under apartheid, granddaughter of a Tamil man who came to South Africa as indentured labor, a bus driver’s daughter from the poor Indian quarter, who became the first non-white woman to run a law practice in her province, who defended Mandela’s people when defending them was dangerous, who sat on the Rwanda tribunal and the court at the Hague, and who, at eighty-five, is right now a judge weighing whether a genocide is a genocide. When we told the world, our chairman said the rule of law “underpins the system we have set up to ensure peace,” and that “peace requires justice.” She wasn’t even in Oslo. She was in Nuremberg. In courtroom 600. The actual room where they tried the Nazis. You cannot stage that. God staged that, and God, it turns out, is a better satirist than any of us. She did not phone us. She did not post. No prime minister demanded it for her on the internet. She had, as far as our deliberations are concerned, the one qualification the loud man could never manufacture, which is that she wanted the work and not the medal. The medal finds those people. It flees the ones who chase it. This is not a rule we wrote. It’s just the only pattern the hundred-odd years of our mistakes has ever shown. The reaction from across the ocean was immediate. His spokesman posted that we “place politics over peace.” Ja. Perhaps. We’re five damp pensioners in a rainy city; of course it’s political, it was always political, it was political when we gave it to a sitting American president nine months into his first term for the promise of things he had not yet done, and we have been quietly embarrassed about that one for fifteen years, so believe me, we had a particular reason this year to prefer a woman with fifty years of verdicts behind her over a man with eight wars in front of him and a deadline already behind him. Here is what he will never understand, the thing I’d tell him on the tram if he ever took one. We are the one prize he cannot buy, cannot post his way to, cannot have a friendly dictator phone in for him. Not because we’re incorruptible, nei, we’re as vain and wrong and human as the portraits on our wall. But because the entire point of the thing, the only power a small cold country’s book club has ever held, is that it goes to the person not performing the wanting. The moment you demand it, you’ve proven you don’t understand what it’s for, and proving that is itself the disqualification. He ran the most expensive campaign in the history of the prize and the campaign was the reason. He was never losing to Navi Pillay. He was losing to the concept. It’s dark now. Four o’clock dark. The buns are gone. Kristin said “well” an hour ago and we all went home. I’m on the tram with my wet shoes, and somewhere across the water a very powerful man is explaining to a camera that the prize is rigged, that we’re corrupt, that he’ll win it next year, and he genuinely might, we’re only five idiots and we’ve been wrong before, Kissinger is still on the wall. But not this year. This year an old woman in Nuremberg, in the room where the law once stared down the exact kind of man who thinks wanting a thing loudly enough should make it his, got a phone call she didn’t ask for. That’s the job. We don’t reward the man who ends the war and announces it. We reward the woman who spent fifty years deciding what a war was. He’ll never see the difference. That’s rather the whole point of him. Takk for i dag. I have to change trams.
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ab üç cepheden saldırı altında. abd, rusya ve çin farklı yönlerden uzun zaman sürmüş bir rehavetin kırılganlaştırdığı ab’yi sarstı. ab ne yapacak? çıkışı nerede? türkiye nelere dikkat etmeli. youtu.be/Qflkst3ecEo
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Netanyahu supporters seem to be taking advantage of @Brett_McGurk’s book and interviews to claim vindication for Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza. But while Brett’s front-row account is valuable, that doesn’t mean it is definitive or its perspectives widely shared—including among former members of the Biden administration. I would say most of my former colleagues think that President Biden should have put more pressure on Israel to conduct the war differently and end it sooner, and few think that the biggest mistake Biden made was to show daylight with Israel. And even Brett’s account makes clear that hostages were not the top priority for Netanyahu and that when U.S. pressure actually was applied—as after the World Central Kitchen strike—it worked. Brett tells the story of the Biden phone call after that tragedy, but not the story of how Biden called Netanyahu on July 4, 2024 to press him to conclude the hostage deal after Hamas had finally accepted the basic framework, dropping its demand that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released. Netanyahu instead added so many of his own conditions—against the advice of his own security chiefs—that the deal became impossible for another six months, during which nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed and more Israeli hostages died, including the six that Hamas executed in August. The Israeli changes included a demand that Israel retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt, which the IDF had seized only after the original proposal, and a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans who were returning home to the north which would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. Both of those new conditions were dropped in the deal ultimately concluded in January 2025. Nothing in the book or elsewhere changes the reality that October 7 happened on Netanyahu’s watch; that he prioritized “total victory” and the maintenance of his coalition over a hostage deal or an end of the war; that his conduct of the war and management of its humanitarian consequences catastrophic; that it has left Israel more isolated and insecure; and that it has deeply damaged, perhaps irreparably, Israel’s relationship with the United States—which should have done more to change Israel’s conduct rather than enable it. There was never an easy way forward in Gaza, but no version of the story vindicates Netanyahu.
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ab üç cepheden saldırı altında. abd, rusya ve çin farklı yönlerden uzun zaman sürmüş bir rehavetin kırılganlaştırdığı ab’yi sarstı. ab ne yapacak? çıkışı nerede? türkiye nelere dikkat etmeli. youtu.be/Qflkst3ecEo
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