Yesterday, Martin Sellner joined John Laughland on Forum & Friends to discuss the Institute for Remigration, Denmark’s anti-ghetto policies and how remigration can work in practice.

In Sweden’s 2026 election, districts with large migrant populations had both more eligible voters and higher turnout than four years earlier. Across 387 directly comparable districts where at least 60% of residents have a foreign background, the number of eligible voters increased by 29,101 - or 6.6% - between 2022 and 2026. Ballots cast rose even faster, by 37,850 or 14.1%, while turnout increased by 4.3 percentage points. In districts with less than 10% foreign background, turnout moved in the opposite direction, falling by 1.9 points. Sweden’s migrant-heavy electorate is not only expanding; it is becoming more mobilised. In a closely divided country, this asymmetry gives the ethnic vote growing national weight.

Vielen Dank an die taz für die Erwähnung unseres Policy-Papers „Sachsen-Anhalt als Remigrationsmusterland“. Wir freuen uns, dass unsere Arbeit auch außerhalb der üblichen Leserschaft auf Interesse stößt.

Sweden’s 2026 election reveals a widening political divide between low-migration and migrant-heavy electoral districts. Across 5,003 directly comparable districts, the leftist bloc consisting of V-S-MP lost 2.8 percentage points where fewer than 10% of residents have a foreign background. In districts above the 60% threshold, the left instead recorded a minimum net gain of 8.3 points. This comparison already adds Nyans’s entire 2022 vote to the left-wing baseline. Even under that conservative assumption, the gains reach 9.0 points at the 80% threshold and 7.1 points at 90%. Low-migration and migrant-heavy Sweden are moving in opposite political directions. The ethnic vote is becoming an increasingly decisive fault line in Swedish politics.

Sweden’s 2026 election reveals a striking demographic divide. Across 6,282 electoral districts, support for the leftist bloc consisting of V-S-MP rises steadily with the local share of residents with a foreign background: from 34.7% in districts below 10% to 79.3% where that share reaches at least 80%. Over the same range, support for the migration-critical Sweden Democrats falls from 20.6% to 8.1%. The ethnic vote is therefore not confined to a few well-known migrant enclaves. It is visible across Sweden’s electoral geography - and, in a knife-edge election, may already be helping to determine who can govern.

The 2026 ÖIF integration survey shows a clearly perceived social segregation: 84 % see districts in which immigrants largely live among themselves and integration hardly takes place. 🔽