WhatsApp deserves criticism, but claims like this do not contribute positively to the privacy and security ecosystem. The language around what makes a messaging app private has been oversimplified, and people have come to equate end-to-end encryption as a discrete feature with the security / privacy of the overall system(s) in which it is used. WhatsApp happily borrows on Signal's reputation, waving away criticisms through mere mention of the Signal Protocol. However, this deliberately misrepresents people's feelings towards the platform. People feel they do not (or cannot) trust WhatsApp because it is owned by a mega-corporation whose incentives are at odds with its own users. As a result, it chronically under-protects metadata, which largely undermines its use of e2ee. To have a meaningful conversation about private and secure communication now and in the future, we cannot teach the belief that e2ee is enough on its own. E2ee is table stakes, not the gold standard. Vagueposting about 'holes in WhatsApp's encryption' reinforces the myth that security begins and ends with e2ee; it also FUDs end-to-end encryption in general. The belief that encryption cannot be trusted; or that end-to-end encryption alone is synonymous with complete security and privacy, creates extremely favorable conditions for non-private, non-secure communication tools to flourish. With that in mind, undermining trust in encryption does seem a likely strategy for a platform which doesn't utilize e2ee by default. However, who does this narrative really serve? The surveillance apparatus that feasts on the hoard of metadata created by services that are non-private and centralized.